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INTRODUCTION
When measured by dollar amount, the 1980s saw the larg-
est wave of corporate acquisitions in our economic history.1
The rise in takeover activity, the rapid evolution of offensive
and defensive tactics, and the resulting barrage of litigation
have strained the ability of courts and legislatures to respond
effectively - decisionmakers often must feel as though they
are again law students faced with a professor who relentlessly
keeps changing the hypothetical to undermine the previous an-
swer. An especially problematic example of this phenomenon
is the role of performance promises, cancellation fees, and lock-
ups in negotiated corporate acquisitions.
Performance promises, cancellation fees, and lock-ups de-
veloped as a response to the substantial risk that the parties en-
1. CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER
PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
99TH CONG., 2D SESS., CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE ECONOMY AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (Comm. Print 99-QQ 1986).
Most studies have found that the number of transactions identifiable as negoti-
ated acquisitions significantly exceed those identifiable as hostile. See, e.g., id.
at 28; Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 117, 120 (1986) (observing that a
Robert Comment and Gregg Jarrell study demonstrated a high frequency of
negotiated tender offers). But cf SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, TENDER OFFER DISCLOSURE AND FAIRNESS ACT OF 1987, S.
REP. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1987) (contested tender offers repre-
sented only 2.8% of the number of transactions studied, but accounted for
44.4% of their value). Among negotiated acquisitions, the merger probably re-
mains the dominant acquisition technique. See Knoeber, Golden Parachutes,
Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 155, 155 n.1
(1986) (noting that mergers are a more predominate acquisition type, while
tender offers reached an apparent high of 15% of all acquisitions in 1977 and
had fallen to 4% by 1982).
Because it is often difficult to distinguish between purely friendly transac-
tions and purely hostile transactions, this Article uses the following generic
terms with some caution and mainly for convenience: "negotiated acquisition"
shall refer to all changes in corporate control in which the target's board of
directors determines (either initially or ultimately) not to resist the proposed
acquisition; "merger" shall refer to all forms of negotiated acquisitions; and




tering a negotiated merger agreement will not consummate the
merger.2 This risk is inherent in the negotiated acquisition pro-
cess. A two to four month delay typically transpires between
the signing of the merger agreement and the closing,3 which
provides ample opportunity for intervening events to hinder
the merger. Changes in the business environment occasionally
may lead the target board to renege. Competition is an even
greater risk.4 Another party may approach the target board
2. In a negotiated Single Bidder acquisition, the type of transaction with
which this Article is principally concerned, the target corporation negotiates
with only one prospective acquirer at a time. If the parties agree to basic
terms, preliminary discussions typically conclude with the signing of a letter of
intent addressed to the target. J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 59-65
(1975); Molod, Forms and Paperwork, in THE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
HANDBOOK 261, 261-63 (M. Rock ed. 1987). Negotiations usually continue after
the agreement in principle is reached, and now center on preparation of a for-
mal merger agreement. See generally J. FREUND, supra, at 53-389 (discussing
in detail the negotiation process); Freund, Merger Negotiations, in THE
MERGER AND ACQUISITIONs HANDBOOK, supra, 193, 193-200 [hereinafter
Freund, Merger Negotiations] (discussing negotiation issues). Once a definitive
agreement is in hand, the parties obtain requisite shareholder and regulatory
approvals and, assuming the necessary approvals are forthcoming, proceed to
closing. See generally J. FREUND, supra, at 419-48 (discussing closing issues).
Exclusive merger agreements are also comnion in Multiple Bidder trans-
actions, in which at least two acquisition proposals are pending when the tar-
get agrees to be acquired by one of the competing bidders. A Multiple Bidder
contest is typically triggered by the mere announcement of the initial unsolic-
ited bid from a prospective acquirer, which leads other, unsolicited offerors
(gray knights) to enter the bidding. Alternatively, the target may affirma-
tively invite a more friendly bidder (a white knight) to enter the contest.
3. This delay period is necessitated by, among other things, the need to
obtain shareholder, and perhaps also regulatory, approval, prepare and file a
detailed proxy statement, register and list any securities to be issued in con-
nection with the acquisition, and take other necessary steps. Although the de-
lay between signing the merger agreement and closing the transaction can be
reduced by efficient execution of those steps, it cannot be eliminated in light
of various statutory time limits. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (1990) (proxy
statement may not be mailed until at least 10 days after the preliminary state-
ment is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)); DEL.
CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 251(c) (1988) (requiring at least 20 days notice before
shareholder meeting may be held). See generally Hart & Brodwin, Merger
Agreements in Takeover Contests, 17 REV. SEC. REG. 779, 779 (1984) (noting
that effecting a merger of publicly held companies "is usually a costly, com-
plex, and time-consuming process"); Note, Target Directors' Fiduciary Duty
Overrides Contractual Duty in Merger Contracts, 12 J. CORP. L. 735, 737 (1987)
[hereinafter Note, Merger Contracts] (observing that merger negotiation may
take "weeks or even months," and that "final shareholder approval takes at
least three to four months from the time the merger proposal is first
announced").
4. See, e.g., Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Gov-
ernance, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1671, 1712 (1985); Freund, Merger Negotiations,
supra note 2, at 196; Hart & Brodwin, supra note 3, at 779; Herzel, Colling &
1990]
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with an alternative, presumably higher-priced, acquisition pro-
posal; indeed, target management might initiate negotiations
with a second party before presenting the initial bid to the
shareholders. Alternatively, a competing bidder may directly
present its proposal to target shareholders by making a tender
offer for their shares.5
The substantial risk of nonconsummation is especially im-
portant to the prospective acquirer, which incurs substantial
up-front costs in making the initial offer.6 Depending on the
circumstances, the initial bidder may incur significant search
costs to identify an appropriate target. Once an appropriate tar-
get is identified, preparation of the offer typically requires the
services of outside legal, accounting, and financial advisers. If
the bidder will pay all or part of the purchase price from
sources other than cash reserves, a likely scenario, the bidder
also incurs commitment and other financing fees. Finally, the
bidder may pass up other acquisition opportunities while nego-
tiating with the target. Although the bidder "ill recover these
up-front costs if the parties consummate the merger, the emer-
gence of a competing bid may eliminate or reduce the bidder's
expected return on its sunk costs: Second bidders apparently
prevail in a substantial majority of competitive bidding con-
tests7 and, even if the initial bidder prevails, the ultimate acqui-
sition price is likely to be substantially higher than the initial
bid."
The exclusive merger agreement partially responds to
Carlson, Misunderstanding Lock-ups, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 150, 152-53 (1986). Pro-
fessor Leebron, however, estimates "that at most only about 20% of the tender
offers that are meaningfully open to second bidders result in an actual second
bid." Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 195 n.144 (1986).
5. See Herzel & Shepro, Negotiated Acquisitions: The Impact of Compe-
tition in the United States, 44 Bus. LAw 301, 303 (1989).
6. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1982) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions]
(discussing "sunk information costs"); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role
of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161, 1178-79 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role] (same);
Helman & Davis, Merger and Acquisition Agreements in Competitive Bidding
Situations: Rights and Obligations Created by Corporation and Contract Law,
17 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 10-11 (1989).
7. See Ruback, Assessing Competition in the Market for Corporate Acqui-
sitions, 11 J. FiN. ECON. 141, 147 (1983) (second bidders prevailed in 75% of the
48 cases examined).
8. See Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender
Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 277, 283 (1984); Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Liti-
gation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merger?, 28 J. L. & ECON. 151, 174
[Vol. 75:239
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these risks because it discourages the target board from reneg-
ing on the merger agreement or, at the least, reimburses the fa-
vored bidder's up-front costs if the parties do not consummate
the merger.9 The operative provisions of exclusive merger
agreements may be conveniently divided into two basic catego-
ries: performance promises, an agreement between the target
board and the bidder board that the parties will engage (or not
engage) in certain types of conduct prior to the shareholder
vote on the proposed merger; and cancellation fees, typically a
specified amount the target agrees to pay the favored bidder if
the transaction does not go forward.
Performance promises consist of best efforts covenants and
various forms of no-shop covenants. A best efforts covenant re-
quires both parties to use their "best efforts" to consummate
the transaction.10 The covenant also usually requires the target
(1985) (noting the ultimate acquisition of a target typically comes at an addi-
tional 17 points after an auction).
9. Corporation statutes generally require a merger agreement to contain
provisions relating to the terms and conditions of the transaction and the man-
ner of payment, but also permit the parties to include such other terms and
provisions as they see fit. See, e.g., MODEL BusINF.sS CORP. ACr ANN. § 11.01
comment (1985); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 251 (1988). See generally J. FREUND,
supra note 2, at 153-61, 229-324 (categorizing and discussing additional terms
parties may desire); Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role
of Target Directors, 136 U. PENN. L. REv. 315, 351-53 (1987) (listing examples
of "collateral covenants" that may be included in a merger agreement); Molod,
supra note 2, at 263-65 (same).
10. A typical best efforts clause provides:
Subject to the terms and conditions provided herein, each of the par-
ties agrees to use its best efforts to take, or cause to be taken, all ac-
tion and to do, or cause to be done, all things necessary, proper or
advisable under applicable law and regulation to consummate and
make effective the Mergers in accordance with the terms of this
Agreement [and Plan of Reorganization] and the Merger Agreements,
subject, however, to the vote of shareholders [of each party]. In case
at any time after the Merger Date any further action is necessary or
desirable to carry out the purposes of this Agreement or the Merger
Agreements, the proper officers or directors of [the parties] shall take
all such action.
Agreement and Plan of Reorganization, as amended, among Allied-Signal Inc.,
Allied Corp., AC Acquisition Corp., and The Signal Companies, Inc., May 15,
1985, § 7.6 [hereinafter Allied-Signal Reorganization Agreement], reprinted in
3 M. LiPTON & E. STEiNBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEoUTS F-84.2, F-84.21
(1987). In this context, "best efforts" imposes "at a minimum a duty to act in
good faith toward the party to whom it owes a 'best efforts' obligation." Jewel
Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564 n.11 (9th Cir.
1984). But see Great Western Producers Co-Op. v. Great Western United
Corp., 200 Colo. 180, 186, 613 P.2d 873, 878 (1980) (en banc) (holding, under
Delaware law, that a best efforts clause merely imposed an obligation to
"make a reasonable, diligent and good faith effort"). Jewel's interpretation ar-
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board and, typically, the bidder board to recommend the
merger to their respective shareholders. 12
A no-shop covenant prohibits the target corporation from
soliciting competing offers from other prospective bidders.' 3
The standard no-shop covenant, however, does allow the target
to negotiate with an unsolicited competing bidder.14 In con-
guably is more consistent with the use of best efforts terminology in other con-
texts, where it often is defined to mean "maximizing the contractual benefits
of the person to whom the duty is owed, even if the benefits to the one owing
the duty have been depleted." See, e.g., In re Heard, 6 Bankr. 876, 884 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1980); see generally Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises:
The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract Law, 46 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (1984)
(duty to use best efforts has diligence as its essence; one standard courts use
"is to imagine the promisor and the promisee united in a single person and to
ask what efforts a reasonable person in that situation would exert on his or
her own behalf"); Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1111-26 (1981) (describing and applying a "best efforts model," im-
posing a greater burden than a mere good faith effort; addressing the problem
of managerial incompetence); Note, Merger Contracts, supra note 3, at 740 (ar-
guing that a best efforts clause imposes a greater burden than a good faith ef-
fort clause, as it is based on diligence and applies only to parties who agree to
use best efforts to fulfill a contractual obligation).
11. See Note, Merger Contracts, supra note 3, at 740-41. Even in cases
where approval by the bidder's shareholders is not required, such as in a trian-
gular merger, the favored bidder may still agree to use its best efforts to as-
sure that the transaction is consummated.
12. Id. at 736-37, 740-41 (citations omitted). See, e.g., Jewel, 741 F.2d at
1555; ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 382 N.W.2d 576 (1986) (per
curiam). A typical version states that the target's board of directors shall:
recommend that the stockholders ... vote to adopt and approve the
Merger ... [and] use [their] best efforts to solicit from stockholders
... proxies in favor of adoption and approval and... take all other
action necessary or . . . helpful to secure a vote of stockholders in
favor of the Merger.
Merger Agreement among United States Gypsum Co., Permalastic Prods. Inc.,
and Masonite Corp., Mar. 25, 1984, § 6.2 [hereinafter Gypsum-Masonite Merger
Agreement], reprinted in Hart & Brodwin, supra note 3, at 780.
13. See, e.g., Merger Agreement among Marcess Holding Co., Marcess
Sub., Inc., and Esmark, Inc., May 4, 1984, § 5.6, reprinted in Hart & Brodwin,
supra note 3, at 779 n.3:
The Company and its subsidiaries will not, directly or indirectly...
solicit, initiate or encourage submission of proposals or offers from
any person relating to any acquisition or purchase of all or... a por-
tion of the assets of, or an equity interest in, the Company.
Id.
14. Nachbar, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. - The
Requirement of a Level Playing Field in Contested Mergers, and its Effect on
Lock-ups and Other Bidding Deterrents, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 473, 480 (1987).
The no-shop clause may, however, require the target to notify the acquirer if
an inquiry or proposal is received. S. REED & LANE AND EDSON, P.C., THE




trast, the no negotiation covenant, a variant on the no-shop
theme, prohibits such negotiations.15 An intermediary version,
the no merger provision, permits the target to negotiate with an
unsolicited competing bidder, but prohibits it from entering a
merger agreement with the competitor until the shareholders
vote on the initial bid.16 The initial bidder will virtually always
request, and the target will usually grant, a no-shop covenant,
or one of its variants.17
Cancellation -fees are essentially liquidated damages the
target agrees to pay the initial bidder on the occurrence of a
specified trigger event.:' The trigger event commonly is the ac-
quisition of a specified amount of target stock by a third
party.'9 Variants include target termination of the merger
15. The Gypsum-Masonite Merger Agreement, supra note 12, § 6.6,
provided-
[the target company shall not] participate in any negotiations regard-
ing, or furnish to any other person any information with respect to, or
otherwise cooperate in any way with, or assist or... participate in,
facilitate or encourage, any effort or attempt... to do or seek [to ac-
quire a substantial part of the assets or equity of the company].
See also Allied Signal Reorganization Agreement, supra note 10, § 7.7(a)
(prohibiting the parties from taking action that would "directly or indirectly,
encourage, solicit or initiate discussions or negotiations with or knowingly pro-
vide any non-public information to [a non-party] concerning any merger, sale
of substantial assets, sale of shares of capital stock or similar transactions in-
volving [any of the parties]").
16. Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 353 n.130.
17. S. REED, supra note 14, at 754. In addition, the acquirer usually re-
quests a covenant prohibiting the furnishing of confidential information to a
prospective competing bidder. These dissemination of information clauses typ-
ically provide that the target will not provide internal financial information to
any third party until either the bid is accepted or some specified period of time
lapses. See, eg., Gypsum-Masonite Merger Agreement, supra note 12, § 6.6;
Allied Signal Reorganization Agreement, supra note 10, § 7.7(b).
18. Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 354 n.132 (noting that such arrange-
ments may be called a "break-up fee, bust-up fee, termination fee, or penalty
clause"); Nachbar, supa note 14, at 485 (noting such "reasonable break-up
fees"). A variation of the cancellation fee arrangement, closely akin to stock
lock-ups, involves giving an option to the acquirer pursuant to which the ac-
quirer has the right to purchase a specified number of target shares and also a
right to resell those shares to the target at a price higher than the exercise
price in the event that an alternative bid is accepted. See A. MIcHEL & I.
SHAKED, THE ComPE GUIDE TO A SucCESSFUL LEVERAGED BUYOUT 240
(1988).
19. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 178 (Del. 1986) (demand that the target place a $25 million cancella-
tion fee in escrow to be released to the bidder if another party acquired more
than 19.9% of Revlon's stock); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition,
Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1986) (observing that the target was to pay a $9
million "break-up" fee to the white knight "in the event that any third party
should acquire one third or more" of the target's outstanding common stock).
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agreement,20 and shareholder rejection of the acquisition propo-
sal.21 Cancellation fee provisions typically require the target to
pay the bidder a specified dollar amount. In contrast, topping
fee provisions, a relatively recent variation on the basic theme,
require the target to pay the defeated initial bidder a percent-
age of the victorious bidder's acquisition price. 22 In both cases,
the fee ordinarily ranges from one to five percent of the pro-
posed acquisition price.23 A cancellation fee reduces the risk of
entering a negotiated merger by guaranteeing the initial bidder.
reimbursement for the out of pocket costs associated with mak-
ing the offer and, in some instances, for the bidder's lost time
and opportunities.24 Accordingly, they are increasingly com-
mon in negotiated acquisitions. 2s
Although a merger agreement containing exclusivity provi-
sions is not the only method a potential acquirer can use to as-
sure success, it may often be the most effective. Probably the
most common alternative to an exclusive merger agreement is
structuring the acquisition in two steps. The initial stage is a
friendly tender offer for at least a majority of the target's
shares. The second-step is a freezeout merger to eliminate the
remaining minority shareholders. 26 In theory, the large block
20. See, e.g., Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 572 (11th
Cir. 1988) (noting that the potential white knight who requested a $3 million
"hello fee" also requested an $18 million "goodbye fee" if the target termi-
nated the proposed merger); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 28,
1150 (D. Or. 1984) (observing that under the terms of the disputed agreement,
the target has to pay the acquiring company 1% of the gross value of the pro-
posal transaction, plus expenses, if the target terminated the merger).
21. See, e.g., Friedman v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., No. 8209, slip
op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Del file) (under merger
agreement, target required to pay acquirer $300 million if target's shareholders
voted down the merger).
22. See, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 777
(Del. Ch. 1988) (discussing a proposed merger agreement granting a losing bid-
der a topping fee of 20% of any amount over a set price per share that share-
holders ultimately realized).
23. S. REED, supra note 14, at 753 (noting that "[t]he higher percentages
apply to smaller to medium size public transactions").
24. White knights proposing a leveraged buyout of the target in response
to a hostile takeover bid also frequently require an engagement fee, requiring
the target to pay a relatively small fee as consideration for the white knight's
preparation and submission of its bid. See, e.g., Cottle, 849 F.2d at 572 (observ-
ing that a potential white knight requested a $3 million "hello fee"); Hanson
Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1986) (not-
ing that the white knight requested a $1.5 million "engagement fee").
25. See Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 578 (11th Cir.
1988); Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1150 n.7 (D. Or. 1984).
26. See generally Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alterna-
Vol. 75:239
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of target stock acquired in the initial tender offer should pre-
vent, or at least deter, subsequent bidders from entering the
picture. This approach, however, is far from being a panacea.
Current law builds a substantial amount of delay into this ac-
quisition technique - leaving open a window of opportunity for
second bidders. For example, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) Rule 14e-1 requires that a tender offer remain
open for at least twenty days, with an additional ten-day exten-
sion after certain material changes.27 Further delays are neces-
sary when the consideration to be paid target shareholders
includes securities which the Securities Act of 1933 requires the
acquirer to register.28 In addition, this approach reduces the
amount of time available to conduct due diligence review. Fi-
nally, this approach may fail entirely when there are statutory
or other obstacles to effecting the second-step merger.
Another alternative to the exclusive merger agreement is
tive Aproach to Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAw. 1679 (1979)
(discussing the three consecutive stages of the "multistep acquisition": the
block purchase, the tender offer, and the cash merger). A "freezeout" is a
transaction (normally a merger) by which the equity interests of minority
shareholders are eliminated. Brudney & Chirlstein, A Restatement of Corpo-
rate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1357 (1978).
In addition, many bidders seek to prevent disclosure of the impending ac-
quisition at least until an agreement in principle has been reached. Gabaldon,
The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm
of Rule lOb-5 Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218, 1231-33 (1987). See also Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). In Basic, the Supreme Court held that a
target may not make misrepresentations in connection with material prelimi-
nary merger negotiations, materiality being defined by "a highly fact-depen-
dent probability/magnitude balancing approach." Id at 238-39 n.16. Basic,
however, did not impose an affirmative duty of disclosure in connection with
material preliminary negotiations and, at least implicitly, permits a target to
respond to inquiries with a "no comment" statement. Id at 235, 239 n.17.
Thus, the parties are probably still allowed to keep the transaction secret dur-
ing the negotiating process. Cf. Securities Act Release No. 6,835 (May 18,
1989), reprinted in 43 SEC DOCKET 1577, at 1585-86 (1989) (management's dis-
cussion and analysis in annual reports need not disclose preliminary merger
negotiations if doing so would jeopardize transaction, provided certain other
conditions are satisfied).
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1990). See also 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1) (1982)
(Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act requires 15 day waiting period
for certain cash tender offers).
28. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1987). The delay caused by fed-
eral requirements is compounded by state statutes requiring shareholder ap-
proval of the offer. See, eg., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,
94 (1987) (upholding an Indiana control share acquisition statute that in effect
imposes a minimum period of 50 days before a tender offer can be completed
by requiring shareholder approval of the transaction for the acquired shares to




open market purchases of substantial amounts of target stock
prior to announcing the acquisition proposal. In theory, this ap-
proach locks in a profit for the initial bidder in the event the
acquisition fails to go forward because the initial bidder can sell
the shares bought at the relatively low pre-announcement price
to the prevailing bidder or on the market. In reality, this op-
tion frequently is not fully satisfactory. Failing to approach the
target before beginning a stock acquisition program may put a
damper on subsequent negotiations. The target's management
might justifiably view the bidder as having hostile intentions,
despite its protestations to the contrary, and withhold coopera-
tion.-9 Further, informing the target of one's intentions in-
creases the likelihood of leaks and subsequent insider trading,
which may rapidly drive up the stock price and reduce the
profit margin available. Federal law also sharply limits the ini-
tial bidder's ability to assure itself a profit on its up-front ex-
penses by means of pre-announcement purchases. While the
insider trading laws generally do not apply to pre-announce-
ment purchases by bidders,30 section 13(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the SEC rules thereunder require a
person or group to disclose their holdings and intentions within
ten days after acquiring more than five percent of a class of
registered equity securities.3'
In light of the drawbacks inherent in the principal alterna-
tives to merger agreements containing exclusivity provisions, it
29. See generally Herzel & Shepro, supra note 5, at 307 (noting that the
target's management "may view the acquisition of a foothold position [i.e., a
substantial block of stock] as a sour beginning with aggressive overtone, which
may make a cooperative relationship with them difficult").
30. See Rosenbaum & Bainbridge, The Corporate Takeover Game and Re-
cent Legislative Attempts to Define Insider Trading, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229,
240-41, 241 n.77 (1988) (noting that corporate raiders' practice of "routine[ly]
purchas[ing] large blocks of target stock before announcing their intentions" is
"perfectly legal").
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to -7 (1990). Of
course, some bidders are able to acquire considerably more than 5% of the tar-
get's shares by continuing to buy stock during the ten-day window before dis-
closure is required. See Rosenbaum & Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 240-41.
A further constraint is imposed by Securities Exchange Act of 1984,
§ 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988), which requires beneficial owners of more
than 10% of a class of registered equity securities to disgorge short-swing prof-
its from matched purchases and sales within a six month period. For discus-
sion of the effect of § 16(b) on acquisition transactions, see P. ROMEo, INSIDER
REPORTING AND LIABILTY UNDER SECTION 16 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934 73-84,105-09 (1988); Note, Short-Swing Profits in Failed Takeover
Bids: The Role of Section 16(b), 59 WASH. L. REv. 895, 895-912 (1984) (analyz-
ing the potential § 16(b) liability of unsuccessful takeover bidders).
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is not surprising that the latter have become both common and
controversial.3 2 If common practice was the sole (or even the
primary) source of corporate law, the routine use of exclusivity
provisions would be enough to validate them. Such has not
proven to be the case. In recent years, exclusivity provisions
have come under increasing fire from courts and commenta-
tors. Specifically, courts confronted with exclusivity provisions
have struggled with the apparent inconsistency between a
board's efforts to bind itself in advance of shareholder action
and a board's fiduciary duties to its shareholders. A hodge-
podge of rules resulted from this perceived inconsistency,
which until recently narrowed the boundaries within which
parties to a merger may use exclusivity provisions.
This Article argues that these approaches ask the wrong
questions. Under modern corporate statutes, management acts
as a gatekeeper - all forms of negotiated acquisitions require
the target board's approval before shareholders may vote on
the transaction. To obtain the board's cooperation, the bidder
may offer management side payments, such as employment
contracts containing enhanced benefits. In return, management
may take action contrary to the shareholders' best interests,
such as agreeing to an acquisition price below the price manage-
ment could obtain through arms-length bargaining. Because of
this potential for departures from sole allegiance to share-
holder interests, exclusivity provisions, at first blush, appear
unjustifiable. In today's takeover environment, however, the
constant threat that a third party will make a competing bid
before shareholder action on the negotiated merger proposal
constrains management's potential conflict of interest.
The critical issue thus is not whether the target board has
the power to grant exclusivity provisions, but what the board
can do to prevent competing bids. As we shall see, exclusivity
provisions, standing alone, cannot prevent a second bidder from
making a competing offer. Unless the parties erect additional
protections against competition, a competing bidder can easily
bypass exclusivity provisions by making a tender offer directly
to the target's shareholders. Considered in this light, the argu-
ments against exclusivity provisions lose much of their force.
Accordingly, this Article proposes a framework for analyzing
32. See Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1130, 1146




exclusivity provisions that defines and broadens the circum-
stances in which courts should enforce them.
Given the relative weakness of exclusivity provisions as a
bidding deterrent, an additional device was necessary to insure
that the favored bidder's acquisition proposal would succeed -
one that would more effectively deter competing bids. Transac-
tion planners found the necessary device in the lock-up. A
lock-up is any arrangement or transaction through which the
target gives the favored bidder a competitive advantage over
other bidders.3 3 So defined, the term includes an unusually
large cancellation fee or an agreement by the target to use
takeover defenses to protect the favored bid from competition.
A lock-up option refers more narrowly to an agreement (usu-
ally separate from the merger agreement) granting the initial
bidder an option to buy shares or assets of the target.34 Like
cancellation fees, a lock-up option commonly becomes exercisa-
ble when a third party acquires a specified percentage of the
target's outstanding shares.
A stock lock-up option gives the favored bidder an option
to purchase a specified number of treasury or authorized but
unissued target shares. A stock lock-up option deters compet-
ing bids because of the risk that the favored bidder will exer-
33. See Fraidin & Franco, Lock-Up Arrangements, 14 REv. SEC. REd. 821,
829 (1981); Nathan, Lock-ups and Leg-ups: The Search for Security in the Ac-
quisitions Marketplace, 13 ANN. INST. SEC. REG. 1, 4 (1982). In so-called share-
holder lock-ups, the favored bidder enters into a lock-up arrangement,
"running the gamut from stock purchase agreements and options to purchase
stock to agreements to tender to the bidder or not to tender to others and vot-
ing agreements," with a target shareholder or shareholder group. 1 A.
FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 325 (1983);
see S. REED, supra note 14, at 749. Shareholder lock-ups seem most likely to
be successful in companies where a single shareholder or a cohesive share-
holder group already owns a controlling (if not majority) interest in the target.
In any event, these types of arrangements raise issues of controlling share-
holders' fiduciary duties that are outside the scope of this Article.
34. 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 33, at 327-29; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SEcuRrrIEs REGuLATION 798 (6th ed. 1987); Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a
State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1068-69 (1983).
35. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
270 (2d Cir. 1986) (option allowed acquirer to purchase target's "crown jewel"
division if offer did not succeed); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d
366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981) (option allowed acquirer to purchase target's interest in
oil and mineral rights at reduced price if the acquirer's offer did not succeed
and outside party gained control of the target), cert denied, 455 U.S. 982
(1982); DMG, Inc. v. Aegis Corp., No. 7619, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 29, 1984),
reprinted in 9 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 437, 439 (1984) (option giving the acquirer the
right to purchase 51% of the target's subsidiary if a third party purchased 40%
or more of the target's stock).
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cise the option, thereby driving up the number of shares that a
competing bidder must acquire to obtain control, and thus in-
creasing the overall acquisition cost. Even if the lock-up fails to
deter competing bids, however, the option still benefits the fa-
vored bidder. If the bidder exercises the option prior to the
shareholder vote on its merger proposal, the bidder can vote its
shares in favor of the merger, helping to assure that its propo-
sal is approved.- If a competing bidder prevails, the favored
bidder can exercise the option and sell its shares on the open
market or tender them to the successful bidder, thereby re-
couping some or all of its sunk costs.37
An asset lock-up option grants the favored bidder an option
to purchase a significant target asset. Although a target board
may use an asset lock-up option to entice a prospective bidder,
boards principally use them to end or prevent competitive bid-
ding for the target. Accordingly, the subject of the option is
usually either the assets most desired by a competing bidder or
those essential to the target's operations.38
This Article argues that the validity of both exclusivity
provisions and lock-ups should turn on whether a given provi-
sion deters competing bids. Part I describes the judiciary's
traditional methods of reviewing exclusivity provisions and
lock-ups. Part II argues that maintaining a viable threat of
competitive bidding - an "auction" of corporate control - is
essential because it provides the best available check on the
conflict of interest inherent in a board's decision to approve a
favored bidder's acquisition proposal. Part III analyzes the cur-
rent legal regime governing exclusivity provisions and lock-ups
in light of that proposition, with an emphasis on the recent Del-
aware decisions in the Time-Warner-Paramount takeover con-
test.39 Part IV then argues that exclusivity provisions and lock-
ups are properly evaluated as a species of conflict of interest
cases implicating the duty of loyalty. As such, the modified
36. S. REED, supra note 14, at 749.
37. la
38. See, e.g., Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 267 (option giving the bidder the
right to purchase the target's "two most profitable businesses"). Asset lock-
ups are sometimes referred to as "crown jewel options," the name coming
from the notion that the asset subject to the option is the target's crown jewel,
i.e., its most valuable or desirable asset. See, e.g., Mobil, 669 F.2d at 367; see
generally L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTz & J. BAUMAN, CORPORATiONs LAW AND
PoLucY: MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1060-61 (2d ed. 1988).
39. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.




business judgment analysis adopted by the Time courts is essen-
tially misdirected. Accordingly, Part IV proposes a more coher-
ent and workable framework for judicial review of exclusivity
provisions and lock-ups that minimizes the opportunities for
self-interested behavior by target managers in acquisition
settings.
I. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Courts traditionally evaluated exclusivity provisions pursu-
ant to one of two methodologies. The first method asks
whether the target board, consistent with its fiduciary duties,
has the power to make binding performance promises or can-
cellation fee arrangements before shareholder action on the
merger proposal.40 The second method assumes target board
power to enter exclusivity provisions, and rather focuses on
whether the board followed appropriate procedures before it
decided to grant the exclusivity provisions.4' Some courts also
use this second method to evaluate lock-ups, consistently as-
suming target board power to enter lock-ups.4
A. THE EXCLUSIVE MERGER AGREEMENT AS BINDING
CONTRACT
The handful of reported decisions raising the contractual
effect of an exclusive merger agreement almost uniformly in-
volve the same basic fact pattern. The transaction begins as a
Single Bidder acquisition with the favored bidder persuading
the target board to include a best efforts clause, and perhaps
also a no-shop or cancellation fee provision, in the definitive
merger agreement. A competing bidder then makes ' higher
offer for the target, and the favored bidder claims that the new
offer constitutes tortious interference with contract.43 If the
40. See infra Part I. A.
41. See infra Part I. B.
42. See infra notes 118-35 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., R-G Denver, Ltd. v. First City Holdings of Colo., Inc., 789
F.2d 1469, 1471-73 (10th Cir. 1986); Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W.,
Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1557-58 (9th Cir. 1984) (best efforts and no-shop clauses);
ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 137-39, 382 N.W.2d 576, 577-79
(1986) (per curiam); Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 IM. App. 3d 547, 550,
413 N.E.2d 98, 102 (1980); cf Great Western Producers Co-Op. v. Great West-
ern United Corp., 200 Colo. 180, 182-84, 613 P.2d 873, 875-77 (1980) (en banc)
(despite best efforts clause, changed business conditions led target board to re-
nege).
The tort of intentional interference with contract imposes liability on an
actor who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of an
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target board switches sides, perhaps by refusing to recommend
shareholder approval of the initial bid, the favored bidder adds
the target as a defendant, claiming breach of the best efforts
covenant. Central to both claims is the validity and binding ef-
fect of the exclusivity provisions. Only if these provisions are
binding on the target in advance of shareholder action will
either the competing bidder or the target face liability. This is-
sue has proven to be surprisingly complex. While all courts
agree that a merger agreement may not require shareholders to
approve the merger, courts are sharply divided over the extent
to which a target board may otherwise seek to insure merger
consummation 44
In theory, the enforceability of exclusivity provisions turns
on "a delicate interplay of principles of both contract and cor-
porate law, neither wholly controlling the outcome." 4 The ba-
sic contract issue posed by exclusivity provisions is whether
shareholder approval of the merger is a condition precedent to
the formation of the agreement or merely to the target's duty
to complete the transaction. Only in the latter case could the
board make binding promises as to its own behavior prior to
shareholder approval.46 Although the majority view among
commentators appears to be that exclusivity provisions are en-
forceable as a matter of contract law during the interim before
enforceable contract between plaintiff and a third party by inducing or other-
wise causing the third party not to perform the contract, thereby giving rise to
a pecuniary loss on the part of the plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 766 (1979). See generally Perlman, Interference with Contract and
Other Economic ExPectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U.
Cm. L. REV. 61, 61-69 (1982) (describing the tort of intentional interference
with contract).
The tort of interference with prospective business advantage will rarely be
applicable to exclusive merger agreement litigation, because fair economic
competition is typically a defense to such claims. See Belden, 90 Ill. App. 3d at
547, 413 N.E.2d at 101-03; Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 360-61 n.158; Note,
Merger Contracts, supra note 3, at 748. See generally Loewenstein, Tender Of-
fer Litigation and State Law, 63 N.C.L. REV. 493, 497-514 (1985) (describing the
tort of interference with prospective business advantage and defenses to the
tort).
44. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
45. ConAgra, 222 Neb. at 153, 382 N.W.2d at 586.
46. See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 355; Milich, Exclusive Merger
Agreements: The Role of the Board of Directors, 13 J. CORP. L. 823, 831 (1988);
Note, Merger Contracts, supra note 3, at 739. The mere fact that the merger
agreement requires shareholder approval or contains a best efforts clause is
not itself sufficient to render the agreement unenforceable as a matter of con-
tract law. IL at 739-40.
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shareholder action,47 courts have not reached consistent
conclusions."
In practice, most courts have ignored or only paid lip ser-
vice to contract law concerns, instead focusing on the corporate
law aspects of exclusivity provisions. In so doing, the courts
have received little direct statutory guidance. Modern corpora-
tion codes are generally silent on the effect of a merger agree-
ment pending shareholder approval.49 Some courts thus have
sought inferential guidance from potentially analogous statu-
tory provisions. This search has not produced consistent re-
sults. The primary statutory provision to which courts have
looked for guidance is the abandonment provision, which per-
mits a target board to abandon a merger or asset sale that has
received shareholder approval, subject to the contractual rights
of any third parties, without the need for further shareholder
action.ms  The Colorado Supreme Court found that the abandon-
ment clause in the Delaware asset sale statute supported its
conclusion that a target board may not lawfully bind itself to a
proposed control transaction by means of exclusivity provi-
47. See, e.g., Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 359; Ward, The Legal Ef-
fects of Merger and Asset Sale Agreements Before Shareholder Approval, 18 W.
RES. L. REv. 780, 799-801 (1967); see also Temkin, When Does the "Fat Lady"
Sing?: An Analysis of "Agreements in Principle" in Corporate Acquisitions,
55 FORDHAM L. REv. 125, 148 (1986) ("courts should view the parties as having
entered into a mutually binding agreement").
48. Compare ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 156, 382 N.W.2d
576, 588 (1986) (per curiam) ("[t]he [target] board was without statutory power
to bind the corporation to the proposed [favored bidder] merger absent share-
holder approval") with Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d
1555, 1560-61 (9th Cir. 1984) (target board has power to enter into binding per-
formance promises prior to shareholder approval). Cf. Smith v. Good Music
Station, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 262, 267, 129 A.2d 242, 245 (1957) (asset sale agree-
ment could not have "any ultimate binding" effect prior to shareholder ac-
tion); Scott v. Stanton Heights Corp., 388 Pa. 628, 631, 131 A.2d 113, 116-17
(1957) (asset sale agreement binding pending shareholder action); Masonic
Temple, Inc. v. Ebert, 199 S.C. 5, 12, 18 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1942) (agreement could
not have any binding effect prior to shareholder action); Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 788-96 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (agreement in princi-
ple binding on target).
49. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act, for example, merely
states that the merger agreement shall contain certain basic information and
also "[m]ay set forth... other provisions relating to the merger," without plac-
ing any limitations on the substantive content of such provisions. MODEL BUSI-
NESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 11.01(c)(2) (1985).
50. E.g., MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 11.03(i), 12.02(f) (1985); DEL.




sions.5 ' In contrast, the Ninth Circuit interpreted a comparable
provision in the California merger statute as validating exclu-
sivity provisions.52 Specifically, the court found that the aban-
donment clause supported the validity of performance promises
by recognizing that directors have broad discretion to make
binding promises respecting their own conduct, and that the
bidder possesses significant legal rights prior to shareholder
approval.5 3
Commentators also are divided as to the effect of abandon-
ment statutes. One commentator focuses on the fact that aban-
donment provisions address only those transactions which
already have received shareholder approval. In his view, the
"necessary implication" of this limitation is that the merger
agreement does not provide a source of rights and duties prior
to shareholder approval, and hence cannot bind the board until
that time.M Another commentator posits that abandonment
provisions merely save directors from the need to seek share-
holder approval of an abandonment following shareholder ap-
proval of the merger,m and thus neither enlarge nor diminish
the parties' rights under the merger agreement.56
In fact, the binding effect of exclusivity provisions has not
depended on this or other questions of statutory interpreta-
tion.57 Rather, courts have relied on equally debatable judicial
interpretations of target directors' fiduciary duties. State corpo-
rate law has long recognized "the basic principle that corporate
directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the
corporation's stockholders."ss Directors cannot contract away
this duty; a contract that purports to relieve directors of their
fiduciary duties simply is not binding.59 The import of these
51. Great Western Producers Co-Op. v. Great Western United Corp., 200
Colo. 180, 186 n.6, 613 P.2d 873, 878 n.6 (1980) (en banc).
52. Jewel, 741 F.2d at 1563.
53. I1& at 1563 n.10.
54. Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 1703.
55. Ward, supra note 47, at 792.
56. IM
57. For a somewhat dated, but still useful, discussion of other statutory
provisions that may indirectly cast light on the validity of exclusive merger
agreements, see id at 788-99.
58. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
59. See, e.g., Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stares N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555,
1563 (9th Cir. 1984); Great Western Producers Co-Op. v. Great Western United
Corp., 200 Colo. 180, 186, 613 P.2d 873, 878 (1980) (en bane); ConAgra, Inc. v.
Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 156-57, 382 N.W.2d 576, 587-88 (1986) (per curiam).
This rule reflects the general proposition that contracts entered into by a fidu-
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truisms for exclusivity provisions, however, remains a matter of
considerable dispute.
In Great Western Producers Cooperative v. Great Western
United Corp.,60 the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted Dela-
ware law as permitting a target board to renege on a perform-
ance promise.6 1 Section 271(a) of the Delaware corporation
statute requires target directors to determine that a proposed
asset sale is in the best interests of the corporation.6 2 The court
found that this provision imposed on directors an ongoing re-
sponsibility to evaluate whether the terms and conditions of a
transaction are in the shareholders' best interest. Thus, if busi-
ness conditions change, as happened in Great Western, or if a
third party makes a competing bid, as happened in ConAgra,
Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,63 the target directors must reevaluate the
initial offer and, exercising their independent good faith judg-
ment, recommend the course of action they deem in the share-
holders' best interest.6 Because the directors may not validly
agree to abrogate this function,6 both courts held that a best
efforts clause will not bind the target in the face of a higher
competing offer or other changed circumstances that render
the initial offer less attractive.6
So interpreting a best efforts clause would be noncontro-
ciary which involve a breach of duty by the fiduciary are unenforceable as con-
trary to public policy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 194 (1981).
60. 200 Colo. 180, 186-87, 613 P.2d 873, 878-89 (1980) (en banc).
61. Id. at 186-87, 613 P.2d at 878-79. Accord R-G Denver, Ltd. v. First City
Holdings of Colo., Inc., 789 F.2d 1469, 1474-75 (10th Cir. 1986); Con-gra, 222
Neb. at 156-58, 382 N.W.2d at 587-88.
62. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 271(a) (1988).
63. 222 Neb. 136, 382 N.W.2d 576 (1986) (per curiam).
64. Id. at 156, 382 N.W.2d at 588.
65. Great Western, 200 Colo. at 186, 613 P.2d at 878.
66. As the Great Western court stated: "The [best efforts] obligation...
must be viewed in the context of unanticipated events and the exigencies of
continuing business development and cannot be construed to require that such
events and exigencies be ignored or overcome at all costs." Id. at 187, 613 P.2d
at 878-79. As the best efforts clause at issue in Great Western did not specifi-
cally require the target's board to recommend the sale, the court did not need
to decide whether such a clause could be binding. The court's imposition of a
continuing duty to evaluate the fairness of the transaction's terms, however,
may mandate that such clauses not be given effect. By definition, a contrac-
tual obligation to recommend the offer, irrespective of changed conditions,
would conflict with the court's interpretation of a board's duties. In ConAgra,
Inc. v. Cargil, Inc., the Nebraska Supreme Court so interpreted Great West-
ern in the face of just such a provision. 222 Neb. at 156, 382 N.W.2d at 588. See
also R-G Denver, Ltd. v. First City Holdings of Colo., Inc., 789 F.2d 1469, 1474-
75 (10th Cir. 1986). But see infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the board's fiduciary duties to its shareholders).
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versial if the agreement contains an appropriate fiduciary out.
A fiduciary out may be simply a proviso stating that nothing
contained in the merger agreement shall relieve the target
board of its fiduciary duties to shareholders.6 7 Alternatively, a
fiduciary out may expressly retain the target board's right to
solicit other offers or to negotiate with other bidders if the
board's fiduciary duties so require.68 The most potent version
either relieves the target board of its obligation to recommend
the initial offer to shareholders or permits the target to termi-
nate the merger agreement if the board receives a higher of-
fer.6 9 Bidders typically resist inclusion of fiduciary outs
(especially the latter variants) in merger agreements because
they largely undermine the basic purpose of exclusivity provi-
sions. Takeover practitioners are divided on whether target
boards should insist on fiduciary outs.7 0
In Congra, however, the court indicated that fiduciary
outs are not necessary in order for a target board to freely re-
nege on a best efforts clause. 71 The best efforts clause at issue
included a proviso that the clause did not "relieve either Board
of Directors of their continuing duties to their respective share-
holders." 72 Rather than interpreting this fiduciary out as waiv-
ing the board's obligation to recommend shareholder approval
if it decided the offer was no longer in the shareholders' inter-
est,73 the court merely noted that "it is clear that the parties
recognized that there was a continuing fiduciary duty owed by
each board of directors to its respective shareholders which
could not be contracted away."74 The court also endorsed the
doctrine that target directors are subject to a duty to reevaluate
the initial bid in light of changing circumstances. 75 By thus fo-
cusing on fiduciary rather than contractual duties, the Congra
court evidently concluded that the directors' fiduciary duty
67. See, e.g., ConAgra, 222 Neb. at 146-47, 382 N.W.2d at 582; Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 879 (Del. 1985) (en banc).
68. Nachbar, supra note 14, at 481.
69. See A. MICHEL & I. SHAXED, supra note 18, at 240; S. REED, supra note
14, at 755.
70. Compare A. MCHEL & I. SHAKED, supra note 18, at 240 with S. REED,
supra note 14, at 756.
71. Con gra, 222 Neb. at 155, 382 N.W.2d at 587.
72. Id. at 147, 382 N.W.2d at 582.
73. See id. at 166, 382 N.W.2d at 592 (White, J., dissenting); Kalish,
ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., An Interpretive Essay: A Target Corporation
May, But Need Not, Agree That Its Directors Serve as Auctioneers for Its
Shareholders, 65 NEB. L. REV. 823, 824 (1986).
74. Con gra, 222 Neb. at 155, 382 N.W.2d at 587.
75. See id, at 155-56, 382 N.W.2d at 588.
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overrides the contractual best efforts obligation regardless of
whether a fiduciary out is included in the agreement. 76
In Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwes4 Inc.,7 the
Ninth Circuit implicitly rejected the Great Western/ConAgra
conclusion.78 The Ninth Circuit treated performance promises
as raising two distinct issues. The initial issue was whether di-
rectors can enter binding exclusivity provisions. 79 The court
answered this question in the affirmative, holding that the tar-
get directors' fiduciary duties permitted the board "to decide
that a proposed merger transaction is in the best interests of
the shareholders at a given point in time" and to grant exclu-
sivity provisions reflecting that determination.80 The court's
holding does not allow directors to contract away their fiduci-
ary duties, as target directors must still act in the shareholders'
best interest. In contrast to Great Western and ConAgra, how-
ever, the court will determine the board's compliance with
their fiduciary duties (absent a fiduciary out) when the merger
agreement is made, rather than when a competing bidder sub-
sequently comes forward.8 ' The Ninth Circuit thus does not re-
quire directors to reevaluate the initial bid in light of changed
circumstances.
The court found support for its holding in the basic struc-
ture of public corporations.82 Modern corporation statutes give
target boards broad authority to determine whether to merge
76. See Note, Merger Contracts, supra note 3, at 752 n.192. But see Kalish,
supra note 73, at 827-29 (noting that the ConAgra agreement conditioned di-
rectors' best efforts on their continuing duties to their shareholders).
77. 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1984).
78. See also Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 M1. App. 3d 547, 550, 413
N.E.2d 98, 102 (1980) (similarly rejecting such a conclusion that directors' fidu-
ciary duty overrides a best efforts obligation regardless of the presence of a fi-
duciary out).
79. Jewel, 741 F.2d at 1561.
80. Id, at 1563. Accord ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 158-69,
382 N.W.2d 576, 589-95 (1986) (per curiam) (White, J., dissenting); see also
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 703 n.22 (2d Cir. 1980)
("[w]e know of no support for the ... view ... that the [target's] directors
were required to reconsider the merger agreement that had been entered into
and that they were contractually bound to recommend to shareholders"); Scott
v. Stanton Heights Corp., 388 Pa. 628, 631, 131 A.2d 113, 116-17 (1957) (board
not liable to shareholder for adhering to asset sale agreement in face of subse-
quent higher offer); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 786, 808-09 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) ("[o]nce the agreement was made, [the target] could not evade
it, citing fiduciary duty, just because a higher offer came along").
81. Jewel, 741 F.2d at 1563.
82. See id. at 1560-64; see also Belden, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 550, 413 N.E.2d at
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the firm and to select a merger partneras The initial decision
to enter a negotiated merger transaction is thus reserved to the
board's collective business judgment, shareholders having no
statutory power to initiate merger negotiations.84 The board
also has sole power to negotiate the terms on which the merger
will take place and to enter a definitive merger agreement em-
bodying its decisions.8s Shareholders have no statutory right to
amend or veto specific provisions, their role typically being lim-
ited to approving or disapproving the merger agreement as a
whole, with most statutes requiring approval by only a majority
of the outstanding shares.86
The Ninth Circuit used this statutory division of responsi-
bility between directors and shareholders to both validate and
limit the target board's discretionary power to enter a binding
83. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101 (West 1977). If the target's board re-
jects the initial bidder, the merger process comes to a halt without shareholder
involvement: A target's rejection does not require shareholder approval, the
rejection decision being vested in the unilateral discretion of the board of di-
rectors. Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 321-22.
84. See Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores, N.W., Inc., 741.F.2d 1555, 1560
(9th Cir. 1984). In a few instances, shareholders have attempted to use SEC
Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1990), as a means of inducing a fundamental
corporate change such as a merger, sale of assets or liquidation. Although
Rule 14a-8 requires that an issuer include in its proxy materials proposals
made by eligible shareholders, the rule also permits the issuer to exclude
those proposals that are "under the laws of the registrant's domicile, not a
proper subject for action by security holders." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1)
(1990). This provision was intended to prevent shareholders from infringing
on matters committed by state law to the authority or discretion of the board
of directors. Exchange Act Release No. 20091, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,417, at 86,204 (Aug. 16, 1984). However, the SEC
has generally required inclusion of shareholder proposals calling for a merger
or acquisition of the issuer, where the proposal is cast in the form of a recom-
mendation to the issuer's board of directors, rather than in the form of a direc-
tion that the board seek out an acquirer. See, e.g., Rorer Group, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter (Feb. 27, 1985) (LEXIS, FedSec library, NoAct file); Richton In-
ternational Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 9, 1983) (LEXIS, FedSec li-
brary, NoAct file); Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 27, 1983) (LEXIS,
FedSec library, NoAct file); Harnischfeger Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec.
15, 1981) (LEXIS, FedSec library, NoAct file); Two B System, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,402, at
82,697 (Sept. 14, 1979) (LEXIS, FedSec library, NoAct file).
85. Jewel, 741 F.2d at 1561.
86. See, e.g., MODEL BuSINESS CoRP. AcT ANN. §§ 11.03(e), 12.02(e) (1985);
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 271 (1988). Some states require approval by
higher percentages. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 1 11.20, 11.60 (West 1985)
(asset sales must be approved by two-thirds of the outstanding shares entitled
to vote, the corporation's articles of incorporation may vary from that figure,
provided that the number of affirmative votes necessary for approval is not
less than a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
merger agreement pending submission of the agreement to
shareholders. 87 To assure that shareholders can exercise their
role in the statutory scheme, the Ninth Circuit prohibited tar-
get directors from taking any action that deprives shareholders
of their statutory right to ultimately decide the corporation's
future - the board may only preserve the status quo until
shareholders consider the offer.88 Of course, preserving the sta-
tus quo between the signing of the merger agreement and the
shareholder vote is precisely the purpose of exclusivity provi-
sions. Moreover, although exclusivity provisions prevent the
board from reneging on the transaction in light of changed cir-
cumstances, they do not affect the shareholders' right to do so.
Shareholders remain free to accept or reject the merger propo-
sal presented by the board, respond to a merger proposal or a
tender offer made by another firm subsequent to the board's
execution of the exclusive merger agreement, or hold out for a
better offer.89 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit specifically vali-
dated no-shop clauses by permitting the target board to "law-
fully bind itself in a merger agreement to forbear from
negotiating or accepting competing offers until the sharehold-
ers have had an opportunity to consider the initial proposal."' 9
Best efforts clauses also should generally pass muster under
Jewel because they, at most, require the directors to recom-
mend shareholder approval.91
87. The Jewel court also relied on the fact that California's corporate code
only requires shareholders to approve "the principal terms of a reorganiza-
tion." Jewel, 741 F.2d at 1561 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(a) (West Supp.
1984)). Accordingly, "[o]ther covenants in merger agreements that govern the
conduct of the parties pending the shareholder vote are left within the prov-
ince of the respective corporate boards." Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at
362.
88. See Jewel, 741 F.2d at 1562-64.
89. Id at 1564; Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 I. App. 3d 547, 550-51,
413 N.E.2d 98, 102-03 (1980).
90. Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores, N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555, 1564
(9th Cir. 1984).
91. The Revised Model Business Corporation Act permits a board "in spe-
cial circumstances" to forward a merger proposal to the shareholders without
making a recommendation. See MODEL BuSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 11.03(b)(1) (1985). Neither the Act nor the commentary, however, addresses
the question of whether the board must reserve the right to do so or has a con-
tinuing obligation to reassess the proposed transaction. In contrast, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court has interpreted its merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN., tit.
8, § 251 (1988), as prohibiting a board from transmitting a merger proposal to
its shareholders without making a recommendation or with a negative recom-
mendation. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888 (Del. 1985) (en banc). As
a result, the board's only options would be to comply with the exclusive
merger agreement by favorably recommending the transaction to the share-
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The second issue of concern to the Ninth Circuit was the
nature of the competing bidder's conduct: Even though an ex-
clusivity provision is enforceable, not all competing bids consti-
tute tortious interference with the contract. For an initial
bidder to sustain a tortious interference with contract claim, it
must show that the competing bidder induced the target board
to breach the contract, or that a breach was imminent.92 Ab-
sent a fiduciary out, an enforceable exclusivity provision gives
the favored bidder an unequivocal right to receive the perform-
ance promised by target management.93 The favored bidder,
however, does not have an unequivocal right to mandate
merger consummation. Rather, it has only a mere expectancy
in the merger.94 A best efforts clause, for example, only enti-
tles the favored bidder to have the merger presented and rec-
ommended to the target shareholders, who are under no
obligation to approve the merger.95 The tortious interference
with contract doctrine thus protects the favored bidder only
from competition that induces the target board to breach its
promise.96 Accordingly, despite an enforceable exclusivity pro-
vision, a competing bidder has substantial freedom to provide
target shareholders with an alternative. If the competing bid-
der does no more than make a tender offer and identify the op-
tions open to target shareholders, the competing bidder's
conduct will not give rise to liability.
97
holders or to rescind the merger agreement. But the court further indicated
that rescinding an exclusive merger agreement might subject the target board
to liability for breach of contract, implicitly suggesting that it would give per-
formance promises binding effect. Id.
92. Belden, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 550, 413 N.E.2d at 102. Because the target
was "firmly aligned" in opposition to the competing bid, the favored bidder's
tort claims failed. Id. Professor Gilson suggests that Jewel should be inter-
preted as being consistent with Belden: "There is at least an implication that
the mere malting of a competing offer would not constitute tortious interfer-
ence." R. GIISON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUiSmTONS 837
n.14 (1986) (citing Jewel, 741 F.2d at 1564 n.13).
93. Belden, 90 Ill. App. 3d at 550, 413 N.E.2d at 102. In Jewel the Ninth
Circuit remanded for further factual inquiry into whether the parties intended
that the initial merger agreement be exclusive during the interim before
shareholder approval was sought, as the record did not demonstrate whether
the parties intended that the agreement obligate the target to abstain from ne-
gotiating or executing a competing merger agreement with another firm. 741
F.2d at 1564-69.
94. Belden Corp. v. InterNorth, Inc., 90 IlM. App. 3d 547, 550-51, 413 N.E.2d
98, 102 (1980).
95. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
96. Belden, 90 IMI. App. 3d at 551, 413 N.E.2d at 103.
97. Id. Compare Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 806 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987), in which Pennzoil received a judgment of approximately $8.5
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Although both ConAgra and Great Western purported to
interpret Delaware law, it appears unlikely that the Delaware
Supreme Court will adopt their interpretation. Although not
the focus of the court's inquiry, the supreme court first touched
on this question in Smith v. Van Gorkom.98 In Van Gorkom,
the court concluded that a fiduciary out contained in an exclu-
sive merger agreement 99 "on its face cannot be construed as in-
corporating... either the right to accept a better offer or the
right to distribute proprietary information to third parties."100
This conclusion suggests that a contractual obligation to recom-
mend the merger to shareholders binds the target board even if
a higher bid emerges.
This implication is further supported by the court's discus-
sion of the board's options with respect to the shareholder vote
on the merger:
[Ihe Board had but two options: (1) to proceed with the merger and
the stockholder meeting, with the Board's recommendation of ap-
proval; or (2) to rescind its agreement with [the initial bidder], with-
draw its approval of the merger, and notify the stockholders that the
proposed shareholder meeting was cancelled.
But the second course of action would have clearly involved a
substantial risk - that the Board would be faced with suit by [the ini-
tial bidder] for breach of contract.101
billion against Texaco for the latter's interference with Pennzoil's merger con-
tract with Getty Oil, is perhaps best regarded as an aberration that does not
disprove the Belden rule. Setting aside any criticisms that might be directed at
the court's analysis, Texaco went beyond merely making a tender offer for
Getty's shares. In particular, it entered into stock purchase contracts with ma-jor Getty shareholders who were parties to the agreement with Pennzoil and
through them and other Getty representatives sought the support of Getty's
board. See id, at 796-805.
98. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (en banc). Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), suggests that Delaware will follow
neither line of authority, instead treating the validity of exclusive merger
agreements under an entirely different methodology. See infra notes 327-33
and accompanying text.
The commentary on the Van Gorkom case is voluminous. Some useful
samples include Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union
Case, 40 Bus. LAw 1437 (1985); Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The
Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw 1187 (1986); Manning,
Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw 1 (1985).
99. The fiduciary out provided that the target directors "may have a com-
peting fiduciary obligation to the shareholders under certain circumstances."
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 879.
100. Id-
101. Id at 888. See also City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco,
Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 n.15 (Del. Ch. 1988) (implying an obligation for board to
recommend such a merger to shareholders). Professor Gilson, however,
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By indicating that the breach of contract suit posed a "substan-
tial risk," the court again appeared to suggest that the target
board can legally bind itself to an exclusive merger agreement.
Subsequent Delaware cases confirm that a target board can le-
gally bind itself through an exclusive merger agreement if the
board complies with its fiduciary duties when entering the
agreement. 02
In sum, target directors considering a proposed exclusivity
provision face considerable uncertainty. The divergent rules
announced in Great Western and Jewel admittedly are rela-
tively clear. Because so few jurisdictions have definitively ad-
dressed the question of target board power to enter binding
exclusivity provisions, however, directors of firms incorporated
in other states cannot know which line of authority will control
their agreements. These directors thus must remain uncertain
as to the validity of exclusivity provisions.
B. THE DUTY OF CARE APPROACH
Rather than focusing on a target board's authority to grant
exclusivity provisions, some courts apparently assume that ex-
clusivity provisions are valid if the board complied with its fidu-
ciary duty of care when deciding to enter the exclusive merger
agreement. Directors and officers owe a duty of care to their
firm, which usually is formulated as requiring them to exercise
that degree of skill, diligence, and care that a reasonably pru-
dent person would exercise in similar circumstances. 103 The
business judgment rule, however, shields directors and officers
from personal liability in connection with business decisions by
providing a presumption that the directors or officers acted on
an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company. 04 In
other words, even clear mistakes of judgment will not result in
rightly cautions that Van Gorkom is sufficiently ambiguous to render reliance
on it a dubious proposition. See R. GILSON, supra note 92, at 836 n.11.
102. Time, 571 A.2d at 1140.
103. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 (1986).
104. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,
382 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
954 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 219, 225, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALY-
sis AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1985) [hereinafter CoRPO-
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personal liability.105 Persons challenging the board's decision
could traditionally rebut this presumption by showing that
fraud, illegality, or self-dealing tainted the decision.106
In Smith v. Van Gorkom,10 7 the Delaware Supreme Court
added another basis on which courts may set aside the business
judgment rule. Specifically, the court ultimately denied the
target directors the protections of the business judgment rule
because they failed "to act in an informed and deliberate man-
ner in determining whether to approve an agreement of merger
before submitting the proposal to the stockholders.' ' 0 8 The
central issue was the process by which the board approved the
merger agreement and an accompanying lock-up. 09 Indeed,
the court, in many respects, appeared to lay out a model target
boards should follow when making corporate decisions of this
magnitude.110
RATE GOVERNANCE: Draft No. 4]; see generally 3A FLETCHER CYc. CORP.
§ 1039-42 (perm. ed. 1986).
The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized, but not adopted, a distinc-
tion between the business judgment rule, which is said to shield corporate of-
ficers and directors from personal liability in connection with business
decisions, and the business judgment doctrine, which shields the decision itself
from review. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 180 n.10 (Del. 1986).
105. R. CLARK, supra note 103, at 123.
106. Id.
107. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (en banc).
108. Id- at 873. In Delaware, the standard applicable to this determination
is one of gross negligence, while in other jurisdictions a negligence standard
may apply. Compare id at 872 with Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisi-
tion, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274-77 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying a duty of reasonable
care). In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the board had not
fully and adequately disclosed all material facts to the shareholders. See Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864.
109. The final agreement included a stock lock-up, a best efforts clause,
and a no-shop covenant. The lock-up gave Pritzker an option, subsequently
exercised, to purchase one million treasury shares of Trans Union stock
(Trans Union had approximately 13.4 million shares outstanding) at $38 per
share - 75 cents over the then market price, but $17 below the merger price.
See i&i, at 864 n.3, 883. The best efforts clause required Trans Union's board to
recommend the merger to its shareholders, subject to a fiduciary out. See id.
at 879.
110. See Herzel, Colling & Carlson, supra note 4, at 165; Herzel & Katz,
supra note 98, at 1191-93; Manning, supra note 98, at 3. Strict adherence to the
court's decision making model, however, may not be a prerequisite for the
business judgment rule to be applicable. Throughout the opinion the court
suggests that it continues to rely on the board as the primary decision maker
in the corporate setting. E.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 ("[t]he business
judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the
managerial power granted to Delaware directors"). Arguably, the basic thrust
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The court strongly criticized the process by which Van
Gorkom, the Chairman and CEO of the target corporation,
conducted the merger negotiations with Pritzker, the initial
bidder. At their initial meeting, Van Gorkom effectively asked
Pritzker to purchase the corporation for $55 per share, and told
Pritzker how he could finance the transaction at that price."'
Soon afterwards, Pritzker proposed a leveraged buyout at $55
per share.1 2 Van Gorkom's failure to haggle obviously con-
cerned the court, especially given his fiduciary duty to obtain
the best price possible.113 Equally troubling was Van Gorkom's
failure to consult with the target directors and senior managers
before effectively reaching an agreement with Pritzker.114 Ad-
ditionally, the time constraints under which the board approved
the merger and the perfunctory manner in which the matter
was presented to and discussed by the board likely contributed
to the court's impression that Van Gorkom railroaded the
transaction through the board."15
The central issue, however, was the manner in which the
of the opinion is simply a requirement that the board provide some credible,
contemporary evidence that it knew what it was doing.
111. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877.
112. Id. In buyout acquisitions, a closely held entity purchases substan-
tially all the business and assets of a public corporation. To preclude future
participation by non-participating shareholders in firm decisionmaking, the
consideration used is typically cash or debt securities. AMEmCAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 3 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1989) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: Draft
No. 9]. Most buyouts can also be classed as leveraged buyouts (LBOs), because
they are typically financed with significant amounts of debt. In the manage-
ment buyout (MBO) variant, members of the firm's incumbent management
acquire a significant equity interest in the purchaser, which typically thereto-
fore has not been an operating company or a subsidiary of one and whose
other equity participants are usually specialized investment firms and institu-
tional investors. See Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
730, 732 (1985). In recent years, MBOs have become a common means of elimi-
nating public ownership (going private) and of responding to a hostile take-
over bid. See generally Williams, Procedural Safeguards to Ensure Fairness in
the Management Buyout A Proposal, 21 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 191
(1988).
113. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877.
114. During the negotiations with Pritzker, Van Gorkom only consulted
with Peterson, the controller. Moreover, once senior management learned of
the proposed transaction, they reacted negatively, a factor of some apparent
import. Having evidence in the record of these types of internal disagreements
obviously raised questions about the fairness of the transaction. Id. at 867-68.
115. See id at 874-75. At a two-hour meeting, the board accepted the offer
and that evening Van Gorkom executed the merger documents. The share-
holders approved the merger, but disgruntled Trans Union shareholders soon
brought a class action. Id.
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board gathered information before making its decision. The
duty of care requires directors to inform themselves of all ma-
terial information reasonably available to them.116 In the
court's view, the directors failed to fulfill this obligation.
Among other things, the board twice failed to review the rele-
vant documents, instead relying on brief oral presentations by
Van Gorkom. 117 This failure appears to have been critical. In
the court's view, the board should have pressed Van Gorkom
for the details on which he based his presentations; particularly
emphasizing the basis for the acquisition price. Because the
board relied on Van Gorkom, it failed to discover that Van
Gorkom had suggested the $55 price in the first place, and that
he had based the price solely on a financing feasibility study.118
The court seemingly assumed that if the board had known
these facts, it could not have reasonably believed that the price
was fair without further evaluation.119
In response, the target directors claimed that they had sat-
isfied their duty of care because the original merger agreement
and subsequent amendments allowed the target to escape the
merger agreement with Pritzker if a competing bidder made a
higher offer. Specifically, the board claimed that it placed two
conditions on its acceptance of the original merger agreement:
"(1) that [the target] reserved the right to accept any better of-
fer that was made during the market test period; and (2) that
[the target] could share its proprietary information with any
other potential bidders."' 2 0 The board also noted that it later
amended the merger agreement to allow active solicitation of
competing bids and termination of the agreement with Pritzker
if the board either consummated a merger or asset sale with a
116. Id. at 872-73. The American Law Insitute has proposed a standard
that only requires directors to be informed to the extent that they reasonably
believe to be appropriate under the circumstances. This standard seemingly
permits directors to make decisions on less than all reasonable available infor-
mation, if they reasonably believe doing so is appropriate given the situation.
Perkins, The ALI Corporate Governance Project in Midstream, 41 Bus. LAw.
1195, 1206 (1986).
117. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877, 882-83 (Del. 1985) (en banc).
While Delaware law provides that the directors are fully protected in relying
in good faith on reports made by officers, DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(e)
(1988), that protection was unavailable here. Van Gorkom's oral presentation
was not a "report" because Van Gorkom himself was uninformed as to the de-
tails of the plan. Id. at 874-75.
118. Id. at 865. Rough calculations showed that a price of $50 could be eas-
ily financed, while a price of $60 would be difficult to finance. Id.
119. Id. at 875.
120. Id. at 869.
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third party or entered a definitive acquisition agreement on
more favorable terms within a specified time period. 12 ' Finally,
the board noted that it hired an investment banker to solicit
other bids, but no firm offer materialized. 2 2 In other words,
the board argued that any deficiencies in its original decision
were cured by a subsequent search for competing bids - the
so-called market test.123 The court rejected this rationale on
several grounds. First, it concluded that the original merger
agreement did not in fact permit the board to terminate the
merger agreement if a higher offer emerged.'2 4 Second, in its
view, the amendments, especially in light of the surrounding
circumstances, did not permit a meaningful market test.25 Fi-
nally, the court apparently believed that Van Gorkom's conduct
during the market test period may have chilled the bidding
process.126
Van Gorkom, however, does not require a target board to
shop the company among competing bidders to satisfy its duty
of care.2' 7 Rather, the court seems to be saying that a target
board must have some credible basis for determining that a
proposed merger is in the best interest of shareholders. An un-
fettered market test is merely one means of satisfying the
121. Id. at 881-84.
122. In December 1980, the investment firm of Kravis, Kohlberg & Roberts
(KKR) proposed, subject to obtaining necessary financing, a leveraged buyout
of Trans Union for consideration equivalent to $60 per share. KKR withdrew
the offer before the board had an opportunity to consider it, purportedly be-
cause a key Trans Union manager declined to participate. Id. at 884-85. Gen-
eral Electric Credit Corporation also made an acquisition proposal, which was
withdrawn because Pritzker refused to grant an extension of the planned
Trans Union shareholders meeting. Id.
123. Id- at 878. Trans Union also argued that the reasonableness and fair-
ness of Pritzker's $55 per share price was confirmed by the market test. Id
The court, however, rejected this reasoning by ordering the trial court on re-
mand to determine whether Trans Union's "intrinsic value" on September 20,
1980 exceeded $55 per share and to award damages based on any resulting dif-
ferential. I&. at 893.
124. I& at 880.
125. Id. at 885. The board could no longer withdraw simply because a bet-
ter offer was received. A requirement that Trans Union use its best efforts to
mail a proxy statement relating to Pritzker's offer by early January effectively
shortened the market test period. The announcement that Pritzker had exer-
cised the lock-up option and had completed financing may have deterred other
bidders. See id at 881-84.
126. Id. at 884-85.
127. Of course, Van Gorkom was decided before the duty to auction control
emerged in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986). On the other hand, that duty has never been extended to Van
Gorkom-type cases. See infra notes 285-333 and accompanying text.
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board's duties. A determination of the firm's "intrinsic value,"
preferably in the form of a fairness opinion by an independent
financial expert, is another.12 8 A combination of both tech-
niques is probably the safest approach, but the board should
satisfy its duty of care even if it uses only the latter device. 2 9
In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.,130 the
Second Circuit applied standards comparable to those annunci-
ated in Van Gorkom to determine whether a target board's de-
cision to grant an asset lock-up option was an informed one.
Among other factors suggesting that the target board had failed
to act with due care, the Second Circuit noted that the directors
made their decision after a three-hour late night meeting.' 31
Quick action alone might not have condemned the decision, but
the board also failed to use the time available properly.132 Spe-
cifically, the board failed to read or carefully review the agree-
ments and offers133 and to inquire into the basis of its financial
adviser's opinion that the option prices were fair.'3 The court
found that these failures placed the board's conduct outside of
the usual rule that permits directors to rely on reports and
128. Although the Delaware Supreme Court expressly rejected a require-
ment that a written fairness opinion be obtained prior to a merger decision,
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 876, the Court's opinion clearly indicates reliance on
internal valuations is a risky proposition at best. See id at 875-78. As Profes-
sor Fischel aptly noted, "no firm considering a fundamental corporate change
will do so without obtaining a fairness letter or similar documentation from
outside consultants. Indeed, these outside consultants are the biggest winners
after" Van Gorkom. Fischel, supra note 98, at 1453.
129. Cf. In re TW Services, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,179 n.8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989)
("alternatives to an auction for collecting the information that directors need
to make an informed choice may be appropriate"); In re Amsted Indus., Inc.
Litig., No. 8224, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1988) (1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116) (al-
ternatives to auction procedures acceptable), affl'd, 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
130. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying New York law).
131. Id at 275.
132. Id Compare Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875 with Priddy v. Edelman,
883 F.2d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1989) (quick decision to accept one of two competing
bids consistent with exercise of due care in light of "directors' rejection of the
bidders' initial offers, close consultation with two carefully selected outside fi-
nancial advisors, and insistence on further negotiations") and Keyser v. Com-
monwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1130, 1147-49 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (in a
later opinion in the same case, 675 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1987), the court indi-
cated that new evidence created material issues of fact as to the board's due
care) and Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 581-82 (Del. Ch. 1984) (up-
holding lock-up despite quick action, in light of deadline imposed by bidder).
133. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275. The board relied solely on outside ad-
visers. Id
134. Id at 275.
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opinions of management and outside advisers1 a 5
The court found particularly troubling the board's failure
to inquire into the adequacy of the option exercise price when
considerable evidence existed that the optioned assets were
worth far more than the exercise price.13 6 In fact, the court
concluded that if the favored bidder exercised the lock-up op-
tion and did not subsequently acquire the company, the target
would be broken up for inadequate consideration. 3 7 The in-
crease in the bid obtained by granting the lock-up-1 and the
adequacy of the consideration to be paid for the underlying as-
sets on exercise of the lock-up option'3 9 thus emerged as criti-
cal factors in determining the lock-up's validity.
The Hanson Trust court, however, recognized that because
target boards often intend lock-ups to give the favored bidder
"a bargain as an incentive to bid and an assured benefit should
its bid fail,"' 40 a bargain price alone does not indicate a breach
135. Id. at 275-76. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del.
1985) (en banc) (board must review advisers' opinions). But see Buffalo Forge
Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892, 904 (W.D.N.Y.) ("[r]eliance upon the at-
torney's advice, even when unsound, is not a breach of fiduciary duty"), qff'd,
717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Whittaker Corp. v. Ed-
gar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same).
136. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d
Cir. 1986). The board relied on a conclusory opinion by its investment banker
that the price was within a fair range. Had the board probed the basis of that
opinion it would have discovered that its adviser had failed to calculate a range
of fairness. Id.
137. Id. at 283.
138. Compare, e.g., id. at 281-82 (lock-up invalidated, among other things,
where board obtained only minimal price increase in return for granting op-
tion) and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
184 (Del. 1986) (same) and DMG, Inc. v. Aegis Corp., No. 7619, slip op. (Del.
Ch. June 29, 1984), reprinted in 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437, 441-42 (1984) (lock-ups
and cancellation fees granted solely in return for making of bid) with Cottle v.
Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 576-77 (11th Cir. 1988) (asset lock-up
upheld where substantial improvement in bid received in return for its grant)
and Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 583-84 (Del. Ch. 1984) (lock-up
upheld even though mere making of bid was apparently the sole consideration
for its grant).
139. E.g., Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275-76, 278-80; Buffalo Forge, 717 F.2d
at 759 (upholding lock-up where exercise price "exceeded the cost of the stock,
its book value and its normal trading price," as well as the hostile offer price),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178 (assets' option price
$100 to $175 million below fair value); cf Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc.,
744 F.2d 255, 266 n.11 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[a]lthough a finding that the corporation
received a fair price for shares transferred is not essential to establishing that
a transaction is in the company's best interest, it is certainly relevant to the
inquiry").
140. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 276.
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of the board's duty of care. Rather, the court prohibited only
prices lower than necessary to entice a reluctant bidder.141 The
court also required the directors to subject the proposal to sub-
stantial analysis to ensure that the price does not cross this crit-
ical line.142 At a minimum, the court apparently required a
written fairness opinion by an independent financial adviser
and board minutes reflecting extensive inquiry into the basis
for that opinion.' 43
A final, crucial factor in the court's decision was that the
board essentially rubber-stamped management's proposals even
though management would have an equity interest in the sur-
viving entity and thus had an obvious conflict of interest with
the shareholders. 144 On the one hand, managers, as agents of
the shareholders, must seek the best possible price for the cor-
poration. On the other hand, managers who will receive an eq-
uity interest in the surviving entity also are acting as
purchasers and thus have an incentive to sell the corporation
for the lowest price possible. 45 The lock-up option, which ef-
fectively precluded further bidding by potential acquirers and
coerced shareholders into accepting the transaction, com-
pounded this conflict of interest.14 The temptation to pay an
unfairly low price must surely be exacerbated when competing
offers are effectively foreclosed.' 47
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id at 275-77.
144. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 277. Compare Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp.,
798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986) (lock-up invalidated where board "rubber
stamped" agreement with MBO group) with Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp.,
717 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir.) (lock-up upheld where hard "arms-length" negotia-
tions conducted with unaffiliated bidder), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983) and
Hastings-Murtagh v. Texas Air Corp., 649 F. Supp. 479, 485 (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(same).
145. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 284
(Oakes, J., concurring); Williams, supra note 112, at 192 n.4 (quoting Long-
streth, Remarks to the International Bar Association (Toronto, Oct. 6, 1983)
(Management Buyouts: Are Public Shareholders Getting a Fair Deal?)).
146. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 277, 281-83. The bid-preclusive and coercive
effects of lock-ups are discussed infra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
147. To eliminate a comparable conflict of interest, trust law largely pro-
hibits the trustee from selling trust assets to himself. The Restatement of
Trusts applies this prohibition to virtually all sales to the trustee, regardless of
whether, among other things, the sale was done by auction, the trustee profits
from the transaction or the trustee paid fair consideration for the assets. RE-
STATEMENT OF TRUSTS (SECOND) § 170 comment b (1959). See 2A A. ScoTr &
W. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 170.1 -.11 (4th ed. 1988). Only in a few
circumstances, such as where the sale is effected subject to court approval or
pursuant to the express terms of the trust instrument, is a trustee permitted
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In summary, Van Gorkom and Hanson Trust assume that
target boards have the power to grant exclusivity provisions
and lock-ups. They stress that target boards have a duty to use
due care when deciding to grant exclusivity provisions and
lock-ups. Courts following Van Gorkom and Hanson Trust will
closely scrutinize the process through which the board reached
its decision to grant the exclusivity provision or lock-up, and
may invalidate the provision, impose personal liability on the
directors, or enjoin the transaction if the directors failed to
jump through the proper hoops.148
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
As Part I demonstrates, courts reviewing exclusivity provi-
sions and lock-ups traditionally have used one of two distinct
inquiries: (1) does the target board have the power to enter
into binding promises before shareholder action; or (2) did the
board make an informed decision when agreeing to the exclu-
sivity provision or lock-up. Both inquiries purportedly arise out
of management's fiduciary obligations. Both ask important
questions. But neither asks the critical question.
At the heart of management's fiduciary duties is an obliga-
tion to make decisions based on their unbiased, independent
judgment as to the best interests of the firm's shareholders.1 49
If directors have made an objective, reasonably informed deci-
sion, they have done all that their duties require. Thus, the
critical question is whether the board's decision was objective.
In other words, is there a substantial risk that personal inter-
to purchase trust assets. Id at §§ 170.7 -.9. Corporate law's failure to adopt a
comparable prohibition appears justified in light of the strong evidence that
MBOs can benefit target shareholders and the economy. See DeAngelo, De-
Angelo & Rice, Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth,
27 J.L. & EcoN. 367, 400-01 (1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 723-31 (1982); Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class
Common Stock- The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 816-32
(1987).
148. Since Van Gorkom, many states have adopted new director liability
statutes, providing that directors will not be monetarily liable unless they
commit a breach of the duty of loyalty; in other words, if an appropriate
amendment to the firm's charter is made, monetary liability may not be im-
posed on directors who violate the duty of care. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8,
§§ 102(b)(7), 145 (1988). See generally Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty
of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919 (1988) (examining recent director liability legislation);
Note, Corporate Directors - An Endangered Species? A More Reasonable
Standard for Director and Officer Liability in Illinois, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV.
495 (examining Illinois legislation).
149. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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ests conflicting with those of the shareholders affected the
board's decision? This Part argues that a potential conflict of
interest exists in all negotiated acquisitions and that competi-
tive bidding - an auction of corporate control - is the best
available constraint on self-interested behavior by target
management.
A. COMPETITIVE BIDDING AND MANAGEMENT CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
During the early 1980s there was a voluminous debate over
the shareholder and social wealth effects of competitive bidding
in hostile takeover battles.150 Although that debate still rages
in some quarters, this Article takes an essentially agnostic posi-
tion with respect to it. Indeed, one can argue that the side of
the debate on which one comes down largely remains a matter
of intuition. There simply is no good empirical data as to the
net economic effects of competitive bidding.1 51 Instead, this Ar-
ticle focuses on the role of competitive bidding in constraining
self-interested behavior by target managers in the negotiated
acquisition setting.
Inherent in all corporate acquisitions is a potential conflict
between the interests of target managers and the interests of
shareholders.152 This tension is perhaps most obvious in hostile
150. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers,
95 HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 27-30 (1982) [here-
inafter Bebehuk, Reply and Extension]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role,
supra note 6, at 1165-82; Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions, supra note 6, at 7-9;
Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer De-
fense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982); Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property
Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987);
Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders: A
Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 53 (1985).
151. See Bebchuk, Reply and Extension, supra note 150, at 49; Easterbrook
& Fischel, Auctions, supra note 6, at 6, 21; Haddock, Macey & McChesney,
supra note 150, at 724, 741; cf Milgrom, The Economics of Competitive Bid-
ding: A Selective Survey, in SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 261,
287 (L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler & H. Sonnenschein eds. 1985) (current eco-
nomic theory offers relatively little insight into the general question of when
auctions are the best means of selling any asset). For a useful recent summary
of the theoretical and empirical literature on control auctions in corporate
takeovers, as well as a cogent analysis of when such auctions are desirable, see
Macey, Auction Theory, MBOs and Property Rights in Corporate Assets, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 85 (1990).
152. Corporate acquisitions are a classic example of what economists refer
to as "final period problems." R. GILSON, supra note 91, at 579. Where parties
(such as management and shareholders) expect to have repeated transactions,
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takeovers. If the bidder is successful, many target directors and
officers will almost certainly lose their positions. 53 On the
other hand, if incumbent management defeats the bidder, tar-
get directors and officers will retain their positions, but target
shareholders will lose a substantial premium for their shares.' 4
Any action by management in a hostile takeover situation, ex-
cept pure passivity, is thus tainted by the specter of self-
interest. 55
A similar conflict of interest also arises in negotiated acqui-
sitions. Because approval by the target board is a necessary
prerequisite to most acquisition methods, the modern corporate
statutory scheme gives management considerable power in ne-
gotiated acquisitions. To purchase the board's cooperation, the
bidder may offer management side payments such as equity in
the surviving entity, employment contracts, substantial sever-
ance payments, continuation of existing fringe benefits, or
the risk of self-dealing by one party is constrained by the threat that the other
party will punish the cheating party in future transactions. In a final period
transaction, this constraint disappears. Because the final period transaction is
the last in the series, the threat of future punishment disappears. Id-
In addition, a variety of other extra-judicial forces (such as the markets
for corporate control and managerial services) somewhat constrain manage-
ment's ability to structure ordinary corporate transactions so as to benefit it-
self. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 6, at 1196-
97'(discussing the various market forces and incentives that ensure manage-
ment will generally act in the best interests of shareholders); Gilson, A Struc-
tural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 836-40 (1981) (noting the constraints the corpo-
rate structure puts on management discretion). In many corporate acquisi-
tions, however, target management is no longer subject to market discipline
because the target by definition is no longer operating in the market as an in-
dependent agency. As a result, management is no longer subject to either
shareholder or market penalties for self-dealing. R. GILSON, supra note 91, at
579.
153. See Walking & Long, Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Take-
over Bid Resistance, 15 RAND J. ECON. 54, 54-55 (1984).
154. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733, 1739-43 (1981); Easterbrook & Jar-
rell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277,
281-85 (1984); Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate Control
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSp. 49, 54-55 (1988); Jensen
& Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control The Scientific Evidence, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 5, 10-11 (1983); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35
Bus. LAw. 101, 106-09 (1979); Margotta & Marston, Long-Term Results of De-
feated Tender Offers (Working Paper 87-29 1987), reprinted in CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS REvISrrED: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT RESEARCH 1 (Brook-
ings Institution Forum Sept. 22, 1987).
155. The classic statement of this conflict is Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper
Role, supra note 6.
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other compensation arrangements.15 6 These side payments
rarely are large enough to materially affect the price the bidder
could otherwise pay target shareholders. A more likely scena-
rio is that side payments will affect the target board's decision
making - insiders promised side payments may agree to an ac-
quisition price lower than they could obtain from hard bargain-
ing or open bidding.157
Even when the target's management is not consciously
seeking side payments, the bidder's offer to retain management
and maintain the corporate identity may create a conflict of
interest.
There may be at work [in negotiated acquisitions] a force more subtle
than a desire to maintain a title or office in order to assure continued
salary or perquisites. Many people commit a huge portion of their
lives to a single large-scale business organization. They derive their
identity in part from that organization and feel that they contribute to
the identity of the firm. The mission of the firm is not seen by those
involved with it as wholly economic, nor the continued existence of its
distinctive identity as a matter of indifference. 1 5 8
156. E.g., Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614,
618 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (white knight offered target management equity stake);
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 974 (Del. 1977) (target directors offered
employment contracts); Repairman's Service Corp. v. National Intergroup,
Inc., No. 7811, slip op. (Del. Ch. March 15, 1985), reprinted in 10 DEL. J. CoRP.
L. 902, 907 (1985) (plaintiff claimed target managers sought "preferences for
themselves" in surviving entity); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1054
(Del. Ch. 1984) (plaintiff alleged tender offeror modified bid to benefit target
managers), qff'd, 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990). See generally Gilson, Structural
Approach to Corporations, supra note 152, at 825-26 (management offered in-
centives to ensure board cooperation); Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 325
(same); Macey, supra note 151, at 114 (same); Walking & Long, supra note 153,
at 67 (incumbent managers more likely to be retained in an uncontested take-
over). There is some evidence, however, that target managers act in the share-
holders' best interests in negotiating a merger; in particular, target managers
appear to bargain quite firmly with offerors, extracting most of the gains from
an acquisition for the shareholders. See Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra
note 150, at 738.
157. E.g., Pupecki v. James Madison Corp., 376 Mass. 212, 215, 382 N.E.2d
1030, 1033 (1978) (plaintiff claimed that consideration for sale of assets was re-
duced due to side payments to controlling shareholder); Barr v. Wackman, 36
N.Y.2d 371, 376, 329 N.E.2d 180, 184, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 500 (1975) (plaintiff
claimed target directors agreed to low acquisition price in exchange for em-
ployment contracts); see Oesterle, supra note 1, at 131.
An argument can perhaps be made that some side payments to manage-
ment are justified in light of its investment in firm specific human capital. See
Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REv. 1, 105 (1986); Haddock, Macey & McChesney, supra note 150, at
712-17. This Article assumes, however, that side payments conflict with share-
holder interests and management's fiduciary duties.
158. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder]
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Although such motivations are understandable, they also may
result in management decisions contrary to the shareholders'
economic interest.
Competing offers and the threat of competing offers pro-
vide an effective check on conflicts of interest in negotiated ac-
quisitions.159 True, the competing bidder cannot structure its
acquisition as a merger or asset sale if it is unable to persuade
target management to change sides. The intervenor, however,
has a formidable alternative: the tender offer. The cash tender
offer emerged in the 1960s as a potent weapon in the hostile
bidder's arsenal,v6 because it eliminates the need for target
board cooperation by permitting the bidder to buy a controlling
share block directly from the stockholders.' 6' Accordingly,
where side payments persuade the target board to accept a low
initial offer, a second bidder may - and often does - succeed
by offering shareholders a higher-priced alternative. Indeed, in
the rare case when side payments affect the initial bidder's abil-
ity to raise its offer, the second bidder is almost certain to
prevail.
B. ALTERNATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON MANAGEMENT'S CONFLICT
OF INTEREST
To the extent that exclusivity provisions and lock-ups im-
pede competitive bidding, they shield target management and
favored bidders from the risks posed by competing bidders.162
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,268-69 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), affl'd,
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). For a fascinating popular account of the role corpo-
rate "culture" played in the Time case, see Bruck, The World of Business:
Deal of the Year, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 1990, at 66-89.
159. See Bebchuk, Reply and Extension, supra note 150, at 25 n.8; Gilson,
Structural Approach to Corporations, supra note 152, at 847 n.103, 850; John-
son & Siegel, supra note 9, at 407.
160. Bainbridge, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post-MITE:
The Maryland, Ohio and Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 DIcK. L. REv. 731, 735
(1986).
161. Id. The tender offer's increased popularity thus in large part reflected
the significant advantages it possessed over its principal alternative - a
merger proposal. Id. Proxy contests, like tender offers, permit a bidder to
end-run management, but suffer from a number of other drawbacks that ren-
dered them "the most expensive, the most uncertain, and the least used of the
various techniques" of acquiring corporate control. Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 114 (1965).
162. The efficiency of competitive bidding in the market for corporate con-
trol has been the subject of some debate. Compare Gordon & Kornhauser,
Takeover Defensive Tactics: A Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295, 310
(1986) (concluding market control is efficient) with Bradley & Rosenzweig, De-
fensive Stock Repurchases and the Appraisal Remedy, 96 YALE L.J. 322, 334
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This effect might be unobjectionable if other legal or extrajudi-
cial mechanisms adequately constrained management's conflict
of interest. Unfortunately, the commonly cited alternatives -
supervision by independent directors, shareholder approval, the
threat of post-merger acquisitions, and judicial review - do not
match the effectiveness of competing bids.163
1. Approval by Independent Directors
Experience and common sense indicate that independent
directors do not adequately constrain self-interested behavior
by a target board.16 A striking example of this failure is the
(1986) (concluding market control is inefficient). The argument here, how-
ever, is not that competitive bidding is a perfect solution to management's con-
flict of interest, but rather that it is the best available option.
163. Another factor, which has only recently begun to receive attention, is
the risk that persistent overpayment in acquisitions is likely to render the bid-
der an attractive target by devaluing its stock price. See Mitchell & Lehn, Do
Bad Bidders Become Good Targets? 29 (Aug. 25, 1988) (unpublished study by
SEC economists; on file with Minnesota Law Review). Rational bidders would
thus refuse to pay excessive side payments, instead threatening to eschew a
negotiated takeover in favor of a purely hostile bid, if side payments would re-
sult in overpayment for the target.
164. Many courts and commentators have urged that takeover decisions be
made by independent directors in order to neutralize the insiders' conflict of
interest. E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) (target firm's efforts to prove its directors acted reasonably and in good
faith in adopting takeover defenses are "materially enhanced" if the actions
are approved by "a board comprised of a majority of outside independent di-
rectors"); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983) (where
parent corporation breached its fiduciary duties to minority shareholders of a
subsidiary in a freezeout merger, the court suggested: "the result here could
have been entirely different if [the target] had appointed an independent nego-
tiating committee of its outside directors to deal with [the parent] at arm's
length"); cf. Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 378-84 (decisions relating to ex-
clusive merger agreements be vested in the board's independent directors,
although recognizing that additional constraints are necessary); Note, Down
But Not Out - The Lock-Up Option Still Has Legal Punch Wen Properly
Used, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1125, 1157-58 (1986) (same). For purposes of
this article, it suffices to define an "independent" director as a member of the
board of directors who is not otherwise employed by or affiliated with the cor-
poration. There is a vast literature on the efficacy of independent directors in
generally constraining managerial misconduct. A brief sampling follows: R.
NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976);
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALY-
SIS AND RECOMMENDATION § 3.03-.04, at 83-84 (Tent. Draft No. 2 1984); Ameri-
can Bar Ass'n Comm. on Corp. Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus.
LAw. 1595 (1978); Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly City or
Potemkin Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982); Haft, Business Decision by the
New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1981);
Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation,
31 Bus. LAw 1799 (1976); The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition
[Vol. 75:239
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
use of "Special Litigation Committees" consisting of independ-
ent directors to determine whether corporations should support
shareholder derivative litigation against their officers or direc-
tors. In theory, these committees provide unbiased recommen-
dations as to whether litigation should proceed. A 1982 study,
however, discloses that "although there have been more than a
score of special litigation committee cases .... in all but one
the committee concluded that the suit was not in the corpora-
tion's best interest."' 65
This result is not particularly surprising. Even when in-
dependent directors are not overtly biased towards incumbent
insiders, structural bias may affect their judgment. Outside di-
rectors tend to be corporate officers or retirees who likely will
share the same views and values as the insiders.'6 A sense of
"there but for the grace of God go I" is perhaps the likely re-
sponse to litigation against fellow directors. 167
The same sort of bias may affect independent director's de-
cisions in negotiated mergers. According to one survey, over
fifty percent of responding companies believed they were possi-
ble takeover targets, forty-five percent had been the subject of
takeover rumors, and thirty-six percent experienced unusual or
unexplained trading activity.'6 8 When a nominally independent
director's principal occupation is serving as an officer of an-
other corporation, the "there but for the grace of God go I" syn-
drome again rears its head. 6 9 Despite being an outsider, fears
for his or her own firm must often render an outside director
sympathetic to insiders' job security concerns.
of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus.
LAW 2083 (1978).
165. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Litigation,
1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 963.
166. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied sub.
nom. Citytrust v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); Cox, supra note 165, at 960-61; Cox
& Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal
Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBs. 83, 99-108
(1985); Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The
Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 111-13 (1980). But see Car-
ney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Con-
trof" An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 385, 425-30 (discussing limits on
the structural bias argument in the takeover context); Johnson & Siegel,
supra note 9, at 382-84 (arguing that structural bias is not a significant problem
in the acquisition context).
167. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).
168. S. REP. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1987) (additional views of
Sens. Sasser, Sanford & Chaffee).
169. Cf Gilson, supra note 152, at 881 n.220 (outside directors "may well
not be attitudinally independent").
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The argument is not that independent directors have no
role to play in policing management conduct. Delegating deci-
sions to disinterested board members at least avoids an appear-
ance of impropriety and may in fact prevent abuses. The point
is simply that independence alone does not justify significant
judicial deference to board decisions. As Judge Posner nicely
summarized the problem in a related context:
When managers are busy erecting obstacles to the taking over of the
corporation by an investor who is likely to fire them if the takeover
attempt succeeds, they have a clear conflict of interest, and it is not
cured by vesting the power of decision in a board of directors in which
insiders are a minority.... No one likes to be fired, whether he is
just a director or also an officer. The so-called outsiders moreover are
often friends of the insiders. And since they spend only part of their
time on the affairs of the corporation, their knowledge of those affairs
is much less than that of the insiders, to whom they are likely there-
fore to defer.1 7 0
Although many courts still purport to give somewhat greater
deference to merger decisions when a majority of the board is
independent,171 especially when the board is advised by in-
dependent counsel and investment bankers,1 72 in fact most
courts follow Posner and carefully scrutinize the board's con-
duct to ensure that it did not merely rubber stamp incumbent
management's decision.17 3
Interestingly, judicial deference to independent directors
arguably has been greatest in freezeout mergers between par-
ent and subsidiary corporations.1 7 4 Because a controlling share-
holder who has proposed a freezeout merger need not sell its
170. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
171. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951 (N.D. Ill.
1982); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders IAtig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch.
1988); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc., Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,502, at 97,219 (Del. Ch. 1987); Thompson v. Enstar
Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 581 (Del. Ch. 1984).
172. See Herzel, Colling & Carlson, supra note 4, at 160-62. But cf. Cottle
v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 577-78 (11th Cir. 1988) (not abuse
of discretion for board to rely on financial adviser having preexisting relation-
ship with management).
173. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir. 1986);
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277 (2d Cir.
1986); see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 176 n.3 (Del. 1986) (board is not presumed to be independent, because of
14 directors, six held senior management positions, two others held significant
blocks of stock, and six others had previously carried on business with the cor-
poration); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 844, 872, 874-75 (Del. 1985) (en
banc) (board's conduct equally scrutinized).
174. See supra note 164.
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shares to a competing bidder or otherwise make alternative
transactions available to minority shareholders, 175 competing
bids would be futile. In this case, independent directors are
the only available extrajudicial means of neutralizing the con-
trolling shareholder's conflict of interest.176 Where competitive
bidding is a viable option, however, it provides a significantly
more effective constraint on management's conflict of interest.
2. Approval by Shareholders
Absent a competing bid, the requirement that shareholders
approve a proposed negotiated acquisition is particularly un-
likely to constrain management's conduct. Rational sharehold-
ers will expend the effort to make informed voting decisions
only if the expected benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
177
Given the length and complexity of merger proxy statements,
the opportunity cost entailed in reading a proxy statement
before voting is quite high and very apparent. In contrast,
shareholders probably do not expect the proxy statement to
disclose grounds for opposing the proposed transaction.178 Fre-
quently there are no grounds. Even when grounds for opposing
the acquisition exist, shareholders will have difficultly discern-
ing them from the proxy statement. Accordingly, shareholders
presumably assign a relatively low value to the expected bene-
fits of carefully considering the proxy material. Shareholders
are thus rationally apathetic - the expected benefits of care-
fully reviewing the proxy material simply do not outweigh the
investment of time and effort necessary to do so.179 As a result,
shareholders are likely to approve board-supported transactions
even though the transaction furthers management interest
rather than shareholder interest. 80
The situation, however, changes rather dramatically when
175. See Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987).
176. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: Draft No. 9, supra note 112, at 5.
177. See R. CLARK, supra note 103, at 391.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 390-92; Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66-67 (1988). The problem is compounded
by the likelihood that a substantial number of shareholders will attempt to
free-ride on the efforts of a few informed shareholders. See R. CLARK, supra
note 103, at 392-93.
180. See R. CLARK, supra note 103, at 392-93; see also Freund & Easton,
supra note 26, at 1712; Gabaldon, supra note 26, at 1233; Manning, The Share-
holder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 261




a competing bid is made. Setting aside complicating issues such
as differing forms of consideration, shareholders now must
make a rather simple decision: Should they accept the higher
or lower priced bid? Accordingly, shareholder apathy should
largely dissipate in competitive bidding situations.' 8 ' The effec-
tiveness of shareholder approval requirements in monitoring
management's negotiation of an acquisition proposal thus de-
pends on the viability of competitive bidding.
3. Post-Merger Acquisitions
Theoretically, a competing bidder shut out of an initial ac-
quisition by an exclusivity provision or lock-up could acquire
the combined entity. The threat of a post-merger takeover
could conceivably constrain the target board's self-interested
behavior in the initial acquisition. This threat, however, is
often de minimins. The greater cost of acquiring the combined
firm may often prove beyond the competing bidder's means.182
Moreover, the combined firm can use the full array of takeover
defenses and applicable state takeover laws to fend off a hostile
bid. Thus, the theoretical availability of post-merger bidding
opportunities is unlikely to restrain the target board's conflict
of interest in the initial merger.
4. Judicial Review
Judicial review of exclusivity provisions and lock-ups has
failed to effectively constrain self-interested behavior by target
181. CY Ruback, supra note 7, at 147 (in all studied cases, target sharehold-
ers accepted the most valuable offer); Nachbar, supra note 14, at 482 (share-
holders likely to accept best offer). The growing importance of takeover
arbitragers may somewhat offset the problem of rational shareholder apathy
even in the absence of a competing bid. See Note, Merger Contracts, supra
note 3, at 760. Professors Johnson and Siegel likewise argue that shareholder
apathy is also countered by the heavy concentration of shareholdings in the
hands of institutional investors. Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 401 n.332.
There is strong evidence, however, that the principal focus of institutional in-
vestors is on short-term returns. See Lipton, supra note 179, at 7-8. Accord-
ingly, it would be surprising if either arbitragers, who by definition are short-
term speculators, or institutional investors would vote against an acquisition
proposal (typically paying a substantial premium over their purchase costs)
unless they expected a competing bid to emerge.
182. Indeed, the combined firm may be sufficiently large as to preclude any
acquisition effort. Although "recent history has shown that huge acquisitions
can be done", Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,264 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989),




boards on two critical fronts. First, there is considerable uncer-
tainty as to the applicability and content of the current legal re-
gimes. Second, the courts are simply not asking the right
questions.
a. Judicial Uncertainty and its Costs
As we have seen, target directors evaluating exclusivity
provisions and lock-ups cannot know whether a reviewing court
will focus on the directors' powers, the steps they took to
gather the information on which they based their decision, or
both. Equally critical are the ambiguities in each approach. As
to the former approach, uncertainty results from the rarity of
decisions and the lack of uniformity among jurisdictions that
have addressed this issue. As to the latter approach, uncer-
tainty is inherent in the very nature of the inquiry.
Neither Van Gorkom nor Hanson Trust, which applied the
duty of care approach, prohibited the use of exclusivity provi-
sions and lock-ups. The Hanson Trust court, however, did ex-
plicitly indicate that the duty of care requires compliance with
certain procedural safeguards, so-called "prophylactic steps."' 83
The benefits that flow from this emphasis on proper procedure,
however, are not free. Outside legal and financial experts are
more than willing to guide firms over procedural hurdles and
to provide documentation necessary to create the proper record
- in return for substantial fees. As Professor Fischel wryly ob-
served with respect to Van Gorkom: "I wish someone would
pay me several hundred thousand dollars to state that $55 is
greater than $35."'84
Forcing target boards to jump through specified hoops
would be less objectionable if doing so provided some assur-
ances that the transaction would then pass muster. Unfortu-
nately, neither Van Gorkom nor Hanson Trust provide
substantial guidance to directors currently faced with merger
decisions. Directors can answer most of the questions these two
cases raise only with hindsight. Moreover, these questions re-
183. The Hanson Trust court specifically endorsed the "steps that were
previously identified as constituting due care" in Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.,
638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980): "the directors 'armed' their bankers with fi-
nancial questions to evaluate; they requested balance sheets; they adjourned
deliberations for one week to consider the requisitioned advice; and they con-
ditioned approval of the deal on the securing of a fairness opinion from their
bankers." Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275
(2d Cir. 1986).
184. Fischel, supra note 98, at 1453.
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quire courts to evaluate factors (such as valuation procedures)
that "are precisely the types of issues that [they] are ill-
equipped to explore and whose judicial exploration the business
judgment rule is designed to preclude."1 8 5 Thus, they threaten
to significantly increase the transaction costs associated with
corporate acquisitions, thereby decreasing shareholder re-
turns.1 86 These questions also essentially mandate judicial sec-
ond-guessing of business decisions and are therefore likely to
result in greater uncertainty as to exclusivity provision and
lock-up validity.1 8 7
The present uncertainty as to the validity of exclusivity
provisions and lock-ups produces important social costs. If un-
certainty causes parties to not enter into exclusivity provisions
or lock-ups when the provisions, in fact, would benefit share-
holders, socially desirable behavior is deterred. However, un-
certainty also prevents optimal deterrence because target
boards may believe that they can validly enter socially undesir-
able provisions.L8 8 Courts can alleviate this problem, at least in
part, by adopting bright-line standards that clearly define when
target boards can validly enter exclusivity provisions. 8 9 But if
clarity and predictability are therefore the hallmarks of good
corporate law, the present legal regime largely fails that test.
b. Asking the Right Questions
Judicial review also has failed on a second, and more fun-
damental, front: Current law focuses on what are essentially
side issues. None of the Great Western,190 Jewel,19 ' and Van
Gorkom' 92 lines of cases address the potential for side pay-
ments to management. Until courts begin addressing this issue,
185. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 291 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
186. Cf. Fischel, supra note 98, at 1453 (firms will incur judicially imposed
costs of experts prepared to testify that cost is fair); Herzel & Katz, supra note
98, at 1191 (increased formalism will increase costs for attorneys, bankers, ac-
countants, consultants, and economists, among others).
187. See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 374-75.
188. See generally Calfee & Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Com-
pliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965-67 (1984) (uncertain ap-
plication of legal standards may give economic incentives to over-comply or
under-comply with them).
189. Even a highly specific rule, however, may not fully eliminate uncer-
tainty. See id. at 968 n.7.
190. Great Western Producers Co-Op v. Great Western United Corp., 200
Colo. 180, 613 P.2d 873 (1980) (en banc).
191. Jewel Cos. v. Pay Less Drug Stores N.W., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir.
1984).
192. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (en bane).
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judicial review will remain a costly, dangerous, but essentially
meaningless, ritual.
i. Analyzing Exclusivity Provisions
In a critical sense, neither Great Western nor Jewel got ex-
clusivity provisions right. Great Western was wrong because it
effectively said that a target board has no authority to grant ex-
clusivity provisions. Jewel was wrong too, because it apparently
ended the inquiry into the exclusivity provision's validity after
concluding that the board had authority to grant the provision.
Both courts thus conflated two inquiries - the target board's
on-going fiduciary duty to reevaluate whether the transaction is
in the shareholders' best interest and the board's authority to
grant exclusivity provisions. Courts, however, can, and should,
see these inquiries as posing distinct issues.
There are substantial policy arguments in favor of Jewel's
conclusion that target boards have the power to enter binding
performance promises. Admittedly, an enforceable perform-
ance promise is likely to put a late entrant at a disadvantage.
Best efforts and no-shop clauses restrict a target board's ability
to respond to a higher competing bid or changed business condi-
tions. Performance promises, however, should not significantly
affect the viability of competitive bidding. Because sharehold-
ers remain free to reject the favored bidder's offer,1 93 the late
entrant is free to make a tender offer directly to the target
shareholders or conduct a proxy contest against the favored
bidder's proposal without incurring liability for tortious inter-
ference with contract.1 94 Moreover, once a competing bidder
institutes a tender offer or proxy contest, the target board must
disclose this fact to its shareholders. 95 The competing bidder
also will make target shareholders aware of the alternative pro-
posal through its independent efforts. Given the increasing
predominance of sophisticated takeover arbitragers and institu-
193. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 92, 96-97 and accompanying text. Cf. STV Engineers,
Inc. v. Greiner Engineering, Inc., 861 F.2d 784, 788 (3d Cir. 1988) (no-shop
clause in letter of intent did not preclude group of Greiner's executives from
preparing and making competing MBO bid).
195. R-G Denver, Ltd. v. First City Holdings, Inc., 789 F.2d 1469, 1474-75
(10th Cir. 1986); Jewel, 741 F.2d at 1564; Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus-
tries, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D. Nev. 1985); ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc.,
222 Neb. 136, 138, 382 N.W.2d 576, 587 (1986) (per curiam). Cf. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9(a) (1990) (proxy materials must be materially complete and accu-




tional investors in the shareholder community, it seems un-
likely that shareholders will blindly follow a board's
recommendation in the face of a truly superior offer.19 Ac-
cordingly, performance promises provide weak security for side
payments to management. As such, they do not pose a serious
risk of a conflict of interest between target managers and
shareholders.
Why then would a rational bidder demand inclusion of
such provisions? Although a binding performance promise can-
not prevent a late entrant from making a competing bid or pre-
clude shareholders from accepting one, it does constrain the
target board's ability to renege on the transaction. Critics of
performance promises typically focus on this aspect of such ar-
rangements, arguing that the directors' fiduciary duties obligate
them to base their decisions and recommendations on the facts
presented at the time shareholders vote on the transaction.'1
These critics, however, frequently fail to recognize that the tar-
get often receives equivalent benefits. Accordingly, perform-
ance promises are justified, in part, by an explicit quid pro quo.
Although the target board cannot renege on the agreement, the
favored bidder's board also is bound.1 98
Binding the bidder to the agreement can provide necessary
protection for the target, which risks significant harm if the
bidder reneges in response to changing conditions. 199 Merger
agreements generally contain an extensive set of covenants that
limit target management's pre-closing discretion to run the
firm's business.200 The target thus may fail to respond to
changes in the business climate. Furthermore, important per-
sonnel may depart out of boredom or because of job security
concerns. If the bidder does not ultimately acquire the target,
196. See supra note 181.
197. E.g., Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 368; Millich, supra note 46, at
834-35; Note, Merger Contracts, supra note 3, at 753-63.
198. See supra text accompanying note 11; see, e.g., Hastings-Murtagh v.
Texas Air Corp., 649 F. Supp. 479, 485 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
199. But cf. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,275 n.12 (Del. Ch. July 14,
1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) ("[c]ircumstances have rarely if ever
arisen in which an offeror need concern itself with likely changes in circum-
stances affecting its shareholders prior to the proposed closing of its offer").
200. See generally J. FREUND, supra note 2, at 293-95 (describing the cove-
nants contained in merger agreements). This Article does not address the is-
sue of whether binding performance promises could be made as part of a letter
of intent. See generally Temkin, supra note 47 (addressing contractual issues




such developments may leave the target in a less competitive
posture to the detriment of its shareholders. Mutual exclusiv-
ity provisions thus give target shareholders some assurance that
a favorable transaction will not be lost, with potentially severe
consequences.2 01
Performance promises also provide a negotiating tool for
the target board. In return for decreasing the initial bidder's
risk that the merger will not go forward, management can in-
sist that the bidder pay a higher price or otherwise offer more
favorable terms to the shareholders.20 2 Indeed, because ra-
tional bidders presumably discount their bids to account for the
risk that the target board will renege, decreasing this risk
through the use of a performance promise should automatically
offset any such tendency.
Similar policy arguments also support a conclusion that
target boards have the power to enter binding cancellation fee
provisions. Admittedly, the target remains liable for the fee,
thus imposing an economic cost on a successful competing bid-
der.20 3 Most fee arrangements, however, involve only a small
percentage of the value of the transaction.204 This relatively in-
significant contingent liability is unlikely to coerce sharehold-
ers into accepting an otherwise undesirable transaction.
Likewise, there is no reason to believe that a reasonable fee ar-
rangement significantly deters competing bids.20 5 Finally, be-
cause cancellation fees decrease the bidder's risk, management
can demand appropriate consideration in return for granting
such a provision, thus enhancing shareholder gains.
Accepting the Jewel court's view of the board's authority,
however, does not require one to reject the Great Western view
of the target board's ongoing fiduciary duties. The Great West-
ern court arguably was correct in holding that the board has an
ongoing duty to evaluate whether the terms and conditions of
201. Cf. Priddy v. Edelman, 883 F.2d 438, 443 (6th Cir. 1989) (board acted
properly in quickly selecting one of two competing bids in light of risk that
"the deal might have fallen through, leaving the shareholders worse off").
202. Compare Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 406-07 (arguing that the
no-shop agreement is of some value to an acquiring board and thus the agree-
ment will increase the value of the bid) with Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 1705,
1712 (arguing that the agreement may not bring a higher bid).
203. S. REED, supra note 14, at 753.
204. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
205. See Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (target board agreed to a termination fee and still received
other bids); Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 410-11 (reasonable cancellation
fee will not inhibit competition, although a substantial fee may).
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the transaction are in the shareholder's best interest from the
time of signing a merger agreement until closing. Suppose that,
after signing the exclusive merger agreement, the bidder's fi-
nancial condition substantially deteriorates. Or suppose the
target directors failed, because of their own lack of due dili-
gence, to discover troublesome news about the bidder when en-
tering the definitive merger agreement. It is at least plausible
that the target board's fiduciary duties require the board to re-
consider the merger in either case. A useful analogy may be
the lawyer who is obliged to withdraw a favorable opinion let-
ter because of a subsequent adverse change in the law or be-
cause the lawyer failed to discover the contrary law before
issuing the initial opinion.206
Adopting the Great Western conclusion that target boards
have a continuing fiduciary duty to their shareholders, how-
ever, does not require one to also accept the Great Western
conclusion that target boards can freely renege on exclusivity
provisions. In a sense, performance promises and cancellation
fees are the merger contract's equivalent of a liquidated dam-
ages clause. As such, there is a strong economic justification for
routinely enforcing these party designed contractual remedies:
Like a liquidated damages clause, exclusivity provisions may be
considered "an insurance contract written in favor of the inno-
cent party by the breaching party. '20 7
For example, consider the facts of ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill,
Inc.2 0 8 The target was the second largest producer in the boxed
beef industry. ConAgra, desiring to enter this highly competi-
tive industry, presumably placed a high subjective value on
completing the acquisition: Not only was the target intrinsi-
cally valuable, but ConAgra likely anticipated important syner-
gies from the acquisition.20 9 The target, moreover, was the best
possible insurer against the loss of that subjective valuation. If
the acquisition failed to go forward, only the target - through
payment of a cancellation fee or damages for breaching its per-
formance promise - could compensate ConAgra for the loss of
its anticipated synergistic gains. If courts refused to enforce ex-
clusivity provisions, the target would not consider this potential
liability when deciding whether to breach or perform. Effi-
ciency therefore argues for enforcing exclusivity provisions, in
206. I am indebted to Mike Dooley for this analogy.
207. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 293 (1986).
208. 222 Neb. 136, 382 N.W.2d 576 (1986) (per curiam).
209. Id. at 139, 382 N.W.2d at 579.
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the absence of other costs, because the target will then renege
only when the benefits of breaching outweigh the costs. The
law would thereby protect the bidder's subjective valuation at
the lowest possible cost.21 0
By recognizing the enforceability of exclusivity provisions,
the target board's duty resolves into a fairly straight-forward
application of efficient breach theory. For example, suppose
that the Acquirer board and the Target board enter an exclu-
sive merger agreement in which the Acquirer agrees to
purchase Target for $100,000 and the Target board agrees to use
its best efforts to consummate the merger. Before shareholder
action on the proposal, a competing bidder offers $120,000. If
the Target board concludes that breaching the best efforts
clause to accept the competing bid would result in a damage
claim of less than $20,000, it should breach the agreement, pay
damages to Acquirer, and merge with the competing bidder.211
Because the Target shareholders gain and no other party loses,
this breach is both consistent with the Target board's fiduciary
duties and efficient. Thus, a rule that enforces exclusivity pro-
visions through a damages remedy in favor of initial bidders,
but also imposes ongoing fiduciary duties on target boards, pro-
motes efficiency by assuring that corporations obtain the bene-
fits of both exclusive merger agreements and competitive
bidding. In light of this analysis, Part IV of this Article will
propose a framework for analyzing exclusivity provisions that
should result in their routine judicial enforcement.
ii. Analyzing Lock-Ups
Unlike exclusivity provisions, effective lock-ups pose a se-
vere threat to both free shareholder choice and competitive bid-
ding. If the initial bidder exercises a substantial asset lock-up
option, the target will have to operate without crucial assets.
As a result, shareholders are coerced into approving the pro-
posed transaction, so as to avoid being left as owners of a rap-
idly failing business.212 Likewise, an asset lock-up option
should deter competing bids by making the target much less
210. See R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 207, at 293-94. In addition, as
with liquidated damage clauses, performance promises and cancellation fees
"may be the most efficient means of one party's conveying information about
his reliability and his ability to perform the contract." I& at 295.
211. See id. at 289-92.
212. R. GILSON, supra note 92, at 845; see also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML
SMC Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 282 (2d Cir. 1986) (shareholders must bear




A stock lock-up option may be even more effective. If the
initial bidder exercises a stock lock-up involving a significant
percentage of the target's outstanding shares, the bidder (per-
haps in conjunction with insider holdings) may acquire suffi-
cient voting power to approve its proposed transaction
regardless of the views of minority shareholders.2 1 4 Likewise,
such a lock-up could give the initial bidder a controlling inter-
est in the target even if all other shareholders tendered their
stock to a competing bidder. Moreover, even if the stock lock-
up option did not give the holder enough shares to indepen-
dently approve the merger, it might coerce shareholders into
accepting the offer or preclude competing bids because, by ex-
ercising the option, the initial bidder will effectively impose a
Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 583 (Del. Ch. 1984) (shareholders
bear risk that stock price may drop after shareholders meeting).
213. See Helman & Davis, supra note 6, at 16-18. An asset lock-up's deter-
rent effect largely depends on avoiding any shareholder approval requirement.
In general, shareholder approval is statutorily mandated only when exercise of
the option would result in the sale of "all or substantially all" of the target
corporation's assets. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 271 (1988). The Revised
Model Act has done away with the substantially all distinction for purposes of
determining the need for shareholder approval, instead focusing on whether
the transaction is "in the regular course of business." See MODEL BUSINEss
CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 12.01-.02 (1985). Although most statutes speak of sales,
sale of asset statutes have been held equally applicable to options. See, e.g.,
Texas Co. v. Z. & M. Indep. Oil Co., 156 F.2d 802, 865 (2d Cir. 1946) (applying
New York law). There are no bright-line definitions of what constitutes sub-
stantially all of a corporation's assets. Many courts focus on the nature of the
assets, requiring shareholder approval only when sale of the assets would
work a fundamental change in the nature of the corporation. See, e.g., Good v.
Lackawanna Leather Co., 96 N.J. Super. 439, 456, 233 A.2d 201, 210 (1967) (test
is not for amount involved but for nature of transaction); Eisen v. Post, 3
N.Y.2d 518, 523, 146 N.E.2d 779, 780, 169 N.Y.S.2d 15, 18 (1957) (same). Other
courts, particularly those of Delaware, take a somewhat more quantitative ap-
proach, focusing on the value of the assets. See, e.g., Katz v. Bregman, 431
A.2d 1274, 1276 (Del. Ch. 1981); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 605 (Del.
Ch.), aff'd on other grounds, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974). See generally E. FOLK,
THE DELAwARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAw 400-01 (1972); R. GI.SON, supra
note 92, at 523-26. In general, however, the magnitude of the transaction re-
quired to trigger the statutes has been so large as to preclude their application
to asset lock-ups. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951-52
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 98,375, at 92,283 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 7, 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 456 U.S. 982 (1982).
214. Absent unusual circumstances, dissenting shareholders would be rele-
gated to their statutory appraisal rights. Cf. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 703-04 (Del. 1983) (in cash-out mergers shareholders relegated to appraisal
remedy, absent unusual facts).
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substantial penalty on the target.21 5
Of course, not all lock-up options have the draconian ef-
fects just described. When the optioned shares or assets are a
relatively small percentage of the target's overall value, the op-
tion is little more than alternative means of structuring a can-
cellation fee. As such, these options should "not affect the vote
of the stockholders... or stand in the way of possible bids by
other interested parties. '216 Thus, courts must identify those
lock-ups that effectively preclude competitive bidding, and neu-
tralize the potential conflict of interest that may taint a deci-
sion to grant such a lock-up.,
Unfortunately, lock-up decisions, such as Hanson Trust,
that determine the validity of lock-ups based on the reasonable-
ness of the board's decision to enter into the provision are ask-
ing the wrong question.2 17 A poorly negotiated sales contract is
not unenforceable simply because the agent who negotiated the
215. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281-83 (lock-up option would effectively
end bidding); Enstar, 509 A.2d at 583 (lock-up would give purchaser control of
voting); Herzel, supra note 4, at 173-75 (stockholders have very little choice
but to accept offer); Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 373 (lock-up removes
any real choice for shareholders). As with asset lock-ups, a stock lock-up op-
tion's deterrent effect requires the parties to avoid any shareholder approval
requirement. The option therefore typically will be limited by the number of
treasury or authorized but unissued shares, because increasing the number of
authorized but unissued shares usually requires shareholder approval of an
amendment to the corporation's charter. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
ANN. §§ 2.02, 6.01, 10.03 (1985); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 242 (1988). In the case
of targets listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges, the parties'
flexibility is further limited by exchange rules requiring shareholder approval
of stock issuances exceeding, respectively, 18.5% or 20% of the outstanding
shares. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.00
(1983); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY GUIDE § 712 (1983). The
American Stock Exchange has proposed raising its threshold to 25%. Ex-
change Act Release No. 26,263 (Nov. 15, 1988). The short-swing profit provi-
sions of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1980), also act as an
additional constraint on the size of stock lock-up options. See supra note 15.
Despite these limitations, lock-up options covering a greater number of target
shares than those presently outstanding are not unheard of. See, e.g., Data
Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1556-57 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (acquirer granted an option to buy authorized but unissued shares
equivalent to 200% of the target's outstanding voting stock).
216. Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6,342, slip op. (Del. Ch. July 6, 1982), reprinted
in 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 406, 415 (1983), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (en banc). See also Yanow v. Scientific
Leasing, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,660, at
98,033 n.6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988) (option was not a lock-up that would preclude
higher bids).




contract on behalf of a corporate purchaser was incompetent.
Rather, the seller can enforce the contract according to its
terms, and the corporation's remedy is against the agent for the
losses it has suffered. Similarly, in some jurisdictions, a trustee
having a power of sale generally may enter into a binding sales
contract without first auctioning the assets to be sold.218 If the
assets are sold at an unreasonably low price, the contract re-
mains binding even if a third party makes a higher offer prior
to closing.2 1 9 The beneficiary's only recourse is against the
trustee under a negligence or breach of duty theory,220 the ben-
eficiary has no recourse against the purchaser.22'
The basic issue then is not whether the lock-up is a good
deal for the shareholders. If it is a bad deal, the shareholders'
remedy is for money damages against the board (assuming they
can overcome the business judgment rule), not an injunction
against the lock-up.222 Rather, the issue is the legitimacy of the
218. See, e.g., Hatcher v. United States Nat'l Bank, 56 Or. App. 643, 652, 643
P.2d 359, 365 (1982) (trustee may "test market" or obtain an independent ap-
praisal of property); Allard v. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 99 Wash. 2d 394, 405, 663
P.2d 104, 111 (1983) (same). But see Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l
Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718, 734 (D. Colo. 1967) (implying that while open bidding
may not be required, trustee may not dispose of assets in a private sale where
there is another interested party who may pay more); Lockwood v. OFB Corp.,
305 A.2d 636, 638 (Del. Ch. 1973) (trustee "should arrange for competitive bid-
ding if that is possible and appropriate to the asset involved"); State v. Hart-
man, 54 Wis. 2d 47, 54, 194 N.W.2d 653, 656 (1972) (trustee must place property
on open market before selling).
219. See Annotation, Second and Higher Offer as Affecting Final Approval
of Trustee's Sale, 1 A.L.R. 3D 629, 630 (1965); 76 AM. JuR. 2D Trusts § 454
(1974). The courts are split as to whether a trustee has a duty to disavow the
initial contract where the sale is subject to court approval and a higher bid is
made before court approval is obtained. Compare Gilden v. Harris, 197 Md. 32,
42, 78 A.2d 167, 171 (1951) (uphold sale) and In re Trust Estate of Strauss, 11
Wis. 2d 410, 413-14, 105 N.W.2d 553, 555 (1960) (same) with Kane v. Girard
Trust Co., 351 Pa. 191, 196-97, 40 A.2d 466, 469 (1945) (trustee is bound to ac-
cept higher bid until title passes). See also Evans v. Hunold, 393 Ill. 195, 199,
65 N.E.2d 373, 375 (1946) (same).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 147, § 190 comment i;
A. ScoTr & W. FRATCHER, supra note 147, §§ 190.6, 208.6.
221. See, e.g., Wittick v. Miles, 274 Or. 1, 10, 545 P.2d 121, 126-27 (1976). Of
course, corporate law differs from trust law in that it is premised on owner
participation in significant decisions. Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 1672. Exclu-
sivity provisions, especially lock-ups, are thus often criticized on the grounds
that they adversely affect the shareholders' right to make the final decision
with respect to control transactions. On close examination, this criticism is not
very persuasive. See infra notes 362-64 and accompanying text.
222. Of course, the recent wave of director liability statutes may limit the
effectiveness of this remedy. See supra note 148; see also infra text accompa-
nying notes 347-49 (describing the Delaware statute's effectiveness on incen-
tives of target directors). However, those statutes do not preclude equitable
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agreement. Was the agreement within the power or authority
of the board? Because we have the greatest reason to doubt the
board's authority to do something when it is disabled by a con-
flict of interest, duty of loyalty questions necessarily implicate
the legitimacy of lock-ups in a way that duty of care questions
do not. An inquiry limited to the duty of care is appropriate
only for board decisions that contain a low risk of management
misconduct. Thus, lock-ups granted in negotiated acquisitions
are properly analyzed as a duty of loyalty question - the valid-
ity and enforceability of a lock-up should hinge on the
likelihood that it is being used to protect side payments to
management.
Identifying those negotiated acquisitions that contain side
payments and crafting an appropriate judicial response to them
raises several difficult problems. For one, it seems clear that
management's conflict of interest is only a potential problem -
not every negotiated acquisition is motivated by or involves im-
proper side payments. Moreover, even when side payments do
occur, they are extremely difficult to detect.223 For example, a
bidder might legitimately offer target managers improved bene-
fits to retain experienced, knowledgeable key employees. In
the absence of the proverbial smoking gun, what evidence
should a court require to prove such benefits were improper
side payments used to obtain management's cooperation?
Clearly, the greater coercive and deterrent effects of lock-
ups mandates a more restrictive approach to lock-up validity
than the approach applied to exclusivity provisions. As this Ar-
ticle proposes in Part IV, the most sensible course for courts to
take in this situation is to adopt a set of prophylactic rules
designed to assure that negotiated acquisitions are reviewed by
the marketplace. Substituting a market test for judicial review
provides an effective constraint on management, while avoiding
the need to resolve subjective and complex questions of mo-
tive.22 Before describing this alternative to judicial review,
relief for breaches of the duty of care. There may be factual patterns that
would justify enjoining an especially disadvantageous deal if the plaintiff is
able to establish the traditional bases of equitable relief, including irreparable
injury and inadequacy of monetary relief.
223. See Bebchuk, supra note 150, at 25 n.8; Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper
Role, supra note 6, at 1180 n.49.
224. Cf CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: DRAFT No. 9, supra note 112, at 9
("market review of the fairness of the terms of a management buyout is pref-
erable to judicial review").
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however, this Article will review a developing line of authority
that centers on the role of competitive bidding.
III. THE DUTY TO AUCTION CONTROL FROM
REVLON TO TIME
Part II demonstrated that competitive bidding provides the
best available constraint on self-dealing by target managers in
the negotiated acquisition setting. Unfortunately, neither of
the two traditional review methodologies focus on the role of
competitive bidding, instead relying on other, largely ineffec-
tive, constraints. This Part turns to a line of authority that ex-
pressly mandates an auction of corporate control in certain
types of takeover contests.
The duty to auction control emerged as Delaware law gov-
erning target responses to hostile takeover bids evolved. Dela-
ware courts initially used the so-called "primary purpose test"
in reviewing takeover defenses. Under this standard, courts re-
fused to give directors the immediate benefit of the business
judgment rule's presumption of good faith. Rather, directors
had the initial burden of showing that they had reasonable
grounds to believe that a danger to corporate policy and effec-
tiveness existed and that they did not act for the primary pur-
pose of preserving their own incumbency. The directors,
however, merely had to show good faith and reasonable investi-
gation; courts would not hold them liable for an honest mistake
of judgment.22
Because management could routinely identify some policy
conflict with the bidder, primary purpose analysis added little
to the highly deferential treatment of board decisions mandated
by the traditional business judgment rule.226 Accordingly, the
primary purpose test was an inadequate response to the poten-
tial conflict of interest present when management responds to a
takeover bid.22 7 The Delaware Supreme Court eventually rec-
ognized this flaw, and responded in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co.228 The test adopted in Unocal requires directors who
225. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 166, 175, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (1964).
226. Gilson, Structural Approach to Corporations, supra note 152, at 829.
227. Id. at 826-31.
228. 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985). See also Dynamics Corp. of Am. v.
CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Delaware Court's rea-
soning to Indiana law); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256
(7th Cir. 1986) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (similarly abandoning the
primary purpose test). See generally Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Interme-
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adopt a takeover defense to "show that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and ef-
fectiveness existed."229 In addition to requiring proof of good
faith and reasonable investigation, this standard also requires
target directors to prove that the defense was authorized by
law, not undertaken solely or primarily out of a desire to per-
petuate the directors or officers in office, and, most impor-
tantly, reasonable in relation to the threat posed.230 As a
result, courts no longer simply rubber-stamp a target board's
decision to take defensive measures, but review it carefully to
make sure the board really was acting in the best interests of
the corporation.23'
As applied to exclusivity provisions and lock-ups, the net
effect of these developments was a greater emphasis on the im-
portance of competitive bidding in corporate acquisitions.2 2 A
standard closely related to the primary purpose test was ap-
plied to early challenges of lock-up arrangements. This stan-
dard imposed on a competing bidder challenging the lock-up
the initial burden of showing that self-interest or bad faith
tainted the target director's grant of the lock-up.233 If the com-
peting bidder failed to make such a showing, the business judg-
ment rule precluded judicial review of the board's decision.234
diate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is there Substance to Proportionality Re-
view?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247 (1989) (discussing Delaware's Unocal standard for
analyzing a takeover defense); Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation. The Need
for Reform, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 4-17 (1988) (same).
229. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
230. Id. at 953-55.
231. Dynamics Corp., 805 F.2d at 708. This analysis will be applied to a
challenged takeover defense not only when it is adopted, but also when it is
utilized by the target in connection with a particular tender offer. See Moran,
500 A.2d at 1354.
232. Landefeld, Business Auctions Take Hold, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1989, at
S2, col. 2. When a competing bidder objects to a lock-up, it is essentially mak-
ing the same claims which a hostile bidder makes against takeover defensive
tactics. In either case, the bidder complains that the target has erected an im-
permissible barrier to its offer. Not surprisingly, judicial analysis of lock-ups
has frequently parallelled the rules governing takeover defenses. R. GuLSoN,
supra note 92, at 838.
233. Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980)
(citing Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980)).
234. Id During the early 1980s, hostile bidders also frequently argued that
defensive lock-ups constituted "manipulative" practices in violation of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e). See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988) (prohibit-
ing, in pertinent part, "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices" in connection with a tender offer). This tactic met with some initial
success. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). But see, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition
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If the competing bidder made such a showing, however, courts
required the directors to show that the transaction was fair and
reasonable to the corporation.2 5  To sustain the burden of
showing self-interest or bad faith, the competing bidder had to
show that a desire to perpetuate incumbent target managers in
office motivated the lock-up.236 Courts, however, declined to
find improper motives merely because target management
would remain in office if the favored bidder prevailed.2 37 Like-
wise, courts found that a target board's resistance to a compet-
ing bidder did not demonstrate self-interest. 238 Rather, courts
permitted target managers to take affirmative steps to facilitate
consummation of the merger with the favored bidder, and re-
Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1983) (defensive lock-up not suc-
cessful), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F.
Supp. 933, 949 (N.D. IM. 1982) (same); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 98,616, at 93,059 (S.D.N.Y. March
26, 1982) (same). In 1985, however, the Supreme Court held that misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure is an essential element of a manipulation claim under
§ 14(e). Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). As a re-
sult, § 14(e) is essentially inapplicable to exclusive merger agreements that are
fully and accurately disclosed. See Note, Down But Not Out - The Lock-Up
Option Still Has Legal Punch When Properly Used, supra note 164, at 1128.
Competing bidders and objecting target shareholders are thus largely limited
to state law claims based on target directors' fiduciary duties.
It is conceivable, although perhaps unlikely, that Congress will act to pro-
hibit lock-ups in certain situations. Legislation introduced, but not adopted,
during the 100th Congress would have made it unlawful for any company "to
establish or implement" a lock-up, among other defensive tactics, during a
tender offer, if doing so would violate rules to be adopted by the SEC, unless
the defense was approved by the shareholders in a manner also to be governed
by new SEC rules. Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 2172, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 14 (1987).
235. Crouse-Hinds, 638 F.2d at 702 (citing Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638
F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980)).
236. Id. at 702-04; Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892, 903-
04, (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983);
Whittaker Corp., 535 F. Supp. at 950-51.
237. Crouse-Hinds, 634 F.2d at 702. A number of older Delaware cases up-
held asset sales despite evidence that incumbent directors or officers would
have employment arrangements with the acquiring company. See, e.g., Cot-
trell v. Pawcatuck Co., 36 Del. Ch. 169, 172, 128 A.2d 225, 227 (1956), appeal
dismissed and cert denied, 355 U.S. 12 (1957); Smith v. Good Music Station,
Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 262, 266-67, 129 A.2d 242, 245-46 (1957); Baron v. Pressed Met-
als of Am., Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 325, 329, 335, 117 A.2d 357, 360, 364 (1955), aff'd, 35
Del. Ch. 581, 123 A.2d 848 (1956); Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 19
Del. Ch. 326, 328-29, 167 A. 831, 832-33 (1933). Cf. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp.,
638 F.2d 357, 383 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law, self-dealing could not
be found where all directors were to resign after an acquisition).




fused to require them to reconsider the initial offer when a
third party made a competing bid.239 In short, absent the pro-
verbial smoking gun, it was virtually impossible for competing
bidders to show that improper entrenchment purposes moti-
vated a merger. °
Gradually, however, courts began to recognize the central
role of competitive bidding. Smith v. Van Gorkom,41 for ex-
ample, implied that one means of satisfying the target board's
duty of care is through a meaningful market test of the favored
bidder's proposal.m Similarly, Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc.23 sharply criticized the use of a lock-up to
end an active bidding contest.L " This trend came to a head in
the Delaware Supreme Court's ground-breaking decision, Rev-
lon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,2 5 the first sig-
nificant case explicitly mandating an auction process in a
takeover situation.
A. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE DUTY TO AUCTION
CONTROL
Revlon involved defensive measures taken in response to a
hostile bidder, Pantry Pride. The fight for control began when
Pantry Pride approached Revlon with an unsolicited cash
tender offer for any or all of Revlon's outstanding stock at
$47.50 per common share. 4  In response, Revlon's board com-
menced a partial self-tender offer in which Revlon exchanged
239. Id, at 703-04. See also Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951
(N.D. M. 1982) (holding the board of directors of a target company may pro-
mote consummation of a transaction judged to be in the best interests of the
shareholders even if to do so might cause the hostile tender offer to
withdraw).
240. See, e.g., Crouse-Hinds, 634 F.2d at 704; Buffalo Forge, 717 F.2d at 759;
Mhittaker Corp., 535 F. Supp. at 950-51.
241. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (en banc).
242. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
243. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
244. Id. at 281; see also Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 583 (Del.
Ch. 1984) (court giving careful scrutiny to lock-up provisions in light of their
potential to chill competitive bidding).
245. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
246. This factual summary is drawn from the Delaware Supreme Court's
decision, id. at 176-79, and from the previous opinion of the Delaware Chan-
cery Court, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d
1239, 1242-46 (Del. Ch. 1985). Revlon's board of directors initially responded
by instituting a stock repurchase program and adopting a so-called "Note
Purchase Rights Plan," a variant on the poison pill takeover defense. The
Revlon plan differed from the classic poison pill by giving shareholders the
right to exchange their shares for newly issued Revlon notes, instead of the
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10 million outstanding Revlon common shares for newly issued
subordinated notes and preferred stock.247 In turn, Pantry
Pride made a new tender offer at $42 per common share.2 8
Shortly after the Revlon board rejected Pantry Pride's $42
per share offer, it authorized management to enter into negoti-
ations with other prospective bidders. Forstmann Little & Co.
(Forstmann) and Adler & Shaykin made separate white knight
offers in response to management's efforts. After Pantry Pride
increased its bid to $53 per share, Revlon's board agreed to a
leveraged buyout by Forstmann at $56 per share. Pantry Pride
countered by offering $56.25 per share and announced that it
would engage in fractional bidding, topping any Forstmann bid
with a slightly higher one. Forstmann responded with a new
offer of $57.25 per share, conditioned on Revlon's acceptance of
several exclusivity provisions. Forstmann's principal demand
was for an asset lock-up option on two Revlon divisions at an
exercise price substantially below the value given them by Rev-
lon's financial adviser. Forstmann also insisted on a no-shop
clause and a $25 million cancellation fee, payable if any other
party acquired more than 19.9% of Revlon's stock. Revlon ac-
ceded to Forstmann's terms and also agreed to redeem its
poison pill and waive certain anti-takeover covenants in its
notes. Pantry Pride responded by raising its offer to $58 per
share and by seeking judicial invalidation of Revlon's poison
pill, the exchange offer, and the exclusivity provisions granted
to Forstmann. 249
The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis of these
defensive measures by noting that lock-up options and other
such provisions are valid under Delaware law unless they are
tainted by director self-interest or other breach of fiduciary'
duty.250 The court, however, also noted that it will not auto-
matically give the board's decision to enter these provisions the
benefit of the business judgement rule, but will closely scruti-
nize the decision under the standard articulated in Unocal to
determine whether the board breached its fiduciary duty.251
more usual right to purchase additional shares of common stock. See Revlon,
506 A.2d at 177.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 177-79.
249. Id See also supra note 246 (describing Revlon's stock repurchase
program).
250. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
176, 183-84 (Del. 1986).
251. Id. at 180-81.
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Applying the Unocal standard to the Revlon board's defen-
sive actions, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the poison
pill and the exchange offer, deeming them reasonable re-
sponses to an inadequate bid.2 2 In turning to the lock-up ar-
rangement, however, the court added a new wrinkle to its
analysis:
The Revlon board's authorization permitting management to negoti-
ate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the
company was for sale. The duty of the board had thus changed from
the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization
of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit. This
significantly altered the board's responsibilities under the Unocal
standards. It no longer faced threats to corporate policy and effective-
ness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid.
The whole question of defensive measures became moot. The direc-
tors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auction-
eers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale
of the company.
2 5 3
In particular, exclusivity provisions or lock-ups that end an ac-
tive auction will be subject to exacting scrutiny to determine
whether they are reasonable in relation to the threat posed by
the disfavored bidders.2 Because the Revlon lock-up provi-
sions ended the auction in return for minimal improvement in
the final offer, and the Revlon board largely intended the pro-
vision to protect its own interests, the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld the lower court's injunction against the option.255 Be-
cause the no-shop clause and the cancellation fee were part of
an overall effort to thwart Pantry Pride's efforts, their invalid-
ity followed in due course.2
Target directors are given considerable discretion in con-
ducting a control auction mandated by Revlon. They need not
be passive observers of market competition.2s 7 Directors, how-
ever, must scrupulously adhere to ordinary notions of fair-
252. Id. The court found that the board's decision to enter the poison pill
and exchange offer was consistent with its fiduciary duty because the board
could have reasonably believed that Pantry Pride's offer was grossly inade-
quate and thus constituted a harmful threat to Revlon shareholders. Accord-
ingly, the board could properly take defensive measures to forestall the
harmful takeover. Id- at 182.
253. Id
254. IM at 183.
255. Id. at 184.
256. Id-
257. CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 441
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 184 n.16 (Del. 1986).
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ness.258 Their "primary objective, and essential purpose, must
remain the enhancement of the bidding process for the benefit
of the stockholders." 259 If the target board gives favored treat-
ment to one bidder at any stage of the process, it must justify
the favored treatment under a Unocal-like intermediate stan-
dard of review. In a post-Revlon case, the Delaware Supreme
Court articulated this standard as follows:
At the outset, the plaintiff must show, and the trial court must
find, that the directors of the target company treated one or more of
the respective bidders on unequal terms....
In the face of disparate treatment, the trial court must first ex-
amine whether the directors properly perceived that shareholder in-
terests were enhanced [by favoring one bidder]. In any event the
board's action must be reasonable in relation to the advantage sought
to be achieved, or conversely, to the threat which a particular bid al-
legedly poses to stockholder interests.260
Only if the directors' actions pass muster under this test are
they entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule.26 1
Before favored treatment of one bidder can withstand re-
view under the above test, the board probably is obligated to in-
itially negotiate in good faith with each of the competing
bidders.262 At a minimum, the board must be adequately in-
formed of the material facts and engage in a thorough review of
available options.26 3 In determining which bid is in the share-
holders' best interests, however, target directors need not
blindly focus on price to the exclusion of other relevant factors.
The board also may consider the proposed form of considera-
258. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,072, at 91,025 (Del. Nov. 2, 1988).
259. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del.
1989). See also Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp.
772, 785-87 (D. Del. 1988) (unequal treatment of bidders at an auction was not
justified by considerations that did not benefit the stockholders); In re J.P.
Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781-82 (Del. Ch. 1988) (the
board's duty is to achieve the best possible transaction for its shareholders).
260. Mills, 559 A.2d at 1288.
261. Id. Where management breaches its Revlon duties and is interested in
the outcome of the transaction, the intrinsic fairness standard applies. Id. at
1279.
262. See Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535, 1542 (E.D.
Mich. 1986); Mills, 559 A.2d at 1281-83; Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986); Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land
Corp., No. 8486, slip op. (Del. Ch. May 19, 1986), reprinted in 12 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 282, 289-90 (1987).
263. In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,349, at 92,315-16 (Del. Ch. March 22, 1989); In re
RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,713-14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
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tion, tax consequences, firmness of financing, antitrust or other
regulatory obstacles and timing.26 Some jurisdictions,
although not Delaware, also permit the board to consider the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, such as employees,
affected communities, creditors, suppliers and customers.2
Assuming that two bids are comparable as to these other
factors, the target board's duty is to obtain the highest price for
the shareholders. In this circumstance, whether a target
board's decision to grant an exclusivity provision to one bidder
will pass muster under the intermediate standard of review de-
pends on the exclusivity provision's effect on the auction pro-
cess. Like the Second Circuit in Hanson Trust, the Delaware
Supreme Court distinguishes between exclusivity provisions
that draw an otherwise unwilling bidder into the contest and
those that end an active auction by effectively foreclosing fur-
ther bidding.26 For many observers, however, this distinction
264. Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 577 (11th Cir.
1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del.
1988); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781 n.7 (Del.
Ch. 1988); RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
at 91,712 (by implication); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp.,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,915, at 90,102-03 (Del.
Ch. May 19, 1988); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., Inc., [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,502, at 97,220 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16,
1987).
265. Compare Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 675 F. Supp. 238,
265-66 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (under Pennsylvania statute, directors may consider
non-shareholder interests) with Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) ("concern for non-stockholder interests
is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress"). Some
states have implicitly rejected this aspect of Revlon by adopting statutes per-
mitting directors to consider non-shareholder interests in making takeover
and other corporate decisions. See generally R. WINTER, R. ROSENBAUM, M.
STUMPF & L.S. PARKER, STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES AND POISON PILLs 55-56
(1988) [hereinafter TAKEOVER STATUTES AND POISON PILLS] (surveying the
various state statutes). Whether directors should be permitted to consider the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies in selecting a bid raises difficult
questions that lie outside the scope of this Article and as to which other com-
mentators are sharply divided. Compare, e.g., Lipton, supra note 179, at 35-43
and Shaffer, The Tension Between Law in the American Tradition and the
Religious Tradition, in THE WEIGHTIER MATTEas OF THE LAW 315, 328-35 (J.
Witte & F. Alexander eds. 1988) with Macey, Externalities, Firm-Speciic Cap-
ital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes,
1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 181. See also Karmel, The Duty of Directors to Non-Share-
holder Constituencies in Control Transactions - A Comparison of U.S. and
UK Law, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 61, 61-75 (1990).
266. Mills, 559 A.2d at 1286; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183. See Hanson Trust
PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 272 (2d Cir. 1986); Black &
Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772, 784 (D. Del. 1988);
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has not been particularly helpful. "[E]ven when designed to
promote another bid, a good (i.e., effective) lock-up may well
end the bidding after that one last bid it induces is on the ta-
ble. '267 Thus, when price is the target board's sole concern,
courts have yet to develop a workable distinction between per-
missible and impermissible exclusivity provisions. The Dela-
ware Supreme Court currently may be focusing on one or more
of several different factors when determining where to draw
the line.
The court may be focusing on the effectiveness of the pro-
visions - whether the provisions in fact preclude any party
other than the favored bidder from acquiring the target. Under
this approach, the court would uphold only those provisions
that elicit an additional bid, but leave other parties free to con-
tinue the bidding. This approach, however, smacks of an unu-
sual degree of judicial second-guessing, as the effectiveness of a
lock-up often is apparent only with hindsight.268 Moreover, be-
cause courts have upheld auction-ending provisions in practice,
admittedly most often where no one appears willing to top the
favored bidder's offer, they presumably have rejected this
approach.26 9
Alternatively, the court may be focusing on the timing of
exclusivity provisions. In other words, the target board may
simply need to allow a sufficient number of bidding rounds
before granting an exclusivity provision. In fact, exclusivity
provisions granted after several rounds of well-publicized bid-
ding have received more favorable judicial treatment than com-
parable provisions granted early in an auction.2 70 It is unlikely,
however, that there is any magic number of bidding rounds
that will validate the decision to grant exclusivity provisions.
In fact, the court seems to be focusing on whether the
board obtained substantially more favorable terms from the fa-
vored bidder in return for the exclusivity provision or lock-
Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 624 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
267. Freedman, [1987-1888 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at
97,219 n.31. See also Cottle, 849 F.2d at 575-76; Herzel, supra note 4, at 177;
Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 374-75.
268. Herzel, supra note 4, at 177; Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 375.
269. E.g., Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 576-77 (11th
Cir. 1988); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781-84
(Del. Ch. 1988).
270. See, e.g., Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp.
614, 619, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land Corp., No. 8486, slip
op. (Del. Ch. May 19, 1986), reprinted in 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 282, 289-90 (1987).
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up.2 1 When the target board obtains only a minimal increase
in the final bid in return for granting an exclusivity provision
or lock-up, the board's action is unlikely to pass muster.272 On
the other hand, when the target board obtains a significant
price increase in return for granting exclusivity, judicial review
has been more favorable.2 3 Even in this circumstance, how-
ever, the target board probably should make one final attempt
to negotiate with the remaining bidders. If a better offer is not
promptly forthcoming, the board may validly grant exclusivity
provisions. 274
B. THE CHANGE IN CONTROL TRIGGER
What actions a target board must take to satisfy Revlon is
not the only debatable question arising from that case. The
Revlon court also failed to clearly articulate what events trigger
the Revlon duty to auction control. On its facts, Revlon argua-
bly was consistent with prior Delaware precedent. Courts long
have required a fiduciary presented with two or more offers
having substantially similar non-price terms to accept the
higher offer.275 The Revlon board was faced with just such a
situation. Pantry Pride and Forstmann had made essentially
271. A fourth interpretation of the Revlon standard also is possible. The
court simply may be requiring the target board to conduct a fair auction and
then give the lock-up to the party that makes the best bid. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit has seemingly so interpreted Revlon:
All auctions must end sometime, and lock-ups by definition must dis-
courage other bidders. The question therefore is not whether the as-
set lock-up granted to [the favored bidder] effectively ended the
bidding process. The question is whether [the target] conducted a fair
auction, and whether [the favored bidder] made the best offer.
Cottle, 849 F.2d at 576 (citations omitted). As shall be developed below, this
interpretation would most closely align Revlon to the standard proposed
herein. See infra notes 363-79 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286
(Del. 1988); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
183-84 (Del. 1986).
273. See, e.g., Cottle, 849 F.2d at 576-77.
274. See Mills, 559 A.2d at 1285-87.
275. See, e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 41 Del. 548, 557, 200 A.2d
441, 448 (1964); Thomas v. Kempner, Nos. 4138 & 4174, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 5,
1977), reprinted in 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131, 134-35 (1980); Smith v. Good Music
Station, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 262, 272-73, 129 A.2d 242, 248 (1957); Robinson v. Pitts-
burgh Oil Refining Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 193, 200, 126 A. 46, 49 (1924); see also
Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,502, at 97,219 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987) (finding Revlon
consistent with this line of cases); cf. Simkins Indus., Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp.,




identical offers.276 Moreover, Pantry Pride had stated an intent
to top any Forstmann offer.277 Under the circumstances, re-
quiring the board to sell the company to the highest bidder ar-
guably did not mark a significant change in the law.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that subsequent hostile take-
over cases consistently have required a control auction when
the target board is faced with multiple bidders.27 8
A broad application of Revlon to all corporate acquisitions,
however, would be inconsistent with pre-Revlon precedents.
These prior decisions almost uniformly rejected any require-
ment that a target board shop the company before agreeing to a
friendly acquisition proposal. As an early Delaware Chancery
Court decision explained, the board's duty to obtain the best
price does not require the board to place the firm's assets on
the auction block.2 7 9 A Ninth Circuit decision was equally ex-
plicit: "[T]he Corporate Code of California does not adopt the
auction model in regulating negotiated acquisitions."2-80 As
276. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183-84.
277. Id. at 178.
278. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882, 886-87 (6th Cir.
1986); Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 623-24
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280(Del. 1988); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del.
Ch. 1988); In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders IAtig., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,181, at 91,643 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988).
See generally Gilson & Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 37 (1990).
279. Bowling v. Bonneville, Ltd., No. 1688, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1963),
reprinted in 2 DEL. J. CORP. L. 162, 169 (1977). See also Repairman's Service
Corp. v. Nat'l Intergroup, Inc., No. 7811, slip op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1985), re-
printed in 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 902 (1985); Simkins Indus., Inc., v. Fibreboard
Corp., No. 5369, slip op. (Del. Ch. July 28, 1977), reprinted in 3 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 144, 146 (1977). But cf Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578, 583 (Del.
Ch. 1984) (upholding a lock-up in large part because "sufficiently adequate ef-
forts [were made] to seek other offers" and noting that it might have been in-
validated had another firm offer emerged).
Thomas v. Kempner, Nos. 4138 & 4174, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 1977), re-
printed in 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 131 (1980), is sometimes regarded as an exception
to this apparent majority view. That case, however, is more properly regarded
as a forerunner of the Revlon decision. Thomas was a Multiple Bidder case in
which the target's agents failed to negotiate with prospective buyers other
than the favored bidder despite receiving at least two other higher offers. As
such, it does not squarely stand for the proposition that directors must shop
the company in Single Bidder transactions. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
578 (Del. 1984) (en banc), is also consistent with the majority view, because it
did not require that the company be auctioned in order to satisfy the duty of
due care.




courts struggled to develop general rules governing Revlon's
scope, however, a standard emerged that threatened to extend
Revlon duties to negotiated acquisitions.
Until recently, post-Revlon Delaware decisions generally
held that a proposed transaction triggers the auctioneering duty
when (but apparently only when) the transaction will result in
a change of control of the target corporation. Most of these
cases arose in connection with defensive recapitalizations. In a
recapitalization, the target company typically pays a dividend to
shareholders that consists of cash (often borrowed) and debt se-
curities, thus reducing the post-dividend value of the target's
stock to the extent of the distribution. While the process is
usually rather complex, target managers, the target's employee
stock ownership plan, or both, effectively receive the dividend
in the form of stock, rather than cash or debt, at an exchange
rate based on the stock's post-dividend value.281 Alternatively,
the target may conduct a tender offer in which public share-
holders exchange their stock for cash and debt.28 2 In either
case, management's equity interest increases substantially vis-a-
vis public shareholders.
A number of lower courts held that when a recapitalization
transfers effective voting control to target management, the
transaction constitutes a change in corporate control triggering
Revlon's auction duty:
It seems unreasonable to conclude that the Delaware Supreme Court
would limit the applicability of the duties of Revlon, Inc. to only those
situations involving the complete sale of all shares of the company.
Indeed, the Court of Chancery has recognized that the directors of a
company have an obligation to maximize the amount received by
shareholders once it is clear to them that the "corporation is to be
subject to a change of control. ' 28 3
281. E.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp.
772, 782 (D. Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d
1334, 1343 (Del. 1987); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1243
(Del. Ch. 1988).
282. E.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103,
112 (Del. Ch. 1986).
283. Black & Decker, 682 F. Supp. at 781 (quoting Freedman v. Restaurant
Assoc. Indus., Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,502, at 97,218 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987)). See also id- at 780-84; Robert M. Bass
Group, 552 A.2d at 1243; cf. Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345 (Revlon not
triggered where management ally had less than 50% voting control after de-
fensive recapitalization). But see City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. In-
terco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 801-03 (Del. Ch. 1988) (any steps by board to
implement a defensive recapitalization in the face of an outside offer is not
tested under Revlon, but is tested under the Unocal form of review).
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The Delaware Supreme Court later confirmed this approach by
holding that a change of control resulting from an active auc-
tion, a management buyout, or a restructuring will trigger the
duty to auction control.28 4
C. EXTENDING REVLON FROM RECAP1TALIZATIONS TO
NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS
Applying Revlon to defensive recapitalizations raises the
same issue as does its application to negotiated acquisitions: de-
fining the limits on management's ability to protect its favored
proposal from competition. In a recapitalization, this issue
arises when a target board uses takeover defenses, such as
poison pills,285 to protect its restructuring plan from interfer-
ence by a hostile bidder. A poison pill may play a legitimate
role in the early stages of a takeover. The pill gives the target
board negotiating leverage to demand a higher offer. The po-
tential delaying effect of a pill also may give the board time to
arrange and present to shareholders a more valuable alterna-
284. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 (Del.
1988). The apparent extension of Revlon to MBO transactions is particularly
interesting in light of prior Delaware Chancery Court decisions which had not
required a control auction in MBO transactions. See, e.g., City Capital, 551
A.2d at 803; In re TW Services, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,334, at 92,179 n.8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (alterna-
tives to an auction "particularly [appropriate] in the setting of a sale to an
arm's-length third party"); In re Amsted Indus. Inc. Litig., 521 A.2d 1104, 1112
(Del. Ch. 1988) (criticizing failure to check fairness opinion by shopping the
company), aff'd, 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989); In re Fort Howard Corp. Share-
holders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988), appeal refused, 547
A.2d 633 (Del. 1988) (procedures allowing for "an effective check of the mar-
ket before" closing acceptable).
285. Corporations typically structure modern poison pills as rights issued
as a pro rata dividend to common stockholders. A specified event, such as the
acquisition of a large block of stock by a third party or the announcement of a
tender offer for some threshold percentage of target shares, triggers the issue
of the rights. A so-called "flip-in" poison pill gives all target company share-
holders (except the prospective hostile bidder) the right to purchase additional
target stock at a discount. Activation of the plan thus causes a significant dilu-
tion in the acquirer's holdings of target shares. See Grand Metro. PLC v. Pills-
bury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988) (activation of target's flip-in
pill would have reduced acquirer's equity interest in target from 85% voting
power to 56.3%). A "flip-over" poison pill, on the other hand, gives target
shareholders the right to purchase bidder stock at a steep discount if the bid-
der successfully acquires the target. The threatened dilution of the holdings of
the bidder's existing shareholders deters the bidder from proceeding with a
hostile takeover. To account for all possible acquisition tactics, many modern
pills incorporate both flip-in and flip-over elements. For an exhaustive discus-
sion of the evolution of pill plans and their current legality, see TAKEOVER
STATUTES AND POISON PILLS, supra note 243, at 505-1219.
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tive transaction or strategic plan.286 Once the best offers are on
the table, however, the pill serves only to force shareholders
into accepting management's proposed transaction. Because a
poison pill will inflict a substantial financial injury on a bidder,
it effectively precludes the bidder from going forward with the
tender offer.287 Thus, by leaving the pill in place while a defen-
sive restructuring goes forward, the target board can hold off
the hostile bidder until it completes the transaction.
To resolve this dilemma, courts generally have permitted a
board to keep a pill in place so long as the board is running an
active auction or otherwise trying to obtain a better deal for the
shareholders.- 8 Once the auction is over and the best possible
non-coercive alternatives are on the table, however, courts have
required the board to redeem the pill and permit the share-
holders to choose between the available alternatives. Manage-
ment thus cannot use a pill as to coerce shareholders into
accepting their proposed transaction. The shareholders must be
free to choose between the hostile bid and the proposed
recapitalization.
Like a poison pill used to protect a restructuring, an effec-
tive lock-up precludes a disfavored bidder from going forward.
A lock-up, in fact, arguably goes further by directly coercing
shareholders into approving the favored bidder's proposal. Ac-
cordingly, opponents of lock-ups and exclusivity provisions ar-
gue that, if Revlon forbids a target board from using a poison
pill to force shareholders to accept a defensive recapitalization,
286. City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 795
(Del. 1988). See also CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422,
441-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
287. City Capital, 551 A.2d at 795.
288. E.g., id at 799-800; AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,
519 A.2d 103, 113 (Del. Ch. 1986). The Delaware Supreme Court recently cast
considerable doubt on the validity of these decisions, by observing that a fair
cash any or all tender offer could create a threat to corporate policy justifying
defensive responses under Unocal. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-53 (Del. 1989). Some commentators have therefore
seen Time as validating the "just say no" defense, in which management does
not propose a white knight merger, management buyout or restructuring, but
instead simply refuses to redeem the pill in an attempt to remain independent
without any structural change in the corporation. See Hilder, Delaware Court
Explains Action on Time Merger, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1990, at A3, col. 1. See
generally R. GiLSON & R. KRAAxmAN, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
AcQUISMONs 377-83 (Supp. 1989); Gilson, Just Say No to Whom?, 25 WAKE
FOREsT L. REv. 121 (1990). Indeed, a number of targets have already relied on
the Time decisions in rejecting hostile takeover bids. See The "Buzz-Off" De-




Revlon also should prohibit target board use of lock-ups and ex-
clusivity provisions to force shareholders into approving a nego-
tiated acquisition. As the following section demonstrates,
however, the Delaware courts recently refused to extend Rev-
lon to negotiated acquisitions.
D. THE DUTY TO AUCTION CONTROL AND NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS
On its facts, the Revlon duty applied only to initially hos-
tile acquisitions in which the target board had decided to sell
the company to one of several competing bidders. Subsequent
cases made it clear that, at a minimum, a change of control was
necessary to trigger the Revlon duty. The question remained
whether Revlon applied to some or all forms of negotiated
acquisitions.
Extending Revlon to negotiated acquisitions would have
significantly changed the way target boards negotiate proposed
Single Bidder transactions. Courts presumably would require a
target board to shop the corporation among several competing
bidders, or at least to advertise its availability, before entering a
merger agreement (whether exclusive or not). Moreover, the
manner in which the board conducted the bidding process, in-
cluding the grant of lock-ups and exclusivity provisions to the
favored bidder, would have to pass muster under the stringent
standards of the modified Unocal test adopted in Revlon's prog-
eny. Given the rigor with which courts applied this test in
some post-Revlon decisions, it was doubtful whether many bid-
preclusive tactics would survive judicial scrutiny. Accordingly,
whether Revlon duties extended to negotiated mergers re-
mained the critical open question.
In its Revlon decision, the Delaware Chancery Court gave
qualified support to a limited interpretation of the auction duty
by stating that when "there is only one genuine bidder in the
picture and there is a risk of losing his participation in a fast-
moving situation, the quick action of directors in granting an
option on substantial corporate assets will not be second-
guessed under the business judgment rule."2 9 Similarly, albeit
in dicta, the chancery court later suggested that Revlon does
not require a target board to conduct an auction before validly
entering a corporate merger agreement.2 90 A federal district
289. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239,
1250 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
290. City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 802
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court added further support for a limited application of Revlon
by squarely holding that a target board can enter an exclusive
merger agreement with the only bidder to have placed an offer
on the table without triggering Revlon. 291 Specifically, the
court found that the directors need not delay the transaction to
allow for competing bids, and that subsequent offers did not af-
fect the validity of the agreement.292
Despite this precedent, concern that courts would ulti-
mately extend Revlon to negotiated Single Bidder acquisitions
led many target boards to conduct a voluntary control auction
when they received an unsolicited, but more or less friendly,
takeover proposal.2 93 Indeed, one leveraged buyout specialist
(Del. Ch. 1988) (dictum). See also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1988) (not every corporate transaction triggers Rev-
lon); Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,779, at 94,192 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989) (ex-
plaining that Revlon does not require an auction whenever company is sold,
but does require directors to probe for alternatives and have a reasonable basis
for concluding that the transaction is the best available option); In re TW
Services, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 94,334, at 92,179 n.8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) ("alternatives to an auc-
tion for collecting the information that directors need to make an informed
choice may be appropriate"); In re Amsted Indus., Inc. Litig., No. 8224, slip op.
(Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1988) (1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 116) (alternatives to auction
procedures acceptable in MBO transactions), ff'd, 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989);
In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug.
8, 1988) (pre-closing market test provisions satisfied Revlon duties), appeal re-
fused, 547 A.2d 633 (Del. 1988); cf. Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d
840, 844-45 (Del. 1987) (Revlon inapplicable to cash-out merger in which major-
ity shareholder obtained sole ownership over subsidiary target corporation);
Kleinhandler v. Borgia, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,525, at 93,326 (Del. Ch. July 7, 1989) (Revlon inapplicable where major
stockholder acquires entire company); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders
Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,194, at 91,710-
15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (upholding, under the business judgment rule and
under Revlon, target's decision to accept one of two bids submitted in a volun-
tary control auction without conducting further bidding), appeal refused, 556
A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,660, at 98,034 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988)
(holding that manner in which voluntary control auction conducted "a matter
of director judgment"). The Delaware Chancery Court's dicta was noteworthy
mainly because it later adopted the change in control trigger. See Paramount
Communications, Inc., v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) I 94,514, at 93,277 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), qff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 93,502, at 93,218 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987).
291. Hastings-Murtagh v. Texas Air Corp., 649 F. Supp. 479, 484-85 (S.D.
Fla. 1986).
292. Id. at 485.
293. Landefeld, supra note 232, at S2, col. 1.
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estimated that approximately half of all transactions considered
by his firm involved a control auction, with a majority of the
remainder involving some element of competition.294 Para-
mount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,295 however, should
slow or reverse this trend.
Although the Time facts are somewhat unusual, the trans-
action basically typifies the types of acquisitions with which
this Article is concerned. Time's board of directors began
searching for joint venture or acquisition opportunities with
three strategic goals in mind: to develop video production capa-
bilities; to expand its access to global markets; and to maintain
Time's allegedly distinctive corporate culture.296 To further
those ends, Time entered an exclusive merger agreement with
Warner Communications. The proposed merger offered
Warner shareholders newly issued Time shares representing
approximately sixty-two percent of the shares of the combined
entity.297
To discourage any effort to upset the transaction, 298 the re-
spective boards simultaneously approved a Share Exchange
agreement that gave each party the option to trigger an ex-
change of shares. If either party triggered the option, Warner
would receive shares representing 11.1% of Time's outstanding
stock, and Time would receive shares representing 9.4% of
Warner's outstanding stock.299 In addition, the merger agree-
ment contained a no-shop provision and Time obtained commit-
ments from various banks that they would not finance a
takeover bid for Time.300
Shortly before the Time shareholders were to vote on the
proposed merger, PNramount made a cash tender offer for
Time. The Time board rejected the offer as inadequate, refus-
ing to enter negotiations with Paramount.30 ' In response to the
Paramount tender offer, Warner triggered the share exchange
294. Friendly Bidding Wars, 23 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1988,
at 64, 70.
295. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), affg [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
296. Paramount Communications, Inc., v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,514, at 93,267 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989),
aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
297. Id at 93,267-70.
298. Id. at 93,270.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 93,270-71.
301. Id. at 93,271-72. Paramount later raised its offer, which again was re-
jected outright. Id. at 93,275.
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option.30 2 Also in response to the Paramount offer, the Time
and Warner boards restructured the transaction to eliminate
the need for Time shareholder approval. Under the new plan,
Time would make a cash tender offer for a majority block of
Warner shares, and then would acquire the remaining Warner
shares through a clean-up merger.303 Following unsuccessful
litigation to enjoin the share exchange and Time's tender offer,
Paramount withdrew its tender offer and Time's offer success-
fully went forward.3 04
Time raised a number of critical issues. First, did the Time
board's conduct trigger the Revlon duties? There were at least
three possible triggering events: the original decision to merge
with Warner, the subsequent decision to effect the transaction
as a tender offer, or the decision to grant a no-shop clause and a
lock-up to Warner. Second, if none of these events obliged the
Time directors to assume an auctioneering role, what standard
of review applied to the Time board's favorable treatment of
Warner: the traditional business judgment rule or the interme-
diate standard -first adopted in Unocal? Finally, to the extent
the Unocal intermediate standard was applicable, what consti-
tuted a legally cognizable threat to corporate policy, and were
the Time board's defensive actions reasonable in relation to
those threats?
For somewhat different reasons both the Delaware Chan-
cery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that
the Revlon duty did not apply to the original merger agreement
with Warner. The chancery court, applying the change in con-
trol trigger,3 0 5 determined that the Time-Warner merger agree-
ment would not result in the requisite transfer of control:
Surely under some circumstances a stock for stock merger could re-
flect a transfer of corporate control. That would, for example, plainly
be the case here if Warner were a private company. But where, as
here, the shares of both constituent corporations are widely held, cor-
porate control can be expected to remain unaffected by a stock for
stock merger.... Control of both [firms] remained in a large, fluid,
changeable and changing market....
The shareholders of Time would have "suffered" dilution, of
course, but they would suffer the same type of dilution upon the pub-
302. IML
303. IMi at 93,273-75.
304. Hilder & Landro, Paramount Withdraws its Hostile Offer as Time Be-
gins its Purchase of Warner, Wall St. J., July 25, 1989, at A3, col. 1.
305. Paramount Communications, Inc., v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,279 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989),
affl'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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lic distribution of new stock.3 0 6
Thus, even though the former shareholders of Warner were to
receive a premium for their shares and would constitute the
majority of the combined firm's shareholders, the original deci-
sion to merge did not trigger Revlon.
The chancery court's decision left open several questions.
For example, does Revlon apply to negotiated mergers in which
the target's shareholders are to receive solely cash or debt se-
curities for their shares?30 7 Similarly, is a change of control
present when the transaction is structured as a triangular
merger, in which the target company ends up as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the acquirer? When the favored bidder is
publicly held, one could argue that ultimate control rests in the
hands of a diverse pool of market investors both before and af-
ter the transaction, and thus Revlon does not apply. Prior cases
in which courts found Revlon applicable support this argument
because, with the exception of auctions triggered by a proposed
defensive merger with a white knight, those cases were largely
limited to management buyouts and defensive -restructurings.
The former category necessarily involves the elimination of
public ownership. The latter also typically involves a transfer
of control from public investors to corporate insiders or their
allies. Both therefore involve the creation of a large block of
stock held by an identifiable control group. In contrast, when
306. Id. at 93,279-80. Chancellor Allen also rejected plaintiffs' argument
that the acquisition of Warner precluded a future acquisition of Time-Warner
in which former Time shareholders might receive a premium for their shares
and, accordingly, triggered the Revlon duties. Id at 93,280-81. For a useful dis-
cussion of Allen's analysis, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 278, at 46-58.
307. It is noteworthy that Chancellor Allen subsequently held that Revlon
does not require an auction whenever the corporation is to be sold, but does
require that the directors take reasonable steps to probe for alternatives and
have a reasonable basis for concluding that the favored bidder's offer is the
best available alternative. Roberts v. General Instrument Corp., [1990] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,465, at 97,405-407 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990);
Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield Corp., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,779, at 94,192 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989). See also
Rand v. Western Airlines, Inc., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,751, at 94,052 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 1989) (Berger, V.C.) (suggesting.
that Revlon's principles require judicial scrutiny of a lock-up and no-shop pro-
vision granted in a negotiated Single Bidder merger for partial cash considera-
tion). Query whether this requirement of scrutiny survives the Delaware
Supreme Court's determination that the original decision to merge with
Warner was subject to review solely under a business judgment rule analysis.
See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151-52




the acquirer is publicly held, ultimate voting control before and
after the acquisition rests in the hands of the acquirer's public
shareholders. Control of the combined entity thus remains "in
a large, fluid, changeable and changing market."
30 8
On the other hand, the chancery court's reliance on the
fact that the existing Time shareholders merely suffered dilu-
tion of their voting power permits an argument that a change
of control occurs, and Revlon therefore applies, when target
shareholders are entirely bought out. This interpretation, how-
ever, is contrary to the well-developed pre- and post-Revlon
precedent and dicta that rejects application of an auctioneering
duty to negotiated mergers. Moreover, if transaction planners
knew that they could avoid Revlon by structuring a negotiated
acquisition as a stock for stock merger, rather than as a trian-
gular acquisition or a two-party merger with cash or debt con-
sideration, evading the duty to auction control would be a
simple matter indeed.
Because of the Delaware Supreme Court's holding on re-
view, however, the Delaware courts may never resolve this po-
tentially interesting debate. On review, the Delaware Supreme
Court indicated that the chancery court's change of control
analysis was correct "as a matter of law." The supreme court,
however, rejected on "broader grounds" Paramount's claim
that Time's board had violated the Revlon duty to auction con-
trol.3 0 9 Indeed, it appears that the supreme court used Time as
a vehicle for sharply limiting Revlon's scope:
Under Delaware law there are, generally speaking and without
excluding other possibilities, two circumstances which may implicate
Revlon duties. The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation initi-
ates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a busi-
ness reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company.
However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to a
bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an
alternative transaction also involving the breakup [sic] of the
company.
3 1 0
308. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,280. Of
course, Allen's test would pose some line drawing problems in distinguishing
between cases in which an identifiable control block exists and those in which
control remains in the hands of a diffuse aggregate of market investors. See R.
GrLSON & R. KRAAIMAN, supra note 288, at 385-88. For example, in a triangu-
lar acquisition, the target will be controlled by an identifiable entity - the ac-
quiring corporation, acting through its board of directors - but control
ultimately resides (at least in theory) in the hands of the diverse pool of ac-
quiring company shareholders and thus in the market.
309. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
310. I- (citations omitted).
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This passage is not exactly a model of judicial clarity. Among
other things, what are the other Revlon-triggering possibilities
that the supreme court declined to exclude? If the chancery
court's approach was correct as a matter of law, does the
change of control trigger remain the touchstone for applying
the Revlon duties? Or is Revlon only applicable if the transac-
tion involves a break-up of the target company? What the
court means by a "break-up" of the target also is not entirely
clear. Presumably, the court had in mind the species of trans-
actions commonly referred to as "bust-up" takeovers, in which
a bidder finances the transaction through highly leveraged debt
securities and then sells substantial portions of the target's as-
sets to help finance the acquisition.31 1 The court, however, no-
where defines "break-up" - a most curious and potentially
troubling omission. In sum, the court further obscured a body
of law in which certainty was already a rare commodity.
Despite the unusually murky nature of the court's analysis,
parties to a negotiated acquisition should take comfort from
Time. The supreme court squarely held that the original deci-
sion to merge with Warner did not trigger the Revlon duties,
but was subject solely to a Van Gorkom-type business judg-
ment rule analysis.3 12 Moreover, the court explicitly premised
its rejection of plaintiffs' Revlon claims on the ground that the
Time board, in negotiating with Warner, did not make the dis-
solution or breakup of the corporate entity inevitable. 31 3
Although the facts of Time were somewhat unusual, the court's
holding implies that only those negotiated acquisitions that con-
template breaking-up the target will trigger Revlon. This limi-
tation apparently applies even though the negotiated
acquisition results in a change of control under the chancery
311. See Lipton, supra note 179, at 11; cf Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc.,
[1990] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,327, at 96,586-587 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1990)
(Revlon not triggered where company sold one of four divisions, as sale did not
involve a break-up of the seller).
312. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152
(Del. 1989), aff [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del.
Ch. July 14, 1989).
313. Id at 1150. The court's reference to "dissolution or break-up" may
suggest that Revlon would apply to negotiated acquisitions structured as a sale
of substantially all assets followed by a liquidation of the target. Because an
asset sale also usually contemplates the end of the target's continued exist-
ence, this interpretation might be buttressed by the court's subsequent obser-
vation that when "the board's reaction to a hostile tender offer is ... not an
abandonment of the corporation's continued existence, Revlon duties are not
triggered." Id Nevertheless, this interpretation needlessly elevates form over
substance and probably will not take hold.
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court approach. It also would seem to be true even if Revlon
still applies to a white knight bid, made in response to a hostile
takeover proposal, that does not contemplate a break-up of the
target.
Both the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware
Supreme Court also concluded that the recasting of the acquisi-
tion as a tender offer did not trigger Revlon. Rather, the courts
viewed the revised transaction as a defensive response subject
to the Unocal standard of review.3 14 Under the Unocal stan-
dard, the Time board had to identify a cognizable threat to cor-
porate policy posed by Paramount's offer and demonstrate that
its actions were a reasonable response to that threat. Para-
mount seemingly had a strong argument as to both issues. As
we saw, earlier Delaware Chancery Court decisions had sharply
limited the use of a poison pill to protect management-spon-
sored recapitalizations. Those cases had recognized only struc-
tural coercion and inadequate value as cognizable threats to
corporate policy.3 15 Moreover, when a hostile offer was non-co-
ercive and at a substantial premium, courts had deemed defen-
sive tactics which precluded shareholders from accepting the
offer an excessive response to the minimal threat of inadequate
value.316
The chancery court distinguished the Time-Warner merger
314. Chancellor Allen rejected Time's argument that the tender offer
should be analyzed under "the same business judgment form of review" uti-
lized in Crouse-Hinds v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980), conclud-
ing that Unocal's intermediate level of scrutiny provided the correct approach.
Paramount Communications, Inc., v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 94,514, at 93,282 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1989). Chancellor Allen also rejected Paramount's argument that
the tender offer for Warner violated the rule that otherwise lawful "manipula-
tion of the corporate machinery for the accomplishment of inequitable pur-
poses will not be countenanced." I& at 93,281-82.
315. See generally R. GILSON & R. KRAAmA, supra note 288, at 267-69
(discussing cognizable threats to corporate policy). Two-tier tender offers are
the most commonly recognized form of structural coercion. In a two-tier offer
the bidder announces a partial tender offer and, at the same time, announces
that if the offer succeeds it will effect a back-end merger to freeze-out the re-
maining shareholders. The back-end merger is typically at a lower price
and/or in a different type of consideration (such as junk bonds instead of
cash). If shareholders believe that the offeror is likely to obtain a controlling
interest in the front-end transaction, they face the risk that they will be
squeezed out in the back-end for less desirable consideration. Thus, they are
coerced into tendering into the front-end to avoid that risk, even if they be-
lieve the front-end transaction itself is undesirable. See iUpton, supra note
179, at 18-20.
316. See, e.g., Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1060
(Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d
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from those cases. The court found that Time's long-term busi-
ness plan motivated the Time board's original decision to merge
with Warner.317 The court also found that the revised transac-
tion, while a reaction to Paramount's bid, was principally in-
tended to facilitate that policy.318 Because the defensive
revisions arose out of preexisting, legitimate, non-defensive
business considerations, the Time board had a "legally cogniza-
ble interest" in going forward with the acquisition of Warner.31 9
In applying the second prong of the Unocal analysis, the
chancery court evaluated, among other things, the importance
of the corporate policy at stake and the impact of the board's
actions. With respect to the first point, the court reiterated its
view that pursuing the board's long-term strategy was a legiti-
mate and important corporate goal.3 20 As to the latter consider-
ation, the court observed that the offer for Warner "was
effective, but not overly broad,"'32' because Time's acquisition of
Warner did not legally preclude "the successful prosecution of
a hostile tender offer" for the resulting combined entity.322
The Time board thus "did only what was necessary to carry for-
ward a preexisting transaction in an altered form."32
On review, the Delaware Supreme Court again affirmed
the chancery court's holding on broader grounds. It expressly
rejected Paramount's argument, based on the prior chancery
court poison pill decisions, that the only threats cognizable
under Unocal were structural coercion and inadequate value.
Among the threats the court identified as justifying the Time
board's response were the risk that shareholders might incor-
rectly value the benefits of sticking with management's long-
term business plan, the difficulty of comparing Paramount's bid
to the benefits of the Warner acquisition, and the possibility
that Paramount's bid might "upset, if not confuse," the share-
holder vote.324
The supreme court further found that the Time board's re-
787, 790-91, 799-800 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clay-
ton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986) (Allen, C.).
317. Time, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,283.
318. Id
319. Id
320. Id at 93,24.
321. Id
322. Id Chancellor Allen hinted that defensive tactics used against a hos-
tile offer by Paramount or some other bidder for the combined entity after
Time's acquisition of Warner might not be permissible. See id at 93,284 n.22.
323. Id at 93,284.
324. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153
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casting of the transaction was a reasonable response to these
threats. Rejecting any inference that directors are obliged to
abandon a pre-existing business plan to permit short-term
shareholder gains, the court implied that a defensive response
is unreasonable only if it is intended to coerce shareholders into
accepting management's proposals. Because Time's plan was
"not aimed at 'cramming down' on its shareholders a manage-
ment-sponsored alternative, but rather had as its goal the car-
rying forward of a preexisting transaction in an altered form"
and "did not preclude Paramount from making an offer for the
combined Time-Warner company," those actions were both rea-
sonable and proportionate in light of the threat posed by
Paramount.32
Both the chancery court and the supreme court also held
that the exclusivity provisions and lock-up designed to ward off
competing bidders did not trigger Revlon.32 One could, how-
ever, fairly read the chancery court's opinion as requiring ex-
clusivity provisions and lock-ups to pass muster under some
variant of the Unocal test, even in a negotiated Single Bidder
acquisition. In dictum, the Delaware Supreme Court confirmed
that such "structural safety devices... are properly subject to a
Unocal analysis." 32 Although Paramount did not directly raise
the question, the supreme court strongly implied that the lock-
up option was valid because the parties adopted it to prevent
Time and Warner from being "put in play," and it predated any
competing bids.328 The supreme court also indicated that the
no-shop clause was valid because the Time board granted the
no-shop clause at Warner's insistence and for Warner's
protection.3 9
Application of Unocal-like standards in this context thus
should not create significant obstacles to the erection of bidding
deterrents. Indeed, Time creates a fairly clear road map for di-
rectors to follow. They need merely prove that they had rea-
sonable grounds for believing that competing bids posed a
danger to corporate policy and that the bidding deterrents they
erected were a reasonable response to that danger.3 0
(Del. 1989), affg [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del.
Ch. July 14, 1989).
325. I& at 1154-55.
326. Id at 1151.
327. Id.
328. See i& at 1151 n.15.
329. Id
330. See id. at 1152.
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As to the first Unocal prong, a target board is under no ob-
ligation to maximize the immediate value of the corporate
shares unless the proposed transaction triggers the Revlon
duty.33' Rather, the board is free to reject the immediate value
presented by a competing bid in the hope that its long-term
strategic plan will produce greater future value. Accordingly,
in cases like Time, to produce the requisite corporate policy tar-
get boards need merely cobble together a plausible strategic
plan (preferably as far ahead of time as possible) and claim that
the peculiar synergies created by a merger with the favored
bidder are part of achieving that plan. In turn, the risk of com-
peting bids should create the requisite threat, because every
competing bid creates a risk that shareholders will reject man-
agement's long-term plans in favor of the short-term gains
available from the competing bidder. Alternatively, in many
acquisition settings, competing bids will often interfere with the
shareholder vote on the favored bidder's proposal and poten-
tially confuse shareholders. Because Time recognized these
possibilities as cognizable threats to corporate policy,332 Time
significantly eased the burden imposed by the first Unocal
prong.
As to the second Unocal prong, exclusivity provisions and
lock-ups should routinely pass muster after Time. Competent
transaction planners will have little difficulty creating a paper
trail presenting justifications for exclusivity provisions and
lock-ups comparable to those cobbled together by Time and
Warner. Bidding deterrents adopted before a competing bid
emerges, intended to carry forward the preexisting favored bid-
der transaction, and not legally precluding a successful take-
over of the surviving combined entity, likely will be upheld as
reasonable and proportionate responses to the threat posed by
competing bids.3 33
In summary, Time marks a major turning point in the
evolution of both Unocal and Revlon. Both the chancery court
and supreme court significantly expanded the list of cognizable
threats to corporate policy recognized under the Unocal stan-
331. Id at 1154.
332. Id. at 1153.
333. See id at 1151-52, 1154-55. On the other hand, it may still be possible
to argue that the coercive nature of effective lock-ups renders them invalid
under the second Unocal prong. See id. at 1154 ("management actions that are
coercive in nature or force upon shareholders a management-sponsored alter-




dard. Both courts also limited the class of transactions trigger-
ing Revlon's auctioneering duty. Specifically, they refused to
apply Revlon to negotiated mergers - even those protected by
exclusivity provisions or lock-ups - unless the acquisition con-
templates selling off substantial portions of the target. If no
break-up will result, the parties need only comply with the
Van Gorkom requirements, supplemented by a greatly weak-
ened Unocal standard, to validly enter exclusivity provisions
and lock-ups.
IV. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING
EXCLUSIVITY PROVISIONS AND LOCK-UPS
The Time courts correctly refused to extend Revlon to ne-
gotiated acquisitions not involving a break-up of the target.
Forcing unwilling directors to conduct an effective auction is
extremely difficult. More importantly, management often has
legitimate reasons not to affirmatively auction the company.
Many bidders simply refuse to act as a stalking horse for the
target corporationa - 4 Other potential bidders may be unwilling
to invest in the necessary up-front costs if they must participate
in an auction.3 5 The litigation and adverse publicity' that likely
will accompany an auction may deter still other potential bid-
ders.33 6 If the target board nevertheless auctions the corpora-
tion, the initial bidder's willingness to pay a high premium for
the target may dissipate if another bidder does not come for-
ward. In light of these considerations, the target board could
rationally and in good faith decide that a control auction would
334. E.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
270-71 (2d Cir. 1986); Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F.
Supp. 614, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Keyser v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 644
F. Supp. 1130, 1146-47 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land Corp., No.
8486, slip op. (Del. Ch. May 16, 1986), reprinted in 12 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 282, 287
(1987).
335. See Helman & Davis, supra note 6, at 11. Most commentators concur
that exclusivity provisions are often necessary inducements for an offer, espe-
cially in the Single Bidder context. See, e.g., Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9,
at 410; Nachbar, supra note 14, at 481-83; Note, Merger Contracts, supra note 3,
at 757; Note, Down But Not Out - The Lock-Up Option Still Has Legal Punch
When Properly Used, supra note 164, at 1153-54; Note, Lock-Up Options, supra
note 34, at 1078. But see Buxbaum, supra note 4, at 1705; Oesterle, supra note
1, at 151-53.
336. It has become routine for at least one of the contending parties to seek
judicial review of a takeover contest. See R. GILSON, supra note 92, at 642-52.
In addition, public mud-slinging by some or all of the contestants is not un-
common. See generally id. at 658-66 (noting adverse publicity likely to accom-
pany auction of control).
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be detrimental to the shareholders' best interests. Insisting
that directors always shop the company risks losing the bird in
hand with no guarantee that one can be found in the bushes.
On the other hand, the Time courts went too far in al-
lowing target directors to erect bidding deterrents in cases
where some long-term strategic plan purportedly justifies pro-
tecting the favored bidder's proposal from competition. As Part
H demonstrated, competitive bidding (or, more accurately, the
threat of a competing bid) is the best available constraint on
the potential conflict of interest inherent in negotiated corpo-
rate acquisitions. Although the Time courts apparently would
not give management free rein to erect bidding deterrents, the
weakened Unocal-type analysis they mandate is unlikely to be
an effective check on management misconduct. Like the tradi-
tional power and duty of care approaches, the Time approach
substitutes judicial review for market review. As such, it suf-
fers from the same flaws as the traditional approach. More-
over, competent transaction planners should have little
difficulty structuring valid exclusivity provisions and lock-ups
under the weakened Unocal standard.33 7 Accordingly, if subse-
quent courts ultimately interpret Time as generally permitting
bid-deterring exclusivity provisions and lock-ups in Single Bid-
der acquisitions, a likely occurrence, sm Time will significantly
reduce the effectiveness of competitive bidding as a check on
self-interested behavior by target management.
To strike an appropriate balance between the need to en-
able directors to make decisions in the best interests of share-
holders and the need to prevent target board self-interested
behavior, courts should adopt a position between Revlon and
Time. There is an important difference between a duty to af-
firmatively shop the company and a duty that simply prevents
the board from taking steps that will effectively preclude com-
petitive bidding. A Revlon-style control auction after all is only
necessary because, in the multiple bidder context, any decision
by the target board to prematurely favor one bidder raises sus-
picion of self-interested behavior.3  In transactions where a
conflict of interest between target management and sharehold-
ers is less likely, the board need not actively auction the com-
337. See supra notes 326-32 and accompanying text.
338. See text accompanying notes 225-333 (Part HI).
339. At bottom, this was Revlon's main point. The control auction man-
dated by Revlon arguably was not intended to maximize shareholder wealth,
but to constrain self-interested behavior by management.
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pany so long as it does not take steps that foreclose competing
bids. This approach assures that the transaction is at least open
to meaningful market review.
Thus, rather than imposing a duty to affirmatively shop
the company in all cases, courts should focus on whether the
target board's conduct precludes competitive bidding. Because
lock-ups have a greater deterrent impact on competitive bid-
ding than exclusivity provisions, this Article proposes that
.courts require target boards to comply with a more stringent
standard of conduct before they will validate lock-ups than is
required to validate exclusivity provisions.
A. JUDIcIAL REvIEw OF ExcLusivTY PROVISIONS
In the Single Bidder context, a control auction need not
precede the granting of exclusivity provisions. As we have
seen, the target shareholders often have a strong interest in as-
suring that the initial bidder's proposal is successful - an inter-
est that exclusivity provisions may do much to promote s At
the same time, exclusivity provisions do not significantly im-
pede competitive bidding.m Rational target managers must
know that in today's takeover environment these provisions
provide weak security for side payments offered by bidders.
Side payments, therefore, likely do not prompt target boards to
enter exclusivity provisions. A more plausible assumption is
that management grants exclusivity provisions out of a real be-
lief that doing so is in the best interests of the shareholders. As
such, a modified version of the duty of care approach is appro-
priate for performance promises and cancellation fees.
Judicial review of performance promises and cancellation
fees should therefore proceed along the lines suggested in Part
340. The Delaware Supreme Court's holding that the "use of [a no-shop
clause] is even more limited than a lock-up arrangement," Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1989), makes sense, if any-
where, only in the Multiple Bidder context. A serious risk of management
self-dealing plainly exists in many Multiple Bidder cases. Absent distinguish-
ing factors such as the form of consideration and the likelihood of consumma-
tion, a decision by the target board to enter an exclusive merger agreement
containing performance promises with the lower bidder, thereby foreclosing
negotiations with an existing higher bidder, necessarily raises suspicion of mis-
conduct. The same is not true in the Single Bidder context, where there is no
guarantee that a second bidder will emerge. Moreover, as described in the
next Section, there are substantial policy justifications for exclusivity provi-
sions in the Single Bidder context.
341. See supr notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
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II. The initial inquiry should focus on the board's decision to
grant the exclusivity provisions. Concluding that the exclusiv-
ity provision was validly granted, however, should not end the
inquiry. If circumstances have materially changed since the
merger agreement was signed, the board should be required to
determine whether to perform or breach its obligations under
the exclusivity provision.
In the first phase, plaintiff (presumably a competing bidder
or a target shareholder) should bring an action against the tar-
get's board seeking an injunction precluding them from per-
forming under the exclusivity provision and/or damages for
having granted it. In light of the substantial policy arguments
in favor of exclusivity provisions and the low probability in the
Single Bidder context that side payments motivated the board's
decision, a court should presume that the board has the author-
ity to grant exclusivity provisions and should protect its deci-
sion with the business judgment rule. Thus, to invalidate the
exclusivity provision, plaintiff must rebut the business judg-
ment rule by showing that self-dealing or one of the other
traditional bases on which the rule may be set aside tainted the
board's decision to grant the provision. If the plaintiff succeeds
in doing so, the court should enjoin enforcement of the exclu-
sivity provision or grant other appropriate relief. If the plain-
tiff fails, the exclusivity provision remains enforceable and will
support a cause of action for damages if the target board subse-
quently breaches the merger agreement.
A material change in circumstances, such as the emergence
of a competing bid before the merger becomes effective, trig-
gers the second phase of the inquiry. Here, plaintiff should sue
the board if it fails to breach its merger agreement with the fa-
vored bidder. Although the exclusivity provision remains en-
forceable by a third party in an action for damages, once
circumstances change the board must determine whether to
perform or breach its obligations under the exclusive merger
agreement in light of the changed circumstances. Central to
the board's deliberations should be whether breach is efficient,
which requires the board to weigh the costs of breaching
against the benefits of breaching. For example, damages owed
to the disappointed bidder and other litigation costs may con-
ceivably exceed the benefits gained from breaching the agree-
ment and accepting a higher competing offer.343 In such a case,
343. For an overview of contract damage calculations that will promote ef-
ficient breaches, see R. CoonR & T. ULEN, supra note 207, at 296-319. As to
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the board might reasonably determine that failure to breach
the agreement with the initial bidder is in the shareholders'
best interests. The board may be wrong, but it is precisely this
type of decision that the business judgment rule was intended
to protect. As such, a plaintiff again must overcome the busi-
ness judgment rule - this time with respect to the board's deci-
sion not to breach its agreement with the favored bidder -
before courts can hold the board liable.
In sum, the proposal adopts elements of both Jewel and
Great Western. It follows Jewel by holding that the board has
authority to enter an exclusivity provision and that the favored
bidder generally can enforce such a provision. On the other
hand, it follows Great Western by imposing on directors a duty
to reevaluate the transaction when circumstances change. A
board decision to perform despite changed circumstances, how-
ever, will not result in liability unless the plaintiff can over-
come the business judgment rule.
The proposal's adoption of the business judgment rule as
the appropriate standard of review might be criticized on the
same grounds as this Article criticized the current duty of care
methodology, i.e., that the business judgment rule no longer
provides, if it ever did, a relatively objective standard. For ex-
ample, under this proposal, courts could impose a back-end auc-
tion obligation through the requirement that the board make
an informed decision. Courts could do so simply by taking the
position that a failure to seek alternative offers means that the
board was not fully informed when it approved the merger.
Although this Article has not attempted a full-blown eval-
uation of the post-Van Gorkom business judgment rule, it is
true that Van Gorkom and its progeny injected substantial un-
certainty into traditional business judgment rule analysis. The
courts' failure to identify a clear set of standards by which di-
rectors could measure their conduct, however, mainly caused
this uncertainty.s44 This proposal therefore assumes that target
boards will utilize the types of prophylactic steps approved in
Hanson Trust,34 which need not include seeking alternative
bids. This proposal also assumes that compliance with these
prophylactic standards will insulate the board from liability un-
the specific issue of damages for breach of an acquisition agreement, see
Dillport, Breaches and Rezedies, in II BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 1249 (J. Herz &
C. BaUer 2d ed. 1981).
344. See supra notes 130-47, 183-87 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 183.
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less one of the traditional exceptions to the business judgment
rule (such as fraud, illegality, or self-dealing) is present. It may
also be desirable for courts to limit the scope of their review by
adopting the ALI's lower standard regarding the amount of in-
formation necessary for directors to make an informed
decision.346
Of course, Delaware's new director liability statute will
limit the directors' exposure to personal liability under this
proposal. Assuming plaintiff could overcome the business judg-
ment rule and could otherwise satisfy the requirements for eq-
uitable relief, however, the statute would not preclude a
shareholder from obtaining an injunction against enforcement
of the exclusivity provision, an injunction requiring the direc-
tors to breach the initial merger agreement, or both.s47
This Article will not fully explore the merits of director li-
ability statutes. The Delaware statute's effect on the incentives
of target directors in this context, however, is a particularly
noteworthy example of the problems created by limiting direc-
tor liability. For example, suppose the merger agreement con-
tains a best efforts clause requiring the directors to use their
best efforts to obtain shareholder approval of the agreement.
Breach of the exclusive merger agreement in that case might
result in personal liability of the target directors to the disap-
pointed bidder.348 As a result, the target directors would have
an incentive not to breach. In the absence of the shield pro-
vided by the liability statute, however, the directors would have
a counter-incentive to breach. If their failure to breach consti-
tuted a violation of the duty of care as to which a shareholder
plaintiff could overcome the business judgment rule, directors
would face potential liability for refusing to breach. The stat-
ute removes this risk. As a result, limiting director liability
may make directors less likely to breach in cases where breach
is efficient. Courts could counteract this incentive effect by be-
ing more receptive to requests for affirmative equitable relief
or by being more willing to allow plaintiffs to recast their
claims as duty of loyalty actions.3 9
346. See supra note 116.
347. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1988); see generally supra note
148 (noting the states' new director liability statutes).
348. Cf. ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 222 Neb. 136, 156, 382 N.W.2d 576, 587
(1986) (per curiam) (declining to decide whether breach of such a best efforts
clause would result in personal liability for target directors).
349. Significantly, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that both the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty were involved in Revlon, and that both
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B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LOCK-UPS
A much stronger inference, if not a presumption, of self-in-
terest exists when a target board protects a Single Bidder
merger agreement through a lock-up that effectively precludes
competitive bidding. Why would an agent preclude the chance
of a better competing bid for his principals if not for selfish rea-
sons? The directors presumably must feel that a competing
bidder could easily trump the deal they made and that, if
trumped, they and management will not receive the side pay-
ments promised by the favored bidder. True, side payments
may not be present in every lock-up transaction. But it is also
true that not every interested director transaction or taking of
a corporate opportunity involves self-dealing. Just as in the lat-
ter contexts, the greater likelihood of self-dealing associated
with lock-ups justifies more exacting scrutiny of their validity
than was the case with exclusive merger agreements.
Unfortunately, whether a particular lock-up is likely to
elicit or preclude new bids - the current Revlon standard - is
something that can be known with certainty only after the fact.
To avoid this problem, this Article proposes a bright-line stan-
dard dividing bid-preclusive from non-preclusive lock-ups.350
Like exclusivity provisions, courts should give a board's deci-
sion to grant a non-preclusive lock-up the protections of the
business judgment rule. Before enforcing a bid-preclusive lock-
up, however, courts should require the board to comply with an
objective set of prophylactic steps. This objective standard,
along with the bright-line dividing line, will provide directors
with the necessary degree of ex ante certainty. Admittedly,
there is some risk that this standard will be either underinclu-
sive (allowing some bid-preclusive lock-ups to pass muster) or
overinclusive (prohibiting some non-preclusive lock-ups).s15
Gains from enhanced certainty, however, should overcome
these costs. In addition, this approach conserves judicial re-
had been breached. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,
1284 n.34 (Del. 1988). This may presage a greater willingness to allow plain-
tiffs to cast takeover claims generally as duty of loyalty violations, thus avoid-
ing the liability limitations of the new statute.
350. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Contro. A Critical As-
sessment of the Tender Offeror's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 1145, 1264-65 (1984) (discussing desirability of bright-line standards for
takeover defenses).
351. Cf. Erlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaling, 3 J.




sources by substituting an objective standard for the subjective
aspects of the Revlon analysis.
The principal problem is drawing the bright line dividing
bid-preclusive lock-ups from non-preclusive lock-ups. Although
any level is somewhat arbitrary, a threshold of ten percent of
the value of the favored bidder's proposal is a reasonable com-
promise.3 52 Courts have held a lock-up valued at approximately
eight percent of the transaction price did not impede competi-
tive bidding, but that a lock-up valued at approximately seven-
teen percent did deter an auction.353 The ten percent threshold
also corresponds to the federal securities law presumption that
a ten percent shareholder is a controlling person.A4 Finally,
this proposed trigger probably approximates the maximum
number of shares a bidder could reasonably expect to acquire in
the principal alternative to a lock-up - a stock acquisition pro-
gram undertaken before the acquirer discloses its intentions.35
Again, it is worth stressing that however arbitrary this ten per-
cent threshold may appear, and granting that in some cases it
will not capture bid-preclusive lock-ups and in others it will al-
low them, the certainty it (or some comparable level) provides
should ultimately outweigh the risk of under or overinclusive-
ness in a particular acquisition.3 -3
For purposes of the bright-line standard, courts should de-
352. Fifteen percent thresholds, variously measured, also have been sug-
gested by other commentators. See, e.g., SEC ADVISORY COMMrITEE ON
TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 44 (1983), reprinted in [Extra
Ed. No. 1028] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (July 15, 1983) ("requir[ing] that during
a tender offer the issuance of stock representing more than 15% of the fully
diluted shares that would be outstanding after issuance should be subject to
shareholder approval") [hereinafter SEC ADVISORY REPORT]; Johnson &
Siegel, supra note 9, at 409-10 (proposing that stock options be limited to 15%
of the target's outstanding shares and asset options to 15% of its assets). By
using the value of the transaction as its yardstick, this proposal probably ap-
proximates those proposals.
353. Compare Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, slip op. (Del. Ch. July 6, 1982),
reprinted in 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 406, 415 (1983) (lock-up covered one million
shares; offeror proposed to pay $55 per share for a total value of $690 million),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985) (en banc) with Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 372 (6th
Cir. 1981) (lock-up covered 10 million shares; bidder proposed to pay $125 per
share in two-tier offer in which approximately 58.7 million shares would be ac-
quired), cert denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
354. See R. JENNING S & H. MARSH, supra note 34, at 473-74.
355. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
356. Cf. Coffee, supra note 350, at 1265 (noting a similar point with respect
to bright-line rules governing certain takeover defenses). In light of the speci-
ficity of the proposed rule, it may be necessary to adopt it through legislation.
On the other hand, there is precedent for judicial rules of thumb of this sort,
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fine lock-ups as including (1) all cancellation fees paid or to be
paid to the favored bidder, (2) stock options, sales, or other
transactions in which the target corporation issues target shares
to the favored bidder,s57 and (3) asset options or a sale of target
assets to the favored bidder. Courts should calculate the value
of stock lock-up options by the per share price the bidder will
pay target shareholders.-a5 This valuation method obviates the
need to consider the adequacy of the consideration paid for the
option or for the shares issued on exercise of the option.
Courts should likewise measure the value of asset lock-up
options by the appraised fair market value of the assets in
questions 59
such as the control presumption in the securities laws. See supra text accom-
panying note 354.
357. A variety of state takeover laws and corporate takeover defensive tac-
tics can be used in effect as a lock-up by waiving their application with respect
to only one of several competing bidders. See TAKEOVER STATUTES AND
POISON Pis, sup- note 265, at 28-29, 42-43, 937; 1 R. WINT:E?, M. STUMPF &
G. HAWKINS, SHARK REPELLENTS & GOLDEN PARACHUTES § 3.2 at 49-50 (1983
& Supp. 1988). Under current law, a target board's decision to selectively
waive a takeover statute or defense may constitute a breach of the board's fi-
duciary duties. Compare City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc.,
551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch. 1988) (granting preliminary injunction against
poison pill allegedly used to favor target's restructuring plan over competing
tender offer) with Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp.
614, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding board decision to selectively opt out of
takeover statute). While the board should have discretion to use such devices
as a "gavel to run an auction," CRTF Carp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683
F. Supp. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), selective waivers of these devices should be
prohibited where the board does not conduct an auction. Cf. Johnson &
Siegel, supra note 9, at 407-08 (advocating a prohibition on the use of defensive
tactics which deter competing bids).
358. Alternatively, courts could measure the value the bidder places on
stock lock-ups by the difference between the per share exercise price and the
per share price in the bidder's acquisition proposal. Although this approach
appears to more accurately measure the coercive and preclusive effect of a
lock-up, as a practical matter, the difference between the two standards is not
significant. Either valuation approach should suffice so long as the trigger
level is properly set.
359. Valuation of asset lock-ups can be a most difficult issue for the courts.
The risk that the board's financial advisor will place a market value that is too
low on the assets could be countered by judicial appointment of a special
master (perhaps an investment banking firm not associated with either party)
whose evaluation of the fair market value of the assets in question would be
final for purposes of litigation. Cf. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate,
Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983) (providing for appointment of "special
panel" to assess merits of shareholder derivative litigation). This result is ad-
mittedly not perfect. Among other things, it is likely to increase the expense
of litigation. The appointment of a special master, however, has the virtue of
eliminating one of the more difficult litigation issues. It should also encourage
the board's advisers to be conservative in their initial valuation efforts. Fi-
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Under any valuation method, if the target board grants
more than one of the specified arrangements, courts should
combine the value of all the arrangements, including the value
of any arrangements granted to the favored bidder's affiliates,
to determine whether they exceed the trigger level. This com-
bined value requirement is necessary to prevent evasion.- ° For
example, the target otherwise-could grant a lock-up option
slightly below the ten percent trigger level and then further
enhance its deterrent effect by agreeing to a large cancellation
fee.
The next issue is defining the method of review courts
should apply to lock-ups exceeding the threshold. One fre-
quently proposed approach requires prior shareholder approval
of lock-ups.3 1 Proponents of shareholder approval require-
ments often justify this approach with notions of corporate de-
mocracy. Although there is a widely shared belief that
shareholders should make the ultimate decisions about the
company's future,s62 this view is neither universal nor disposi-
tive. An important recent takeover decision stressed the
board's responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation in the course of permitting board actions that a ma-
nally, directors could avoid the uncertainty it produces by relying solely on
stock options or shopping the company before agreeing to an asset option.
360. The combined value approach also obviates any need for assessing the
reasonableness of a cancellation fee standing alone. Professors Johnson and
Siegel, supra note 9, at 409, propose requiring prior shareholder approval of
cancellation fees exceeding "reasonable expenses incurred in negotiations with
the target." I at 410. In light of the problems posed by shareholder apathy
and the difficulty of determining the reasonableness of a fee arrangement, this
Article rejects that approach.
361. This approach recently was adopted by provisions of the British City
Code with respect to defensive lock-ups. PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS,
CrrY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS RuLE 21 (1985). See also SEC ADVI-
SORY REPORT, supra note 352, at 44 (during a tender offer, issuance of stock
representing more than 15% of the fully diluted outstanding shares should be
subject to shareholder approval); R. GInsON, supra note 92, at 844-47 (share-
holder approval of lock-ups proposed); Coffee, supra note 350, at 1261 (sug-
gesting that stock exchange shareholder approval requirement for certain
stock lock-ups be extended to asset lock-ups); Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9,
at 409-13 (advocating prohibiting lock-ups unless the agreement or transaction
receives prior approval by target shareholders; "Lock-Ups" are defined as (1)
stock options or sales resulting in more than a 15% increase in outstanding tar-
get voting shares or (2) sales or agreements to sell more than 15% of the tar-
get's assets).
362. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 276-
77 (2d Cir. 1986) (ultimate decision for shareholders); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney,
Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1984) (same); AC Acquisition Corp. v. An-
derson Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112-15 (Del. Ch. 1986) (same).
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jority of the shareholders probably opposed. As the Delaware
Chancery Court emphasized:
The corporation law does not operate on the theory that directors, in
exercising their powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow
the wishes of a majority of shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders,
are charged with the duty to manage the firm.... That many,. pre-
sumably most, shareholders would prefer the board to do otherwise
than it has done does not, in the circumstances of a challenge to this
type of transaction, in my opinion, afford a basis to interfere with the
effectuation of the board's business judgment.363
A more sophisticated argument in favor of a shareholder
approval requirement is that shareholder approval provides a
necessary constraint on management.3 4 This argument also is
flawed. When a competing bid does not emerge, rational share-
holder apathy prevents shareholder approval from providing an
effective constraint on board misconduct. Moreover, the signifi-
cant costs related to shareholder approval would more than
outweigh any limited benefit that did result. Although share-
holders could approve lock-ups at the same time as the merger
agreement, this approval method would wholly eliminate their
utility. Mandating shareholder approval of lock-ups thus effec-
tively requires two shareholder meetings, one to approve the
lock-up provisions and a later one to approve the underlying
merger. The considerable cost and time required to prepare
and conduct a proxy solicitation means that the double meeting
requirement effectively prohibits the use of lock-ups, especially
in time sensitive acquisitions.3 Proponents of shareholder ap-
proval requirements might just as well convert this de facto
ban into a de jure prohibition of lock-ups, as the end result is
likely to be the same.
Consistent with this Article's general thesis that market
forces most effectively constrain conflicts of interest in the ac-
quisition setting, this part argues that an ex ante control auc-
tion would provide a more effective check on management's
conduct. If the board wishes to grant a lock-up exceeding the
ten percent trigger, courts should require the board to volunta-
363. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,284 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). See also In re TW Services, Inc. Shareholders Litig.,
[1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,180 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (same).
364. E.g., Johnson & Siegel, supra note 9, at 411-13 (discussing the possible
results and consequences of permitting only shareholder approved lock-up
fees).
365. I at 413.
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
rily shop the company among other bidders before agreeing to
the lock-up. If the target board conducts a fair auction, a
preclusive lock-up becomes unobjectionable, as it is now un-
likely that the favored bidder prevailed because of side pay-
ments to management. Indeed, a preclusive lock-up may prove
beneficial if granted at the end of a fair voluntary auction.3s
Among other things, target managers may be able to extract a
higher price or better terms in return for the greater certainty
offered by lock-ups. If the target board refuses to conduct a
voluntary control auction before entering into lock-up provi-
sions that exceed the ten percent trigger, however, courts
should invalidate the provisions.
The remaining problem is to define the standards by which
courts should review the auction's adequacy. Several Delaware
decisions imply that courts will review control auction proce-
dures under the business judgment rule.37 A traditional busi-
ness judgment rule analysis, however, would create
considerable opportunities for abuse because it effectively al-
lows virtually unconstrained directorial power to conduct the
auction. The board could, for example, abdicate its role by del-
egating responsibility for designing and executing the auction
to self-interested insiders who may clandestinely skew the pro-
cess in favor of one bidder.3s  Alternatively, the board itself
might conduct merely a pro forma auction. In either case,
"given the human temptations left unchecked," 69 the salutary
effects of competitive bidding would be lost.
The inherent risk that target insiders may principally pur-
sue their own self-interest calls for strict judicial examination
before courts give deference to the directors' ultimate decision.
As in Unoca,3 70 the board should have the initial burden of
proving that the auction process adopted was fair and
366. E.g., Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575-77 (11th
Cir. 1988) (board granted an asset lock-up to offeror whose offer was $16 per
share higher as a result of the auction).
367. E.g., TCG Securities, Inc. v. Southern Union Co., [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,928, at 95,217 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1990); In
re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,710-15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989), appeal refused,
556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., [1987-1988 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,660, at 98,034 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988).
368. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281-82
(Del. 1989) (defendant's board of directors delegated responsibilities for over-
seeing sale of corporate control to selected corporate representatives who
tipped the process in favor of one bidder).
369. Id- at 1281.
370. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
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reasonable.3 71
The target board should begin by making full public disclo-
sure of the proposed transaction to assure that the market is
fully informed that the target is for sale. The quality and tim-
ing of the disclosure should create a reasonable probability of
notice to parties having sufficient sophistication and resources
to bid.3 2 Retaining an investment banker or broker to solicit
bids from potential acquirers is a common and effective means
of generating offers.37s Because of the additional costs of using
a finder, however, the target board need not use this approach.
At a minimum, however, the target board should demonstrate
that the relevant players in the industry, especially entities pre-
viously expressing interest, were aware of its willingness to en-
tertain offers.3 74
The target board also should provide responsible entities
who express an interest in the target with relevant information
concerning the corporation.3 75 When one bidder in an active
371. Although the reasonableness of the auction process depends on the
unique facts of each case, courts should establish clear standards defining a
fair auction and assure directors that compliance with these specified stan-
dards will validate their decisions. The guidelines proposed herein are based
in large part on the American Law Institute's tentative rules governing MBO
transactions. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: Draft No. 9, supra note 112,
§ 5.15. Although § 5.15 does not expressly address exclusivity provisions, they
provide a workable framework from which to develop appropriate standards.
For a general discussion of various current auction techniques, see Atkins,
"Auction" Law and Practice in Unsolicited Takeovers (and in Other Corporate
Control Tran.fer Cases), in MERGERS & ACQuISITIONs: TODAY'S STRATEGIES
AND TECHNIQUES 131 (1989).
This Article adopts the commentary to § 5.15's proposal that target share-
holders should not be limited to an appraisal remedy when challenging exclu-
sivity provisions. See id. at § 8. Rather, a variety of alternative remedies
should be available, including enjoining the transaction or the provision in
question, rescinding the transaction or damages from the directors who ap-
proved the transaction in violation of their duties.
372. See CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE: Draft No. 9, supra note 112, at 10.
373. E.g., Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1137 (D. Or.
1984) (broker "had a real motive to market the stock with a substantial com-
mission as a reward"). See generally Dwyer & Garner, Finding More than a
Finder, in M. ROCK, supra note 2, at 127 (noting brokers often retained to so-
licit bids); Herz, Broker and Finder Agreements, in M. RocK, supra note 2, at
135 (same).
374. See Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,660, at 98,034 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 1988).
375. In Mills, the Delaware Supreme Court set forth the following non-ex-
clusive list of factors for "assessing the bid and the bidder's responsibility":
the adequacy and terms of the offer, its fairness and feasibility; the
proposed or actual financing for the offer, and the consequences of
that financing, questions of illegality; the impact of both the bid and
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auction receives preferential access to information, it obtains a
significant competitive advantage which may irretrievably skew
the bidding in its favor. Equal access to information is particu-
larly essential when a management buyout (MBO) group is one
of the bidders, because management's inside position gives it
significant informational advantagessTG On the other hand, the
target board can legitimately withhold information from a bid-
der if disclosure of proprietary information would injure the
corporation's business and the bidder refuses to sign a confiden-
tiality agreement.3 77
After giving remaining bidders a reasonable opportunity to
submit proposals, the target's representatives should begin ne-
gotiating with each of the serious contenders. Good faith nego-
tiations with each of the competing bidders is a critical element
in showing that management did not improperly skew the pro-
cess.s78 Prompt and detailed negotiations also help the direc-
tors satisfy their duty of due care because the target's
negotiating representatives can present to the board a more or
less final merger agreement and full information relating to
each offer.
The target board should have reasonable discretion over
the potential acquisition on other constituencies, provided it bears
some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests; the
risk of non-consummation; the basic stockholder interests at stake;
the bidder's identity, prior background and other business venture ex-
periences; and the bidder's business plans for the corporation and
their effects on stockholder interests.
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 (Del. 1989).
376. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: Draft No. 9, supra note 112, at 5-6. In
voluntary auctions, it has become common practice for prospective bidders to
be given an offering document describing the target and offered a limited op-
portunity to meet with target management and conduct due diligence reviews
before submitting their bid. Once the firm or its investment banking firm
identifies several serious bidders, the surviving potential buyers are given an
opportunity for more detailed due diligence review. See A. MICHEL & I.
SHAKED, supra note 18, at 174-77; S. REED, supra note 14, at 447-83; Grafer &
Baldasaro, Effective Due Diligence, in M. ROCK, supra note 2, at 271-80.
377. E.g., Samijens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614,
625 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770,
784 (Del. Ch. 1988); In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip
op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988), appeal refused, 547 A.2d 633 (Del. 1988). An appro-
priate confidentiality agreement would require the bidder to keep non-public
information confidential and to refrain from using the information for any
purpose other than making a takeover proposal. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRTNCIPLES: Draft No. 9, supra note 112, at 11.
378. Compare Mills, 559 A.2d at 1281 with Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land
Corp., No. 8486, slip op. (Del. Ch. May 19, 1986), reprinted in 12 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 282, 289-90 (1987).
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the number of bidding and negotiating rounds.3 79 As under
Revlon, the board also should have discretion to consider fac-
tors other than mere price in deciding which bid to accept. An
all cash offer, for example, may be preferable to a nominally
higher bid in which a significant part of the consideration in-
volves high-risk securities. As is customary with mergers of
public corporations, the target board should obtain an opinion
from an independent financial adviser that the chosen offer is
fair and adequate~sc
Of course, the board must obtain shareholder approval of
the merger with the favored bidder in accordance with the ap-
plicable statute. In doing so, the board should fully disclose any
employment agreements or other arrangements between the
incumbent officers, the disinterested directors, and the prevail-
ing bidder.3 1- The board also should disclose auction proce-
dures used and the results obtained 382 In addition, if an MBO
group is the prevailing bidder, a majority of the disinterested
directors and a majority of the disinterested shareholders
should approve the transaction to further minimi e the risk of
abuse.
If the board fails to comply with these standards in con-
ducting the control auction, the court should invalidate the
lock-up provisions. On the other hand, if the board complies
with these standards, its decision to accept one of the compet-
ing bids and to enter into a lock-up with the prevailing bidder is
entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule. The
process of obtaining competing bids has adequately dealt with
the risk of self-dealing by management. Accordingly, the bur-
den then shifts back to the plaintiff, whether shareholder or
competing bidder, to show a breach of the directors' fiduciary
379. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,194, at 91,714-15 (Del. Ch. Jan 31, 1989), appeal
refused, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989).
380. For a critique of fairness opinions in control transactions, see gener-
ally Bebchuk & Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What
Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27.
381. Cf Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1144-46 (D. Or.
1984) (federal proxy rules not violated where all conflicts of interest fully
disclosed).
382. This parallels a proposal the SEC is currently considering in connec-
tion with MBO transactions. 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 656 (May 5, 1989).
In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1990] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 95,489, at 97,560 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 1990), holds that shareholder
approval of a challenged merger is a complete defense to a Revlon-based cause
of action. In light of this Article's position on shareholder voting, the proposal
does not adopt this view.
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duties. If the plaintiff fails to rebut the business judgment rule,
the court should enforce the lock-up, even if the shareholders
have not yet approved the merger. On the other hand, if the
plaintiff successfully rebuts the business judgment rule, the
court should invalidate the lock-up provision, just as it would if
the board had declined to conduct an auction in the first place
or had failed to carry its initial burden of proof.
C. SUMMARY
The approach proposed by this Article has several advan-
tages. By applying traditional business judgment rule standards
to performance promises, cancellation fees, and lock-ups falling
below the ten percent trigger level, it avoids the need for judi-
cial review of the merits of the board's decision (something
courts have long eschewed), as well as the need for subjective
evaluation of the board's motives (something which is difficult
in any context). Instead, judicial review can focus on the rela-
tively objective duty of care standard: Did the target board
jump through the proper hoops to reach an informed decision
that is within the limits of its authority? On the other side of
the ten percent threshold, the mandated control auction pre-
serves the significant and essential check on management dis-
cretion provided by competing bidders. Moreover, the control
auction approach allows the target board to grant lock-ups ex-
ceeding the ten percent threshold where appropriate. If the di-
rectors wish to do so, they need merely conduct a voluntary
control auction subject to judicial review of their procedures.
The auction process should adequately defuse the conflict of in-
terest that would otherwise require invalidation of the lock-up.
V. CONCLUSION
All duty-based arguments ultimately are "circular: the law
finds a duty not to act when an underlying analysis suggests the
activity should be banned."" Or, as Justice Frankfurter wrote
in another context, "to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a
fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In
what respect has he failed to discharge those obligations?"' s 4
383. Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibit"ion A Legal and Economic
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 56 (1986).
384. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
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Present law has largely failed to answer those questions with
respect to exclusivity provisions and lock-ups.
Analysis must begin with a recognition that there is a po-
tential conflict of interest in all negotiated acquisitions. Bidders
may not offer side payments in every transaction, and if they
do, the offer of side payments may not consciously affect man-
agement's decision. But the potential for a conflict of interest
is simply too great for courts to ignore.
Unfortunately, the Great Western, Jewel, and Van Gorkom
approaches essentially do just that. Revlon at least has the vir-
tue of addressing the conflict of interest problem. The Revlon
solution of a mandatory control auction in which both exclusiv-
ity provisions and lock-up options are viewed with deep suspi-
cion, however, is not an appropriate solution for negotiated
mergers. Revlon would severely restrict the board's ability to
utilize not only lock-ups, but also performance promises and
cancellation fees. Performance promises and cancellation fees,
however, are essentially unobjectionable in the Single Bidder
context. They simply do not affect the viability of competitive
bidding as a constraint on management's conflict of interest be-
cause the second bidder is always free to bypass the exclusive
merger agreement by making a tender offer directly to the tar-
get's shareholders. At the same time, performance promises
and cancellation fees provide substantial benefits to the target
and its shareholders. Accordingly, courts should routinely en-
force them.
In contrast, effective lock-ups must be viewed with greater
suspicion. The practical effect of an effective lock-up is to pre-
clude meaningful competitive bidding and thereby eliminate
the most potent constraint on management's conflict of inter-
est. As a result, Time went too far in permitting managers to
protect acquisitions from competition.
Preserving the viability of competitive bidding in negoti-
ated acquisitions, however, does not require that management
affirmatively auction the company among competing bidders in
all cases. It merely requires that management not take any
steps that are likely to preclude a rational potential acquirer
from entering the bidding. The analytical framework proposed
by this Article therefore permits a target board to bypass the
auction process when granting exclusivity provisions that do
not preclude competing bids and are likely to be socially desira-
ble or at least unobjectionable. On the other hand, the proposal
does not allow a board to grant bid-preclusive lock-up provi-
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sions if the board does not first undertake a voluntary ex ante
auction. This proposal thus optimally constrains the inherent
risk of self-dealing by management.
